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ABSTRACT
News are the direct channel through which most investors learn about fundamental
changes, hence news publishing should have a large impact on asset pricing. However,
current literature mostly focuses on the sentiment contained by news and how would it
affect investors behavior. The objective of this dissertation, instead, is to study the funda-
mental information about links between assets that is disclosed in news. Moreover, in an
equilibrium where investors delegate their information choices to news editors, the partial
coverage decisions on such information can unveil the current economy condition and the
co-movement between assets.
Chapter 2 shows that the business news is a rich source of data on distressed firm links
that drive firm-level and aggregate risks. The news tends to report about links in which a
less popular firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular firm. This constitutes
a contagion channel that yields predictable returns and downgrades. Shocks to the degree
of news-implied firm connectivity predict increases in aggregate volatilities, credit spreads,
and default rates, and declines in output.
v
Chapter 3 further shows that peer linkages instead can be found in news on cryp-
tocurrencies. Such linkages induce significant price co-movement in crypto markets in
excess of common risk factors and correlated demand shocks. When large abnormal return
shocks hit one crypto, its peers experience unusually large abnormal returns of the opposite
sign. These effects are primarily concentrated among smaller peers and revert after several
weeks, resulting in predictable returns. Trading strategies can be developed to exploit this
reversal, and they are significantly profitable even after accounting for trading frictions.
Chapter 4 on the other hand suggests that news editors have state-dependent prefer-
ences for different types of firms. Moreover, firms with high editor preference earn higher
returns than those with low preferences, on average. This is consistent with the theory
positing that if investors delegate their information selection to news editors, the state-
dependent coverage decisions signal risky features and hence covered firms require more
risk compensation. The annualized excess return of around 12% due to coverage cannot
be explained by standard risk factors. This excess is also present among non-covered firms
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iosyncratic volatility, and “MC” for log market capitalization. Standard
errors are clustered by event week and industry. The values in parentheses
give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and
95% confidence levels, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
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3.13 Difference-in-difference panel regressions of abnormal returns, volatility,
log trading volume, and the log number of mentions in the news in the
weeks surrounding a large positive shock. We estimate models of the type
(3.3). All regressions include crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date in-
teracted fixed effects. All regressors except the indicators and log market
capitalization are standardized at the crypto-level using the rolling prior
60-day means and variances. We remove the top and bottom 1% cross-
sectional observations for each time series prior to running the regressions
to ensure robustness. Standard errors are clustered by event week and in-
dustry. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote
significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence levels, respectively. . 94
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3.14 Performance metrics for event-based trading strategies that exploit the pre-
dictability documented in Figure 3·10. Each week, we short-sell cryptos
that are peers of a crypto that is shocked, and go long on Bitcoin. We
short-sell on margin only those peer cryptos that have smaller market cap-
italizations than shocked cryptos. We hold the positions open for several
weeks (the holding period). All short positions are equally weighted. If
the strategy keeps a position open for H weeks, then each week the strat-
egy only invests a fraction of 1/(H + 1) of the available wealth into new
short positions. The long positions are of an equivalent amount to keep the
strategy market neutral. Returns are computed as follows. Each week, we
compute the P&L of the short positions that are closed on that week. We
then compute the return in that week as the ratio of the P&L with respect to
the terminal wealth of the prior week. We subtract from the returns the fol-
lowing fees: A 50 bp bid-ask spread for each transaction, a 2 bp point fee
to open a short position, and a 84 bp fee to keep a short position open for
a week. In total, if a short position is held open for H weeks, then we as-
sume a fee of 50 + 2 + 84H bp. The alpha, average return, and volatility are
measured on a weekly scale while the Sharpe ratio is annualized. The betas
are computed with respect to a 3-factor model that includes market, size,
and momentum factors as used by (Liu et al., 2019). The construction of
the market, size, and momentum factors is described in Section 3.2.2. The
values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance
on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence levels, respectively. . . . . . . . . 97
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3.15 Performance metrics for event-based trading strategies that exploit the pre-
dictability documented in Figure 3·10. Each week, we short-sell cryptos
that are peers of a crypto that is shocked, and go long on Bitcoin. We short-
sell on margin only those peers that have smaller market capitalizations
than shocked cryptos and are available for margin trading with a USD ac-
count on Kraken (Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Cardano, Chainlink, Dash, EOS,
Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Litecoin, Monero, XRP, Tezos, and Tron).
We hold the positions open for several weeks (the holding period). All short
positions are equally weighted. If the strategy keeps a position open for H
weeks, then each week the strategy only invests a fraction of 1/(H +1) of
the available wealth into new short positions. The long positions are of an
equivalent amount to keep the strategy market neutral. Returns are com-
puted as follows. Each week, we compute the P&L of the short positions
that are closed on that week. We then compute the return in that week as
the ratio of the P&L with respect to the terminal wealth of the prior week.
We subtract from the returns the following fees: A 50 bp bid-ask spread
for each transaction, a 2 bp point fee to open a short position, and a 84 bp
fee to keep a short position open for a week. In total, if a short position is
held open for H weeks, then we assume a fee of 50 + 2 + 84H bp. The
alpha, average return, and volatility are measured on a weekly scale while
the Sharpe ratio is annualized. The betas are computed with respect to a
3-factor model that includes market, size, and momentum factors as used
by (Liu et al., 2019). The construction of the market, size, and momen-
tum factors is described in Section 3.2.2. The values in parentheses give
t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95%
confidence levels, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
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1997) (Mom), and the betting-against-beta factor in (Frazzini and Peder-
sen, 2014) (BAB). Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial
autocorrelation using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months. . . . 126
xxvi
4.4 Results of t-tests for the time series of the 8 long-short portfolios that are
sorted on each feature alone, adjusted using (Newey and West, 1987) with
a lag of 3 months. The sample period is February 1995 to January 2016.
The sample includes the 500 largest firms and is updated every month. . . . 127
4.5 Results of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. De-
pendent variables are the return differences between different high static
editor preference portfolios and low static editor preference portfolios among
the 500 largest firms, or their excess returns with respect to the 3-month
Treasury bill. In Panel (b), I do not distinguish between covered firms and
non-covered firms. Independent variables are common factors including
the Fama-French 3 factors in (Fama and French, 1993) (Mkt-RF, SMB,
HML), the momentum factor in (Carhart, 1997) (Mom), and the betting-
against-beta factor in (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) (BAB). Standard er-
rors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey
and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xxvii
4.6 Alphas of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. De-
pendent variables are the return differences between different portfolios
among 500 largest firms, or their excess returns with respect to the 3-month
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4.9 Alphas of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. De-
pendent variables are return differences between different portfolios among
N largest firms, or their excess returns to the 3-month Treasury bill. In ev-
ery month, I estimate the coefficients in Regression (4.1) using the 500
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95% confidence bands computed via bootstrap with 1000 bootstrap sam-
ples. We consider one-standard deviation shocks to the orthogonal com-
ponent of the impulse variable. We base our identification on a Cholesky
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Most rational investors learn about fundamental changes through price changes in the mar-
ket and/or through events reported in the news, while the latter one is obviously a more
direct channel. On one hand, to fulfill such demands news outlets are motivated to gather
comprehensive and timely information which investors care about. On the other hand by di-
recting investors limited attentions, the coverage decisions can affect investors perspective
of the economy and hence the asset prices at equilibrium. Such two-sided role that news
play make it an ideal alternative data source to study some important economics topics,
which can be more challenging to analyze with traditional data.
One major implementation of news data, as documented in Chapter 2, is to study link-
ages between firm through which risks are spread.1 As shown in (Azizpour et al., 2018),
(Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), (Jorion and Zhang, 2009), (Herskovic et al., 2020) and oth-
ers, the network structure of business linkages between firms is an essential factor that
drives aggregate outcomes, including asset prices, volatilities and real output. However,
due to the complicated nature of these business linkages, data access to the networks is
either limited or lagged. Making related risk management decisions or policy decisions
based on such data is hardly applicable. Nevertheless, we show that the news is a rich
source of information about distressed firm links that drive firm-level and aggregate risks.
More specifically, we find that the news tends to report about links in which a less popular
firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular firm. These links suggest potential
1Chapter 2 is based on my co-authored paper (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019). Some contents of the paper
are also incorporated into the introductory and conclusive chapters.
2
contagion path and hence predict stock returns and credit downgrades. Furthermore, we
show that measures of connectivity in the news-implied firm network predict short-term in-
creases in aggregate volatilities and bond spreads, as well as persistent increases in default
activity and declines in output. We also find that these measures are highly correlated with
corresponding risk indexes that are at lower frequency or are more lagged. Besides, in our
tests the documented prediction power on aggregated risks cannot be matched by alterna-
tive firm networks. Combined results emphasize the value of news data in providing timely
and comprehensive fundamental information and its advantages in assisting practical risk
management.
In order to identify firm linkages, we develop a methodology using open source NLP
toolkit to recognize any mention of firms in news articles, which also builds the data foun-
dation for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.2 After recognition, we assume two firms are linked in
an economic sense if they are co-mentioned in the same sentence. The higher frequency
of appearance in news suggests a stronger strength of a link. We then either apply logistic
regression (Chapter 2) or more sophisticated NLP-based labeling (Chapter 3) to identify
the nature of these raw linkages.
In Chapter 3, we further study the competition effect that dominates through peer link-
ages between cryptocurrencies.3 Unlike firms which share business relationships in an
economy, the nature of cryptocurrencies makes the co-movement between them less intu-
itive. The literature has posited two channels that explain the co-movement of cryptocur-
rencies: common risk factors driving the pricing of the cross section of cryptocurrencies
(see (Liu and Tsyvinski, 2020), (Liu et al., 2019), and others) and correlated demand shocks
among cryptos that are co-listed in an exchange posited by (Shams, 2020). After we iden-
tify peer linkages from the news on cryptos using a pre-trained BERT model, we find strong
evidence that the co-movement between crypto peers aligns with a competition effect that is
2All relative codes are written in R and can be downloaded at https://github.com/zhenghannan.
3Chapter 3 is based on my co-authored paper (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2020). Some contents of the paper
are also incorporated into the introductory and conclusive chapters.
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also present in traditional financial markets. In other words, when a crypto receives an neg-
ative idiosyncratic shock in a given week, we observe positive shocks to its news-implied
peers even though the fundamentals do not change. Similar to Chapter 2, we do not see
any significant pattern when construct alternative networks using traditional approaches.
Lastly, such competition effect yields return predictability in crypto markets, especially
among smaller cryptos where information processing is slower. Trading strategies that ex-
ploit this mean-reverting behavior earns significant alphas with high Sharpe ratios, and is
robust to very conservative market frictions.
Finally, Chapter 4 shows how news coverage decisions themselves can signal the cur-
rent state of economy and affect risk compensations in financial markets. (Nimark and
Pitschner, 2019) and (Chahrour et al., 2019) posit that if state-dependent news editors be-
lieve riskier firms are more newsworthy, then firms more covered in news should be re-
quired higher returns by investors if they are aware of the mechanism behind editors. In
Chapter 4, we firstly develop a methodology to estimate editor preference, even for firms
that are never covered in our news data. And then we show robust empirical evidence that
support this channel. More specifically, we find that firms with higher editor preferences
earn significant higher returns in next periods than others. This return difference can not
be explained by mainstream risk factors and potential sentiment contained in news. More
importantly, the return difference is not, and should not be, limited to only covered firms,
which separates our findings from other literature that studies investors attentions. Never-
theless, we also find that the return difference is more short-lived than other fundamental-
based risk factors. The corresponding alphas shrink to half of their original sizes after one
year, and extending news formation periods does not help much. This suggests the myopia
of news editors, who only monitor and report short-term risks for their target readers.
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Chapter 2
The Network of Firms Implied by the News
2.1 Introduction
Recent research shows that the network of business linkages across firms is a key determi-
nant of firm-level risks and aggregate outcomes. (Azizpour et al., 2018), (Cohen and Frazz-
ini, 2008), (Jorion and Zhang, 2009), (Herskovic et al., 2020) and others show that firm
links facilitate the contagion of risks across firms, affecting asset prices, volatilities, and
default probabilities. (Acemoglu et al., 2012), (Carvalho, 2010), (Gabaix, 2011), and (Her-
skovic, 2018) show that the architecture of the network of firm links determines whether
idiosyncratic shocks are amplified to aggregate shocks in the broader economy. In spite
of the demonstrated importance of the network of firm links for risk measurement, data
access is notoriously limited. Often, only incomplete and lagged data are available. The
unavailability of extensive and timely firm network data hinders the precise measurement
of risks that drive economic outcomes.
We show that the news is a rich source of information about distressed firm links that
drive firm-level and aggregate risks. We develop a machine learning methodology that takes
news data as an input and outputs a network of firm connections implied by the news. Our
news-implied networks include a vast majority of the links recorded in currently available
data sets. In contrast to the currently available networks, however, news-implied networks
capture a wider range of firms and links, and are available in high frequencies. Consis-
tent with a reader demand consideration mechanism, we find that the news tends to report
about links in which a less popular firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular
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firm. These links enable contagion effects that yield predictable stock returns and credit
downgrades. On an aggregate level, we show that news-implied firm networks capture in-
formation about contagion and uncertainty effects that drive aggregate outcomes. We find
that measures of connectivity in the news-implied firm network predict short-term increases
in aggregate volatilities and bond spreads, as well as persistent increases in default activity
and declines in output. Our methodology and data are freely available for download, facil-
itating the use of news-implied firm networks for empirical work. All in one, the results of
this paper enable the estimation of accurate measures of firm-level and aggregate risks.
We analyze an extensive data set containing over 100,000 financial news articles pub-
lished by Reuters between 2006 and 2013. In order to understand the informational content
of the news, we develop a machine learning methodology that takes text data as an input
and outputs a network of firm links implied by the data.1 We exploit novel natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) tools to identify the names of corporations in text data.2 NLP is
commonly used to estimate the sentiment of media content – that is, whether the media ex-
presses negative or positive opinions – and how sentiment affects asset prices and macroe-
conomic factors; see (Baker et al., 2012), (Beber et al., 2015), (Chen et al., 2014), (Da
et al., 2015), (Das and Chen, 2007), (Engelberg et al., 2012), (García, 2013), (Jegadeesh
and Wu, 2013), (Ke et al., 2019), (Tetlock, 2007), and (Shen et al., 2017), among others.
The application of NLP for sentiment analysis is a univariate exercise: It extracts from a
large dimensional text data set an aggregate measure of sentiment. In contrast, we extract
bivariate signals from text data. Our methodology identifies two firms that are connected
to each other and assesses how strong this relationship is. Our identifying assumption is
that if two firms share a business connection, then the news should report about this link in
an article by mentioning the two firms in the same sentence.3 The stronger the relationship
1All codes have been written in R and are available for download at https://github.com/
zhenghannan.
2NLP has become increasingly popular in economics research; see (Engle et al., 2020) and (Jelveh et al.,
) for recent applications of NLP for the analysis of climate change and the influence of political partisanship.
3We show in the Appendix that the majority of the economically relevant information about firm links is
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is, the more often should the news report about this relationship in different articles.
Our NLP methodology identifies about 3,000 firms from the CRSP / Compustat uni-
verse in our news data, together with over 20,000 distinct firm links. Our approach is highly
accurate, correctly identifying more than 70% of all firms mentioned in the text data. We
capture a majority of the links implied by the Compustat segments data (customer-supplier
links), the 10-K similarity scores of (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) (peer links), the EDGAR
co-search measures of (Lee et al., 2015) (peer links), and the covariance structure of firms’
stock returns (correlation links). We also capture strategic partnerships, intra and inter-
sectoral competitive links, as well as credit, financing, banking, and subsidiary relations.
The network of firms implied by our news data showcases a core consisting of large banks
that are strongly interconnected and several smaller banks that are connected to the larger
banks, making up a core-periphery structure for the financial sector. Core-periphery struc-
tures are often identified in empirical and theoretical studies of interbank networks; see
(Babus and Hu, 2017), (Farboodi, 2014), and (Gofman, 2017). There are several clusters
of non-financial firms surrounding the financial firms, delivering a star architecture for the
broader network of firms as in (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Turning to the dynamic evolution
of the network over time, we find that some sectors become more or less prominent over
time but the financial sector remains central and strongly connected.4 These observations
are consistent with the centrality of the financial sector highlighted by (Bernanke et al.,
1999) and (Carvalho and Gabaix, 2013).
Our first set of results shows that demand-side considerations incite the news to report
about firm links that actively transmit risks across firms and lead to contagion. These
results highlight the news as a primary data source to identify distressed firm links. Logit
regressions reveal that the news is more likely to report about a firm link when one of the
linked firms experiences negative stock returns, high volatility, credit downgrades, negative
communicated in individual sentences rather than across sentences of a news article, validating our approach.
4The monthly series of news-implied networks can be downloaded at http://www.
gustavo-schwenkler.com.
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net income, or downward revisions by earnings analysts. We find that the likelihood of
observing a firm link in the news is primarily driven by whether the less popular linked
firm experiences financial distress in the form of negative stock returns, credit downgrades,
or downward earnings estimate revisions. Our results suggest that the link likelihood is
higher if the less popular linked firm experiences distress, but it is not higher if the more
popular linked firm does. We establish these results controlling for firm characteristics and
market conditions with time, firm, or link fixed effects, regardless of whether we proxy
popularity by the market capitalization or the number of institutional investors of a firm.
These findings are highly robust. They hold when we consider the 3,000 most frequently
identified links in the data, suggesting that this is a pervasive phenomenon. They also hold
when we only consider the links among the 500 largest firms in our data, suggesting that
our results are not driven by the fact that there are more small firms in the economy. Finally,
our results also hold when we exclude data recorded during the financial crisis, indicating
that our results are not driven by this unique period in our sample.
Our data imply that the smaller linked firm is in distress at the time the link is reported
and its health continues to deteriorate in the 6 months after. Even though the larger linked
firm does not clearly experience distress at the time the link is reported, it accrues sig-
nificantly negative stock returns in the months post link. Its credit rating also significantly
drops after being linked with a smaller distressed firm in the news. The effects for the larger
firm are transient and dissipate after four months. These results are consistent with a con-
tagion channel through which investors slowly learn about the larger firm’s exposure to the
smaller distressed firm and adjust their trading behavior, which results in predictability in
the asset prices of the larger firm.5 A counterfactual simulation study shows that our results
5That predictability can arise as a result of slow information diffusion across economically linked firms
was established by (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). Our results do not contradict alternative findings about lead-
lag relationships in equity markets that show that information tends to flow from large to small firms (see
(Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) and (Hou, 2007)). Instead, we show that the news reports about links in which
information flows from a smaller to a larger firm.
8
are not driven by the fact that the news tends to report about firms that experience negative
shocks, as was recently established by (Niessner and So, 2018). Instead, we find that the
news choses to report about links that actively transmit risks across firms. Our findings are
consistent with a mechanism advocated by (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) and (García,
2014) that posits that demand-side considerations incite the news to report about adverse
shocks that affect the health of popular firms. They extend the results of (Scherbina and
Schlusche, 2016) by showing that the news is not an unbiased source of information about
firm links.6
Our next set of results shows that the information contained in news-implied firm net-
works is highly predictive of aggregate outcomes. Following (Acemoglu et al., 2012) and
(Herskovic, 2018), who theoretically show that the degree of connectivity in economic
networks is a key driver of aggregate risks, we compute several measures of connectivity
in the news-implied firm network: An average degree measure that is proportional to the
number of links reported in the news in a given month, a first-order interconnectivity mea-
sure that states whether the monthly network is more centralized or more dispersed, and a
second-order interconnectivity measure that captures whether clusters of firms are strongly
or weakly connected to each other through intermediate firms. All three connectivity mea-
sures spike during recessions and are mostly unrelated to the sentiment of the news articles
from which we extract our networks. However, their influence on aggregate risk measures
is quite different. We consider a monthly vector autoregressive model of the three connec-
tivity measures together with the return of the S&P 500 index, the VIX, the level and slope
of the Treasury yield curve, the AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, the GDP growth
rate, and the aggregate default rate among U.S. corporations. Impulse response functions
show that orthogonal shocks to our average degree measure trigger short-run increases in
the VIX and the corporate credit spreads that remain significant for up to three months.7 In
6(Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) show that selective news reporting is an equilibrium outcome when agents
have attention constraints and delegate the collection of information to news outlets.
7Our identification strategy is based on a Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance
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contrast, orthogonal shocks to the second-order interconnectivity measure trigger signifi-
cant increases in the aggregate default rate and significant declines in the GDP growth rate
that can persist for 12 or more months.
The different impacts of shocks to average degree and second-order interconnectivity
are due to the different informational content of these measures. We find that the average
degree of the news-implied network is closely related to the financial uncertainty measures
of (Baker et al., 2019), (Carriero et al., 2018), and (Jurado et al., 2015). This suggests that
the average degree captures information about financial uncertainty that drives short-term
fluctuations in risk premia. On the other hand, the second-order interconnectivity measure
is closely related to a measure of credit risk contagion introduced by (Azizpour et al., 2018).
This observation suggests that the second-order interconnectivity measure captures infor-
mation about contagion effects that drive aggregate credit risk in the economy. Consistent
with the theoretical models of (Acemoglu et al., 2012) and (Herskovic, 2018), our results
show that connectivity in the news-implied network is related to measures of aggregate
risks and is predictive of adverse aggregate outcomes. Our findings support a mechanism
proposed by (Chahrour et al., 2019) that posits that information disseminated in the news
can trigger aggregate shocks when firms are constrained and outsource the monitoring of
their production networks to news publishers. They align with the results of (Manela and
Moreira, 2017) and (Liu and Matthies, 2018), who in different settings also show that in-
formation contained in the news can be used to forecasts aggregate risks.
Finally, we show that news-implied firm networks capture information that is not con-
tained in alternative networks. We consider a customer-supplier network extracted from
Compustat’s segments data, a firm similarity network extracted from the the 10-K textual
similarity scores of (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016), a peer network proposed by (Lee et al.,
2015) that is implied by the frequency with which users look up two firms within a short
period of time on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data-Gathering,
matrix.
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Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) website, and a network implied by a variance decom-
position for firms’ stock returns as proposed by (Demirer et al., 2018). Regressions sug-
gest that the connectivity measures of our news-implied network are negatively related to
the connectivity measures of the firm similarity network implied by (Hoberg and Phillips,
2016). Still, the R2 are low. Compared to the connectivity measures of the alternative
networks, we find that the connectivity measures of our news-implied network are better
predictors of the levels of the VIX, the corporate credit spreads, as well as the growth
rates of the S&P 500 Index and GDP at the monthly horizon. These findings highlight the
prominent nature of news data to identify firm networks that are predictive of aggregate
outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our data and
methodology and Section 2.3 summarizes the methodology’s output. Section 2.4 describes
the estimated networks. Sections 2.5 through 2.7 present our empirical results. Section 2.8
concludes. There is an Appendix A.1 that describes details of our methodology and also
contains robustness tests.
2.2 Data & methodology
We obtain an extensive full-text news dataset from (Ding et al., 2015). The data contains
Reuters financial news articles published between October 20, 2006, and November 20,
2013. There are 106,521 articles in total. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the news
articles and Panel (a) of Figure 2·1 provides a sample news article in the data. We see that
an average article is fairly large, including about 600 words and 21 sentences. There is also
significant variability across articles: One article contains over 6,000 words while others
only contain a few sentences sentence. Panel (b) of Figure 2·1 shows that the number of
articles published each year is fairly constant, although we have a much shorter sample for
the year 2006.
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Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Number of words per article 583 359 19 6658
Number of sentences per article 20.61 13.34 1 253
Number of firms per article 2.36 2.56 0 26
Number of connections identified in an article 1.31 3.68 0 94
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of news articles in our data set. We consider 106,521 news articles from
Reuters financial news published between October 20, 2006, and November 20, 2013.
2.2.1 Identification
We analyze each news article in our data to identify whether an article reports about a rela-
tionship between two firms. Intuitively, if an article reports about two firms that share some
sort of business relation, then these two firms should be mentioned within close proximity
from each other. Based on this insight, we identify a link whenever two firms are mentioned
in the same sentence of an article.
We show in the Appendix A.1 that the majority of the information about economically
relevant firm links is contained in individual sentences rather than across sentences of an
article. As a result, our approach provides a robust alternative to identifying firm links
when two firms are co-mentioned in an article regardless of where in the article they are
mentioned.
2.2.2 Methodology
We require a methodology that can identify firms mentioned in each sentence of a news
article such as the one in Figure 2·1. This is not a trivial task. One could use a static list
of firm names but, given the dynamic nature of firm birth and failure, a static firm name
list may miss some firms. Furthermore, firm names are often abbreviated or replaced with
pseudonyms in the news. For example, General Electric Company is often just called GE,
Ford Motor Company is often just referred to as Ford, and JPMorgan Chase often goes by
JPMorgan, J. P. Morgan, or J. P. Morgan Chase. Keeping track of all possible abbreviations
or pseudonyms is computationally costly. Finally, the use of alternative firm identifiers,
such as tickers, also presents a series of challenges. Tickers are not always mentioned
12



















(b) Number of articles per year.
(c) Sample output of the coreNLP toolkit.
Figure 2·1: Sample of a news article in our data together with the time series of the number of articles
per year and a sample output of the coreNLP software.
in news articles. Even when they are, tickers change periodically and this restricts the
usefulness of a static list of tickers.
We develop a three-step machine learning methodology to address these challenges. We
summarize the methodology here and provide details in the Appendix A.1. The methodol-
ogy we develop can be applied for any sort of text data, although we focus here on news
data.
The first step consists of using a natural language processing (NLP) toolkit to iden-
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tify all nouns mentioned in a news article that could potentially be firm names.8 We use
the Stanford coreNLP toolkit available in R for this step (see (Manning et al., 2014)).
The coreNLP toolkit is a popular natural language processing software that identifies in
text data nouns that refer to entities and classifies these into different categories: named
entities (“PERSON”, “LOCATION”, “ORGANIZATION”, “MISC”), numerical entities
(“MONEY”, “NUMBER”, “ORDINAL”, “PERCENT”), and temporal entities (“DATE”,
“TIME”, “DURATION”, “SET”). Consider as an example the first sentence of the article
in Figure 2·1: “Several aspects of the tentative contract between General Motors Corp (
GM.N ) and the United Auto Workers union will be hard for Ford Motor Co. ( F.N ) and
Chrysler LLC to match in labor talks expected to heat up in coming days, people familiar
with the negotiations said.” Figure 2·1 shows the output of the coreNLP algorithm applied
to this sentence. The coreNLP algorithms recognize the following entities in the sentence:
(GM, ORGANIZATION), (Ford, ORGANIZATION), (Chrysler, ORGANIZATION), and
(Tuesday, DATE). Even though coreNLP does not recognize United Auto Workers union as
an entity, it performs well at recognizing all three corporations mentioned in the sentence.
The coreNLP toolkit has been demonstrated to be highly accurate in identifying named
entities (see (Abdallah et al., 2017), (Atdag and Labatut, 2013), and (Costa et al., 2017)).
In the second step, we take all organizations identified by the coreNLP toolkit and run
an algorithm developed by us to determine which of these organizations are corporations
(details can be found in the Appendix A.1). We first remove all organizations whose names
contain words that signal government agencies or nonprofit institutions, such as “agency”,
“cooperation”, “federal”, “foundation”, or “university.” For the remaining organizations,
we remove from their names all special symbols, unreasonable postfixes, and words that
indicate business types (like “Co.,” “Inc.,” and “Ltd”). We assume that every organization
that survives these steps is a firm. Still, there may be instances in which one firm goes
8Natural language processing (NLP) is a branch of machine learning that focuses on processing and
analyzing text data. (Gentzkow et al., 2019) provide an overview of how NLP is used for financial economic
research.
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by several names. We run additional steps to determine a unique name for each firm. We
begin by creating clusters of firms with common words in their names and consider the most
frequently mentioned name in a cluster as the name stem. Consider the following example.
Suppose there is a cluster consisting of 6 firms that go by the names “Toyota,” “Toyota
USA,” “Toyota Motor,” “Toyota Motor Credit,” “Toyota Motor,” and “Toyota Motor". In
this cluster, the most frequent name is “Toyota Motor” so we designate “Toyota Motor”
as the name stem for the cluster. Then, for each one of the firms in the cluster we check
whether the name of the firm is fully contained in the stem or vice versa. If so, we update
the stem to be either the name of the firm or the prevalent stem, whichever is shorter. If
not, we remove the firm from the original cluster. We proceed iteratively until no more
improvements of the name stem can be made. All firms that remain in the cluster are
considered to be the same firm and we assign the name stem as the name of this firm.
In our example, we would iterate through the firms named “Toyota,” “Toyota USA,” and
“Toyota Motor Credit.” Given that “Toyota” is the shortest name fully contained in the
original stem, we would update “Toyota” to be the new firm name stem. Then, because
“Toyota” is contained in all other firm names in this cluster, we would update all other
names to “Toyota” and terminate the iteration.
In a final step, we match the firms identified in the previous steps with firms in the
merged CRSP / Compustat database. We follow a similar procedure as in Step 2. Details
can be found in Appendix A.1.
Steps 1 (coreNLP), 2 (firm identification), and 3 (firm matching) introduced above de-
liver a list of firms mentioned in our news data. When running these steps, we keep track
of the article in which a firm is mentioned, the sentence within an article where the firm
was identified, and the publishing date of the article. We establish that two firms share
a connection whenever the firms are identified in the same sentence of an article. All
codes used to run our algorithms have been written in R and are available for download at
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http://www.gustavo-schwenkler.com.
2.3 Output of methodology
Our methodology finds 656,167 firm mentions in the data. Figure 2·2 shows the number
of recognized firm mentions in each year. Except for the year 2006, for which we have a
shorter data sample, we see that our algorithm recognizes around 90,000 firm mentions in
any given year. We also see that the number of firm mentions in any given year is fairly
constant. Of course, not every mention corresponds to a different firm: Some firms are
mentioned repeatedly. Our algorithm identifies 2,961 different firms during the time span
covered by the data. On any given year, our data covers about 1,300 distinct firms. The
five most frequently identified firms are General Motors, Chrysler, Citigroup, Apple, and
Goldman Sachs.
Table 2.2 and Figure 2·2 provide descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. We
see that the majority of the firms are publicly listed in U.S. exchanges. The median firm in
our sample is an investment-grade small cap firm with a market capitalization of about $1.6
billion. There is significant dispersion in the distribution of firm sizes, covering the whole
spectrum between small and large caps. The OLS estimator for the exponent of a power
law that approximates the market capitalization distribution of the largest 1000 firms in our
sample is 0.952 with a standard error of 0.043, which is similar to the power law exponents
estimated by (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) and (Luttmer, 2007) for the size distribution of
the largest U.S. firms. We see that firms in our sample cover all 11 GICS sectors. The
distribution of sectors in our data is comparable to the sector distribution in the whole
CRSP / Compustat universe. Minor differences can be observed in the telecommunication
services and consumer staples and discretionary sectors, which are slightly overrepresented
in our sample. The IT and health care sectors are slightly underrepresented. We also see
that our data contains firms that are domiciled in the U.S. and abroad, in countries such as
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Mean Median Std dev. Min. Max.
Market capitalization (million USD) 8511.26 1593.28 23490.77 5.87 392547.03
Rating BBB- D AAA
Total assets (million USD) 27801.30 1957.49 159333.86 7.42 2554300.77
Total debt (million USD) 7183.25 407.00 45780.22 0.00 998531.73
Book leverage 24.44% 19.62% 23.76% 0.00% 432.01%
Cash holdings (million USD) 990.55 145.35 3795.57 0.00 62439.79
Net income (million USD) 128.18 10.46 532.44  5056.76 9199.68
Sales (million USD) 1990.50 281.52 6633.45 0.00 116084.71
Cost of goods sold (million USD) 1362.51 157.76 5168.50 0.00 106142.24
Annualized realized volatility 30.91% 28.03% 15.58% 0.06% 143.47%
Quarterly dividends per share (USD) 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.00 2.33
Number of 13-F institutional owners 164.62 109.88 207.10 0.00 1662.33
Institutional ownership ratio 0.52 0.61 0.37 0.00 4.42
Ownership concentration 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.00 1.00
Analyst coverage 6.91 5.16 6.84 0.00 37.81
# of firms whose stocks are traded in U.S. exchanges 2567 (86.69%)
# of firms whose stocks are traded over-the-counter 338 (11.42%)
# of private firms 35 (1.18%)
# of firms with missing fundamentals data 75 (2.53%)
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of firms in our data set. Our sample includes 2,961 distinct firms and
spans the time period between October 20, 2006, and November 20, 2013. The above statistics are time
series moments over firm lifetimes that overlapped with our sample. Total debt is the sum of current and
long-term debt. Book leverage is the ratio of total debt over total assets. We compute the annualized
realized volatility of a firm as the standard deviation of monthly log-returns over the sample (adjusted
for dividends and stock splits) times the square-root of 12. We take the rating class to be the median
S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating over a firm’s lifetime. Data on institutional ownership
is obtained from Thomson Reuters. We measure the institutional ownership ratio as the fraction of the
number of stocks held by institutions over the number of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter.
Ownership concentration is measured via the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Analyst coverage counts the
number of analysts following a firm. These data are obtained from I/B/E/S.
Canada, China, Great Britain, Bermuda, and many others.
Firms in our sample hold an average of $28 billion in assets, $7 billion in debt, and $990
million in cash. The average firm is profitable, with a quarterly reported net income of $128
million. It pays dividends on an annual basis of around $0.13 per share. The average firm
has a 24% leverage ratio and an annualized realized volatility of 67%. It is followed by 7
analysts and has an institutional ownership of about 50%.
Turning to our sample of firm links, Table 2.1 shows our methodology identifies 1.31
firm connections per article with a standard deviation of 3.68 connections per article. Over
the whole data sample, there are 177,300 instances in which two firms are mentioned in the
same sentence. This corresponds to 20,504 unique links between 2,406 firms.9 Table 2.3
shows the results of a logit regression for the likelihood that a firm was linked at some point
in our sample based on characteristics of the firm. We see that the firms that are linked in
9Considering that there are 2,961distinct firms in our sample, this suggests that not all firms are connected.
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(1) (2) (3)
Intercept *** 0.826 · 0.322 0.413
(6.118) (1.919) (0.560)
Market capitalization *** 0.119 *** 0.065 * 0.036
(x 10 3) (6.978) (3.854) (1.983)
Total assets 0.000 0.003 0.005
(x 10 3) (0.150) (0.858) (0.983)
Leverage · 0.004 * 0.006 0.002
(1.944) (2.495) (0.381)
Volatility 1.375 * 2.630 · 4.110
(1.202) (2.196) (1.778)
Number of 13-F institutional owners 0.001 0.002
(1.437) (1.465)
Institutional ownership ratio  0.192  0.508
( 0.865) ( 1.469)
Ownership concentration  0.313  0.951
( 1.047) ( 1.629)




Data points 2836 2836 1415
Table 2.3: Estimates of a logit regression of the indicator that a firm was ever linked in our sample based
on characteristics of the firm. All characteristics are time-series averages over our sample as summarized
in Table 2.2. The values in parentheses give z-statistics. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the
99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
our sample tend to be larger firms with large analyst coverage.
Table 2.4 reports the most frequently identified links in our sample together with sam-
ples of the sentences in which these links are identified. We see that several of the sentences
point to competitive relations. These competitive relationships can be strategic (such as
when Google cooperated with Apple) or destructive (as in the case of Microsoft challeng-
ing Google). Some sentences point to joint investment banking solutions provided by big
banks (such as Goldman and Morgan Stanley sponsoring the Alibaba IPO) while other
sentences point to interbank relationships (like when Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS formed a new company to
develop a trading platform). We identify some credit relationships, as when it was reported
that Daimler is covering liabilities at Chrysler. We also identify parent-subsidiary relation-
ships (Vodafone owns a majority stake in Verizon) and M&A links (Bank of America buys
Merrill Lynch).
Table 2.5 provides descriptive statistics of the firm links in our data, where the firms
in a link are sorted by market capitalization. We see that the larger firm in a link tends to


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean Median Std dev. Min. Max.
Market capitalization (million USD) Larger Firm 15570.82 4424.87 31798.58 15.14 392547.03Smaller Firm 10101.64 1986.06 24773.00 6.29 258664.37
Rating Larger Firm BBB D AAASmaller Firm BBB- D AAA
Total assets (million USD) Larger Firm 52942.84 5627.93 224069.07 18.35 2554300.77Smaller Firm 34368.44 2467.77 179692.54 9.61 2554300.77
Total debt (million USD) Larger Firm 13611.07 1357.11 64442.71 0.00 998531.73Smaller Firm 8931.73 549.49 51719.64 0.00 998531.73
Book leverage Larger Firm 26.02% 22.23% 22.62% 0.00% 321.73%Smaller Firm 24.83% 19.79% 23.73% 0.00% 432.01%
Cash holdings (million USD) Larger Firm 1790.06 388.25 5182.17 0.00 62439.79Smaller Firm 1194.19 189.24 4226.21 0.00 62439.79
Net income (million USD) Larger Firm 240.37 40.09 737.23  5056.76 9199.68Smaller Firm 151.67 14.56 561.83  5056.76 6992.88
Sales (million USD) Larger Firm 3635.99 815.52 9107.33 0.00 116084.71Smaller Firm 2382.79 366.37 7165.25 0.00 116084.71
Cost of goods sold (million USD) Larger Firm 2456.88 448.33 7104.52 0.00 106142.24Smaller Firm 1628.23 210.28 5593.35 0.00 106142.24
Annualized realized volatility Larger Firm 28.01% 24.89% 13.56% 0.08% 99.41%Smaller Firm 30.62% 27.62% 15.34% 0.08% 143.47%
Quarterly dividends per share (USD) Larger Firm 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.00 1.77Smaller Firm 0.14 0.04 0.22 0.00 2.23
Distinct linkswith both firms in same industry 4093 (19.96%)
Distinct linkswith both firms in same sector 8177 (39.88%)
Table 2.5: Summary statistics of linked firms in our data set. Our sample includes 20,504 distinct links
between 2,406 firms and spans the time period between October 20, 2006, and November 20, 2013.
The above statistics are time series moments over firm lifetimes that overlapped with our sample period.
Total debt is the sum of current and long-term debt. Book leverage is the ratio of total debt over total
assets. We compute the annualized realized volatility of a firm as the standard deviation of monthly
log-returns over the sample times the square-root of 12. The rating class of a firm is the median S&P
Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating over a firm’s lifetime.
the smaller counterpart. The larger firm also tends to be less volatile and pay out more
dividends than the smaller firm. Only about 20% (40%) of the links are composed of firms
in the same industry (sector).
Table 2.6 lists the 20 most frequently identified cross-sectoral links, which cover about
78% of all cross-sectoral connections in our sample. It also provides sample sentences for
each cross-sectoral link. We see that there are several links between the financial and non-
financial sectors, pointing to rating, banking, credit, and other financing solutions provided
by the financial sector to the wider economy. We also identify links across non-financial
sectors, such as customer-supplier links (Boeing selling airplanes to UPS), strategic part-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reuters news articles have a helpful feature that facilitates the validation of our algorithm.
As showcased in the sample sentence of Figure 2·1, the names of publicly traded firms in
Reuters financial news are often followed by an identifier known as the Reuters Instrument
Code (RIC). The RIC characterizes the ticker of the firm and the exchange where its stock
is traded. We exploit the availability of RIC in our text data to validate our methodology.
We collect all RIC in our text data and match the resulting tickers with tickers in the
CRSP / Compustat database. We are able to identify 77,080 RIC mentions corresponding
to 1,858 distinct firms that are also matched in CRSP / Compustat. For the set of RIC men-
tions, we ask the following questions: How many of the RIC mentions are identified in Step
1 as organizations by the Stanford coreNLP algorithm? How many of the RIC mentions
identified as organizations in Step 1 are classified as firms in Step 2 of our algorithm? How
many of the RIC mentions identified as firms by Step 2 are matched to the correct firm
in the CRSP / Compustat database by Step 3 of our algorithm? Out of the firms that are
not properly matched by Step 3 of our algorithm, is the failure due to a mismatch (i.e., we
match with a different firm than suggested by the RIC) or due to a non-match (i.e., we are
unable to find a firm in the CRSP / Compustat database that matches with the firm name
assigned by our algorithm)?
Table 2.7 provides answers. We see that out of the 77,080 RIC mentions, Step 1 of our
algorithm correctly identifies around 84% as organizations. This rate of accuracy for the
coreNLP toolkit is in line with similar accuracy estimates by (Abdallah et al., 2017), (Atdag
and Labatut, 2013), (Costa et al., 2017), and (Pinto et al., 2016) based on alternative text
data. Once an RIC mention is identified as an organization by Step 1 of our algorithm, Step
2 also correctly labels that RIC mention as a firm. This suggests that our firm identification
algorithm is highly accurate. Finally, out of the set of RIC mentions that we correctly
identify as firms, Step 3 of our algorithm matches around 87% to the correct firm in CRSP
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RIC mentions 77080
RIC mentions identified as organizations by Step 1 64525
RIC mentions also identified as firms by Step 2 64525
RIC mentions correctly matched in CRSP / Compustat by Step 3 56458
RIC mentions incorrectly matched in CRSP / Compustat by Step 3 2121
RIC mentions not matched in CRSP / Compustat by Step 3 5946
Number of RIC that are always incorrectly matched 0
Number of RIC that are never matched in CRSP / Compustat 0
Table 2.7: Accuracy analysis for our methodology. We collect all mentions of Reuters Instrument
Codes (RIC) in our news data. We then match the tickers implied by the RIC to tickers in the CRSP /
Compustat database. The data sample includes 1,858 distinct firms.
/ Compustat. Putting everything together, these results show that our approach correctly
identifies and matches 73% of all RIC mentions in the data. When our methodology fails,
it is primarily due to an inability to identify the firm as an organization or to match with a
firm in the CRSP / Compustat data. These types of errors only reduce our sample size; they
should not bias our results. We match a firm in our data with a wrong firm in the RIC data
only in 2.75% of all RIC mentions. Table 2.7 shows that there are no firms with RIC that
are never correctly identified and matched by our algorithm. While mismatches are serious,
the facts that mismatch is an extremely rare phenomenon and that no firm is consistently
mismatched mitigate the concerns.
The above analysis highlights an advantage of our approach compared to relying on
the availability of Reuters Instrument Codes. Our methodology is able to identify 2,961
firms that are cross-matched with firms in the CRSP / Compustat database. In contrast,
there are only 1,858 firms with RIC mentions that are also matched in CRSP / Compus-
tat. We find that 78% of all firms with RIC mentions are also included in the firm sample
identified by our algorithm. Table 2.8 provides summary statistics of the firms with RIC
mentions. We see that the RIC firms tend to be mid cap or larger firms with less volatility
and more assets, cash, debt, sales, expenses, and net income than the firms in our sam-
ple. The maximum column of Table 2.8 is almost the same as the maximum column of
Table 2.2, suggesting that our sample and the RIC sample cover similar sets of large firms.
However, our approach is able to identify small cap firms and firms with stocks that are
traded over-the-counter more frequently than an alternative approach based on RIC. These
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Mean Median Std dev. Min. Max.
Market capitalization (million USD) 10325.16 2249.50 26611.88 5.85 391914.93
Rating BBB- CCC AAA
Total assets (million USD) 32320.85 2820.11 172817.73 5.84 2650692.69
Total debt (million USD) 9188.13 646.26 60128.42 0.00 1125964.27
Book leverage 25.07% 20.33% 24.26% 0.00% 355.29%
Cash holdings (million USD) 1074.28 191.93 3915.14 0.00 61895.07
Net income (million USD) 150.92 20.00 650.47  9658.00 9142.50
Sales (million USD) 2352.71 444.26 7249.88 0.00 118561.95
Cost of goods sold (million USD) 1593.71 246.12 5548.17 0.00 106142.24
Annualized realized volatility 28.30% 26.44% 12.16% 0.52% 101.24%
Quarterly dividends per share (USD) 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.00 1.84
# of firms that only operate domestically 1446 (77.83%)
# of firms that operate internationally 404 (21.74%)
# of firms that do not operate domestically 0 (0.00%)
# of firms whose stocks are traded in U.S. exchanges 1812 (97.52%)
# of firms whose stocks are traded over-the-counter 28 (1.51%)
# of private firms 8 (0.43%)
# of firms with missing fundamentals data 6 (0.32%)
Table 2.8: Summary statistics of firms with Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC). We identify all RIC in
Reuters financial news published between between October 20, 2006, and November 20, 2013. We
match firms with RIC with firms in the merged CRSP / Compustat database, from where we obtain
fundamentals data. The sample includes 1,858 distinct firms. The above statistics are time series mo-
ments over firm lifetimes that overlapped with our sample period. Total debt is the sum of current and
long-term debt. Book leverage is the ratio of total debt over total assets. We compute the annualized
realized volatility of a firm as the standard deviation of monthly log-returns over the sample times the
square-root of 12. The rating class of a firm is the median S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit
Rating over a firm’s lifetime.
results indicate that our methodology can identify a more extensive range of firms than an
alternative approach based on RIC. They provide further validation for our approach.
2.4 Estimated news-implied networks
2.4.1 Full data sample
We plot in Figure 2·3 the network of firms implied by all news articles in our data sample.
Each node represents a firm. The size of a node is proportional to the number of times that
firm is found in the data while the width of a link is proportional to the number of times that
link is identified in the data. For clarity, in Figure 2·3 we only show the largest 50 nodes,
which correspond to the most frequently identified firms in the sample. We label firms with
their tickers.
We observe several interesting features. We first see that the big banks – Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley – represent some
of the largest and most central nodes in our network, suggesting that the news reported
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very frequently about relationship between these major banks and other firms. The large
banks are also highly interconnected, indicating that the news often reported about the
relation between big banks. There are several smaller banks that lie on the periphery:
Deutsche Bank, Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse, UBS, Barclays, Merrill Lynch, Wells
Fargo, RBS, ABN Amro, and HSBC. Banks in the network of Figure 2·3 have a core-
periphery structure with large banks being highly central and highly interconnected and
smaller banks being connected to the larger banks on the outskirts. Such a core-periphery
network is often observed in interbank data; see (Craig and von Peter, 2014), (in ’t Veld
and van Lelyveld, 2014), and (Gofman, 2017), among others. Core-periphery networks
have also been demonstrated to arise naturally in interbank network formation models; see
(Babus and Hu, 2017) and (Farboodi, 2014).
The network in Figure 2·3 also highlights the central position of the banking sector in
the general economy, as advocated by (Bernanke et al., 1999) and (Carvalho and Gabaix,
2013). We see that most non-financial firms are located in the outskirts of the network, sur-
rounding the large banks in the center. Several firms are only indirectly connected because
they share a common link with one of the banks. For example, Chrysler and Apple are
indirectly connected in Figure 2·3 because they share a link with JPMorgan.
Figure 2·3 exhibits several sector-based clusters. On the top right corner, we find a clus-
ter of firms associated with the IT and telecommunication services sectors. Below it we find
an automobile cluster. The bottom left part of Figure 2·3 is dominated by financial firms.
These clusters arise because the news often report about connections between firms in the
same sector in addition to intersectoral relationships (see Table 2.6). The general architec-
ture of the news-implied network resembles the star network of intersectoral connections
estimated by (Acemoglu et al., 2012) from input-output linkage data for the United States.
For a full comparison, we aggregate firms in our sample by two-digit NAICS codes and
display in Figure 2·4 the resulting news-implied intersectoral network. We also display in
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Figure 2·4 the intersectoral networks implied by the 2012 BEA industry-by-industry total
requirement tables.
We see that the news-implied intersectoral network in Panel (a) of Figure 2·4 exhibits
a similar star structure as highlighted in (Acemoglu et al., 2012) and also showcased in
the BEA input and output networks in Panels (b) and (c). Similar as in the BEA input
network, the most prominent sector in our intersectoral network is the manufacturing sector
(NAICS code “33”). This sector includes computer, electrical, furniture, machinery, metal,
and transportation manufacturing firms which heavily dominate the production of final
goods. Because the BEA data mostly measures the use and production of commodities,
the BEA input-output networks diminish the importance of the insurance and financial
sectors (NAICS codes “51” and “52”, respectively). In contrast, those sectors are highly
central and prominent in our news-implied network, consistent with the theoretical models
of (Bernanke et al., 1999) and (Carvalho and Gabaix, 2013) that put the financial industry
at the center of the U.S. economy.
2.4.2 Time series of networks
We plot yearly time series of networks implied by news articles in our data sample in
Figures 2·5 and 2·6. For each year between 2006 and 2013, we use the methodology of
Section 2.2 to extract all firm links implied by news articles published in that year. For
clarity, we only plot the connections between the largest 50 firms in every year together
with their tickers. Similar plots can be constructed for arbitrary frequencies – as frequently
as daily or hourly and as infrequently as quarterly or annually. A monthly time series
of the estimated news-implied firm network is available for download at http://www.
gustavo-schwenkler.com.
The time series of news-implied networks yields several additional insights. We see
that the architecture of the news-implied network can change drastically from year to year,
according to how the news report about the relationships between firms. The news-implied
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networks in 2006 and 2007 were relatively dispersed with a central cluster associated with
the financial sector and some non-financial clusters dispersed in the periphery. Entering
the financial crisis in 2008, the news-implied network became more centralized, showing a
strongly connected core of banks. The automobile sector became dominant in the network
for the year 2009, consistent with the prevailing crisis in that sector. After 2010 when the
great recession ended, the news-implied networks again showcase a more common star
structure as in (Acemoglu et al., 2012), with banks located in the center and other sectors
positioned around the financial sector.
We summarize the information contained in the time series of news-implied networks.
For this, we consider the time series of three measures of connectivity:
1. The average degree, which measures the number of connections of an average node.10
The average degree is inversely related to the network sparsity measure of (Her-
skovic, 2018).
2. The first-order interconnectivity measure of (Acemoglu et al., 2012), which is given
by the coefficient of variation of the degree distribution in the network and measures
how dispersed the degree distribution is. A more dispersed distribution implies that
there are few large nodes that have connections with many small nodes. As a re-
sult, high first-order interconnectivity is characteristic of a network that showcases
few very large nodes in the center and many smaller nodes in the periphery. First-
order interconnectivity is closely related to the network concentration measure of
(Herskovic, 2018).
3. The second-order interconnectivity measure of (Acemoglu et al., 2012), which is the
weighted covariance of the degree of two nodes that are indirectly connected through
a third node. Second-order interconnectivity highlights how strongly two clusters of
nodes are indirectly connected through intermediate nodes.
10The degree of a node is the number of links that a node shares with other nodes in the network.
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Figure 2·7 plots the monthly time series of these connectivity measures for our news-
implied network. For this, we generate analogous networks as those in Figures 2·5–2·6
but on a monthly basis and then compute the implied connectivity measures. We see that
there is significant time variation in the interconnectivity measures. The time series of con-
nectivity measures appear to be persistent. The regression results in Table 2.9 confirm these
visual insights by showing that the monthly AR(1)-coefficients of 0.4940 for the average
degree, 0.533 for first-order interconnectivity, and 0.479 for second-order interconnectivity
are significantly large.
We evaluate the relationship between connectivity and sentiment (see Figure 2·7 for the
time series of the average article sentiment in our sample). One may be concerned that the
connectivity measures capture negative sentiment in the news articles.
We check whether this is the case by running monthly regressions of our connectivity
measures on the average article sentiment. Table 2.9 summarizes the results. We find
that our measures of news-implied connectivity are indeed negatively related to sentiment.
However, the R2 of the regressions are low. After controlling for the autoregressive nature
of connectivity and the influence of sentiment, about 70% of the time series variation of
the connectivity measures remains unexplained. We therefore reject the notion that spikes
in our interconnectivity measures are only driven by sentiment. These results suggest that
news-implied connectivity conveys information that is complementary to the sentiment of
the news articles from which we extract our networks.
2.5 Link level results
We evaluate whether the news is an unbiased source of information about firms links. For
this, we study the drivers of the likelihood of observing a firm link in our news data. We
consider the 3,000 most frequently identified links, which cover 904 distinct firms. For the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































monthly time series of link-level dummy variables that indicate whether in a given month
we identified a link between the two firms. We then run logit regressions of the link dum-
mies on several measures of financial performance for the linked firms as well as character-
istics of the linked firms that were found to be link predictive in Table 2.3, and market and
macroeconomic controls. Table 2.10 summarizes our findings, where we randomly assign
the labels “Firm 1” and “Firm 2” between the two linked firms in a given month but keep
the link identifier fixed throughout the sample. Table 2.11 provides summary statistics of
our control factors.11
We find that it is more likely to observe a firm link in the news when one of the two firms
experiences high volatility, credit downgrades, downward revisions by earnings analysts,
or negative net income. We also find some evidence that the likelihood of observing a
link is higher when the one of the two firms experiences negative monthly stock returns or
negative earnings surprises. When controlling for all firm characteristics and the state of the
economy, we do not find that the link likelihood is higher when positive stock returns, credit
upgrades, upward earnings estimate revisions, or positive net income occur. These result
hold with clustered standard errors in the presence of time and link fixed effects, which
control for cross-sectional differences in link frequencies and time series fluctuations of
the network architecture.
We run several robustness tests in the Appendix A.1. We obtain similar results if we
11The contagion factor is due to (Azizpour et al., 2018) and measures the component of the condi-
tional arrival rate of defaults that is due to contagion of credit risk across linked counterparties. It is es-
timated semiparametrically from default timing data via an autoregressive model and covers our sample
through the year 2012. Data on the one-month aggregate default probability as well as the distance-to-
default of U.S. firms is obtained from the Credit Research Initiative at the National University of Singapore
(https://www.rmicri.org/en/). We assume that default probabilities and distance-to-default are esti-
mated at the start of a month with the concurrently available data from the end of the previous month. We
consider a logistic transformation of the default probability. We obtain data on the financial uncertainty mea-
sure of (Jurado et al., 2015) from Sydney Ludvigson’s website (https://www.sydneyludvigson.com),
the financial uncertain measure of (Carriero et al., 2018) from the Review of Economics and Statis-
tics data replication website (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:
10.7910/DVN/ENTXDD), and the equity market volatility (EMV) index of (Baker et al., 2019) from the Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty website (https://www.policyuncertainty.com/EMV_monthly.html).
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(Return)+ 0.141 0.079 0.091
(1.273) (0.577) (0.473)
(Return)  *  0.209 *  0.218  0.173
( 2.471) ( 2.111) ( 1.158)
Volatility *** 1.509 *** 1.382 *** 1.353
(12.965) (9.460) (6.936)
Upgrade dummy 0.113  0.055 0.106
(1.425) ( 0.485) (0.725)
Downgrade dummy *** 0.492 *** 0.219 · 0.179
(10.941) (3.319) (1.956)
Revisions up ** 0.006 0.004
(3.074) (1.127)
Revisions down *** 0.010 *** 0.013
(5.607) (3.878)
Earnings surprise ·  0.023 0.017
( 1.773) (0.780)
(Net income)+ ·  13.616  16.497 21.525
(x 10 6) ( 1.788) ( 1.460) (1.305)
(Net income)  ***  28.365 ***  20.542 **  32.026
(x 10 6) ( 7.917) ( 4.478) ( 2.889)
Market cap *** 3.149 *** 2.368 *** 2.610 *** 2.849 *** 3.527 *** 2.843
(x 10 6) (12.325) (9.781) (10.927) (11.739) (9.951) (6.018)
Analyst coverage 0.002 ·  0.003  0.001 0.001 0.000  0.003




(Return)+ 0.036 0.010  0.013
(0.326) (0.071) ( 0.065)
(Return)  ·  0.141 ·  0.181  0.003
( 1.646) ( 1.727) ( 0.017)
Volatility *** 1.388 *** 1.244 *** 1.336
(12.038) (8.202) (6.174)
Upgrade dummy * 0.168 0.070 0.169
(2.247) (0.681) (1.239)
Downgrade dummy *** 0.453 ** 0.198 0.143
(10.050) (2.962) (1.551)
Revisions up *** 0.007 0.004
(3.722) (1.272)
Revisions down *** 0.009 *** 0.011
(5.499) (3.792)
Earnings surprise *  0.029 0.012
( 1.975) (0.445)
(Net income)+  8.624  0.454 9.358
(x 10 6) ( 1.074) ( 0.040) (0.555)
(Net income)  ***  26.412 ***  18.691 ***  42.598
(x 10 6) ( 7.579) ( 4.871) ( 3.821)
Market cap *** 3.067 *** 2.396 *** 2.616 *** 2.767 *** 3.037 *** 2.987
(x 10 6) (12.239) (9.879) (10.963) (11.110) (8.367) (6.313)
Analyst coverage · 0.003  0.003  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.003
(1.745) ( 1.601) ( 0.491) (0.613) (0.574) ( 0.873)
Link-month obs. 118002 148638 135209 249067 81416 48479
Positive obs. 18506 25311 20527 37233 13734 8133
Unique links 2593 2211 2211 2949 1927 1156
Unique firms 721 587 587 874 525 361
Table 2.10: Logit regressions of link dummies, which indicate whether in a given month we identified
at least one link between two firms. We consider the 3,000 most frequently observed links in the data.
For every link-month observation, we randomly assign the labels “Firm 1” and “Firm 2” among the two
linked firms but keep the link name fixed. Albeit unreported, each regression includes an intercept as
well dummies for whether the two linked firms are in the same industry or sector. We also control for
the monthly return of the S&P 500, the level of the VIX, the monthly industrial production growth rate,
as well as a control for the level of the yield curve. The estimates for these controls are available upon
request. All regressions include time and link fixed effects. The values in parentheses give z-statistics.
Standard errors are based on sandwich estimators clustered by link and month. ***, **, *, and · denote
significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
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Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
S&P 500 return 0.417 4.398 -20.395 12.022
VIX 22.736 10.324 10.820 62.640
VXO 22.552 10.995 10.484 65.447
AAA credit spread 3.670 1.616 0.040 5.730
BAA credit spread 4.949 1.911 0.950 8.820
Level of yield curve 0.990 1.645 0.010 5.030
Slope of yield curve 1.942 1.023 -0.480 3.430
GDP growth 0.707 0.781 -1.900 1.400
Industrial production growth 0.014 0.865 -4.300 1.400
Aggregate default rate 0.178 0.195 0.000 0.935
Contagion factor 43.931 24.608 14.805 113.516
Aggregate default probability -8.010 0.910 -9.511 -5.541
Aggregate distance-to-default 4.037 1.084 1.754 5.805
Financial uncertainty ((Jurado et al., 2015)) 0.961 0.224 0.634 1.546
Financial uncertainty ((Carriero et al., 2018)) 0.961 0.224 0.634 1.546
Equity market volatility index 0.961 0.224 0.634 1.546
Table 2.11: Summary statistics of our financial and macroeconomic factors. All factors are sampled at
the monthly frequency. We measure S&P 500 returns from open at the start of the month to close at the
end of the month. The VIX (VXO) in a given month is evaluated as the average VIX (VXO) observed
during that month. The BAA and AAA credit spreads correspond to the Moody’s Seasoned corporate
bond yields minus the Federal Funds Rate. The level of the yield curve is measured via the 3-month
Treasury Bill secondary rate, while the slope is constructed as the spread between the fixed-maturity
yields of the 10-year and the 1-year Treasury Bills. Both level and slope are evaluated at the end of
a month. GDP growth is measured from quarter to quarter. We obtain a monthly GDP growth rate
time series by interpolating with the most recent quarterly observation. Industrial production growth is
given by the month-to-month growth rate in the industrial production index of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. Data on the above factors are obtained from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED
database. All macroeconomic time series are seasonally adjusted annualized rates. We compute a
nonparametric measure of the aggregate default rate in the U.S. economy as the ratio of the number of
observed defaults in a month over the number of days in that month. We use the same historical default
timing data as in (Azizpour et al., 2018), which is obtained from Moody’s Default Risk Service and
covers the years 1970 through 2012.
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include firm rather than link fixed effects. This suggests that our results are not driven
by uncontrolled differences in how the news reports about different firms. We also obtain
similar results when we exclude links observed during the financial crisis, suggesting that
our results are not driven by the severe nature of this period of time in our sample.
All in one, our results show that the news tends to reports about firm links in which
one of the two linked firms is distressed. Our findings extend the results of (Scherbina and
Schlusche, 2016) by showing that the news is not an unbiased source of information about
firm links.
2.5.1 Mechanism
Why does the news report about distressed firm links? Recent research suggests that this
may be due to demand-side considerations. (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) show that
the news attracts readers by fine-tuning their reporting to match their readership’s interests.
It is well known that investors are more concerned about downside risk than upside poten-
tial; see (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), (Kuhnen, 2015), and others. Because of this, news
outlets have incentives to publish articles about negative events that represent risks for in-
vestors. Indeed, (García, 2014) shows that a negative market return triggers more negative
news reporting than a positive market return of equivalent magnitude and that this is pri-
marily driven by reader demand considerations. (Niessner and So, 2018) demonstrate the
the news is more likely to report about firms with declining financial health. (Nimark and
Pitschner, 2019) show that selective reporting about newsworthy shocks is an equilibrium
outcome in a model in which agents have attention constraints and delegate the collection
of information to news outlets.
We evaluate whether demand-side considerations drive the news to report about dis-
tressed firm links. For this, we consider the relative popularity of the linked firms. If the
news reports about distressed links to attract concerned investors as readers, then there
should be stronger incentives to report about links that affect the health of popular firms.
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We therefore conjecture that the news is more likely to report about links in which a less
popular firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular firm. We test this hypothe-
sis by repeating the analysis of Table 2.10 when controlling for how popular the two linked
firms are. We consider two proxies for how popular firms are among investors: The market
capitalization of a firm and the number of 13-F institutional investors in a firm. Table 2.12
shows our findings.
We find that the news is more likely to report about a firm link when the less popular of
the two linked firms experiences negative stock returns, credit downgrades, or downward
revisions of earnings estimates. We do not find that the same applies for the more popular
firm: Negative returns, credit downgrades, or downward estimate revisions for the more
popular firm do not significantly increase the likelihood of observing the link in the news.
Extending the results of Table 2.10, we also find that the news is more likely to report
about links between firms that experience high volatility or negative net income, regardless
of how popular these firms are. The Appendix A.1 shows that similar results hold if we
control for firm fixed effects rather than link fixed effects, suggesting that the results are
not driven by differences in how the news reports about different firms. We also obtain
similar results when we consider the links shared among the largest 500 firms in the data
or if we exclude links observed during the financial crisis. These findings suggest that our
results are not driven by the fact that there are more small firms in the economy or by the
severity of the financial crisis in our data. Putting everything together, our results show
that whether or not a firm link shows up in the news is primarily driven by whether the less
popular linked firm experiences financial distress.
We test whether, when reporting about firm links, the news delivers information about
a potential contagion from the less popular firm to the more popular firm. For this, we
consider the subsequent performance of the two linked firms in the six months after a link
between the two firms is observed in the news. Figure 2·8 summarizes our findings. We
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Popularity proxy
Market capitalization Institutional investors









(Return)+ 0.206 0.052 0.239 0.264
(1.272) (0.231) (1.251) (1.227)
(Return)  0.005 0.055  0.024 0.098
(0.040) (0.291) ( 0.147) (0.521)
Volatility *** 1.402 *** 1.623 *** 1.524 *** 1.554
(6.741) (5.888) (6.112) (5.647)
Upgrade dummy  0.024 0.109  0.141  0.026
( 0.212) (0.711) ( 0.982) ( 0.168)
Downgrade dummy 0.003  0.042 0.056 0.054
(0.035) ( 0.409) (0.649) (0.563)
Revisions up 0.004 0.002
(1.052) (0.737)
Revisions down · 0.006 0.005
(1.814) (1.553)
Earnings surprise  0.008  0.035
( 0.264) ( 0.858)
(Net income)+ **  37.178 ·  27.005 **  23.868  9.099
(x 10 6) ( 2.935) ( 1.650) ( 1.522) ( 0.514)
(Net income)  ***  25.427 *  29.053 ***  33.241 *  26.949
(x 10 6) ( 4.568) ( 2.285) ( 3.040) ( 2.298)
Market cap *** 1.726 ** 1.794 *** 2.329 *** 2.199
(x 10 6) (3.669) (3.016) (4.530) (3.905)
Analyst coverage 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002








(Return)+  0.011 0.106  0.026  0.082
( 0.091) (0.597) ( 0.152) ( 0.443)
(Return)  ***  0.408 ·  0.272 *  0.320 ·  0.295
( 3.939) ( 1.768) ( 2.129) ( 1.836)
Volatility *** 1.291 *** 1.206 *** 1.049 *** 1.191
(7.783) (5.261) (4.442) (4.891)
Upgrade dummy 0.053 0.181 * 0.226 * 0.265
(0.525) (1.431) ((1.995) (2.120)
Downgrade dummy *** 0.353 *** 0.297 *** 0.300 ** 0.236
(5.662) (3.573) (3.720) (2.714)
Revisions up 0.006 0.007
(1.475) (1.492)
Revisions down *** 0.019 *** 0.020
(4.957) (4.977)
Earnings surprise 0.025 0.045
(0.829) (1.569)
(Net income)+ * 35.021 *** 119.493 23.667 * 58.738
(x 10 6) (2.115) (4.954) (1.278) (2.391)
(Net income)  ***  16.995 ***  48.336 **  24.610 ***  48.544
(x 10 6) ( 4.051) ( 3.834) ( 3.205) ( 4.014)
Market cap *** 7.515 *** 5.857 *** 4.776 *** 4.679
(x 10 6) (9.066) (5.417) (5.851) (4.805)
Analyst coverage 0.000 ·  0.009 * 0.009  0.007
(0.134) ( 1.927) (2.102) ( 1.301)
Link-month obs. 81416 48479 59465 48185
Positive obs. 13734 8133 9682 8086
Unique links 1927 1156 1415 1149
Unique firms 525 361 411 356
Table 2.12: Logit regressions of link dummies, which indicate whether in a given month we identified
at least one link between two given firms. We consider the 3,000 most frequently observed links in the
data. For every link-month observation, we call the more (less) popular of the two linked firms “Firm
1” (“Firm 2”), where popularity is measured either by the market capitalization or the number of 13-F
institutional investors of a firm in that month. Otherwise, we keep the link name fixed. All regressions
include time and link fixed effects. The values in parentheses give z-statistics. Standard errors are based
on sandwich estimators clustered by link and month. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%,
99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
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find that on average, in the month a link is observed in the data, the smaller counterparty
of a link experiences a statistically significant credit downgrade and statistically significant
negative monthly stock return. In the subsequent months, the health of the smaller coun-
terparty continues to deteriorate: its net income falls, it accrues negative returns, and its
credit worthiness declines. The larger counterparty, on the other hand, generally does not
experience negative stock returns when a link with a smaller counterparty is reported in the
news. In the months after being linked with a smaller firm in the news, however, the finan-
cial health of the larger firm deteriorates on average without a corresponding deterioration
in fundamentals. It accrues significantly negative stock returns while experiencing signif-
icant declines in its credit worthiness, but its net income does not decrease. The negative
effects on cumulative stock returns and credit worthiness are transient and dissipate after 4
months. These findings suggests that investors learn about the larger firm’s exposure to the
smaller distressed firm and they slowly incorporate this information in asset prices over the
course of a few months.12
In summary, our results show that the news is more likely to report about links between
firms in which a less popular firm experiences distress and may contaminate a more popu-
lar firm it is connected with. They highlight that the news is selective about what firm links
it includes in its reporting. Consistent with (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), our find-
ings suggest that demand-side considerations drive the news to report about distressed firm
links. Extending (García, 2014) and (Niessner and So, 2018), we show that the demand-
side considerations incite the news to inform about the transmission of shocks from a less
popular distressed firm to a more popular firm.
12The slow incorporation of information into the asset prices of the larger linked firm is consistent with a
limited attention channel highlighted by (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008).
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2.5.2 Counterfactual
One may be tempted to believe that our results are driven by the fact that the news tends
to report about firms that experience a deterioration in financial health ((Niessner and So,
2018)). This would be the case, for example, if the news only reported about firms that ex-
perience financial distress and these firms ended up being mentioned in the same sentence
of an article out of pure coincidence. To evaluate whether this is the case, we repeat the
analysis of Figure 2·8 under the assumption that firms are linked at random if, in the month
in which the link appears in the news, one of the two linked firms experiences any one of
the following distress cases: Its monthly stock return lies in the bottom quintile of the stock
return distribution, its monthly realized volatility lies in the top quintile of the realized
volatility distribution, its net income lies in the bottom quintile of the net income distribu-
tion, or it experiences a credit downgrade. Figure 2·9 shows the post-link performance of
firms that are linked this way.
In contrast to Figure 2·8, Figure 2·9 shows that the larger linked firm would not expe-
rience transient financial distress after a link is reported in the news if the link were drawn
randomly when one of the two linked firms is distressed. Similar as in Figure 2·8, Figure
2·9 also shows that the smaller linked firm would experience a persistent deterioration of
financial health in the 6 months post link if the reason the news were reporting about a link
of this firm is because it is distressed. The analysis of Figure 2·9 confirms a key takeaway:
The news reports about links between a less popular firm that experiences financial distress
and a more popular firm that is seemingly healthy. The information reported in the news is
digested slowly by investors, resulting in asset price predictability.
2.6 Aggregate level results
Several recent papers argue that the architecture of the network of firm links is a key driver
of aggregate risks. (Carvalho, 2010) and (Gabaix, 2011) show that idiosyncratic shocks
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can amplify to large aggregate fluctuations when business links spread shocks across firms.
(Acemoglu et al., 2012) show that aggregate risks are high in a disaggregated economy that
is highly interconnected.13 (Herskovic, 2018) and (Herskovic et al., 2020) show that the
degrees of concentration and sparsity of a production network are systematic risk factors
that drive the cross-section of asset returns and idiosyncratic volatilities. These theoretical
results motivate us to investigate the relationship between news-implied firm networks and
aggregate risks.
We estimate a one-lag vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the joint dynamics of
GDP growth, S&P 500 returns, the VIX, the level and slope of the yield curve, the AAA
and BAA corporate credit spreads, the aggregate default rate, and news-implied connec-
tivity. Figures 2·10 through 2·12 show the cumulative impulse response functions of the
VAR model for one-standard-deviation orthogonal shocks to the average degree, the first-
order interconnectivity, and the second-order interconnectivity of a monthly news-implied
network. Our identification strategy is based on a Cholesky decomposition of the resid-
ual variance-covariance matrix, where we assume that GDP growth is the most exogenous
variable and the news-implied connectivity measures are the most endogenous variables.
The captions of Figures 2·10–2·12 provide details.
We see that shocks to the average degree of a news-implied network cause short-lived
increases in the VIX and the corporate bond spreads. Shocks to the first-order interconnec-
tivity measure are not associated with any significant short-term or long-term increases in
any of the risk measures. In contrast, shocks to the second-order interconnectivity measure
cause persistent and significant increases in the VIX, the BAA credit spread, and the aggre-
gate default rate, as well as persistent and significant GDP declines. Shock to second-order
interconnectivity are also associated with short-lived declines in aggregate stock returns.
Validating the theoretical results of (Acemoglu et al., 2012), (Carvalho, 2010), (Gabaix,
13Here, “disaggregated” means that there are several clusters or sectors of firms in the economy while
“interconnected” means that different clusters share links with each other.
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2011), (Herskovic, 2018), and (Herskovic et al., 2020), our empirical results confirm that
the architecture of the network of firms links that actively transmit risks across firms is a
key determinant of aggregate measures of risks. Our results show that changes in the archi-
tecture of the news-implied firm network predict large aggregate fluctuations, in particular
when the network becomes denser or more interconnected. These findings are consistent
with a channel posited by (Chahrour et al., 2019) that states that information disseminated
in the news can trigger aggregate shocks when firms are resource constrained and rely on
the news to identify risks in their production networks.
2.6.1 Informational content
We analyze the information contained in the different connectivity measures. We begin
with the average degree of the news-implied network. A large value of the average degree
tells us that the news reports about many links between firms. Links in the news-implied
firm network are typically distressed and facilitate the transmission of risks across firms
(see Section 2.5). As a result, periods of times with elevated average degree correspond
to episodes in which firms face elevated risks. Such episodes are typically associated with
high financial uncertainty. Based on this intuition, we evaluate whether the average degree
of the news-implied firm network is associated with measures of financial uncertainty.
We consider the level of the VIX, which is a forward looking measure of stock market
volatility, as well as the level of the VXO index, which is the implied volatility of short-term
S&P 100 Index options and has been employed as a measure of financial uncertainty by
(Basu and Bundick, 2017). We also consider the financial uncertainty measures of (Jurado
et al., 2015) and (Carriero et al., 2018), which are derived from econometric models for the
volatilities of macroeconomic and financial data. Finally, we consider a measure of stock
market volatility by (Baker et al., 2019) that is extracted from news data. Table 2.13 reports
the estimates of the regressions of the financial uncertainty measures on lagged values of
themselves and contemporaneous values of the connectivity measures for the news-implied
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VIX VXO Financial uncertainty Financial uncertainty EMV index
((Jurado et al., 2015)) ((Carriero et al., 2018)) ((Baker et al., 2019))
Intercept *  3.835 *  4.407 0.022  0.034  0.237
( 2.030) ( 2.270) (1.002) ( 0.393) ( 0.084)
Lagged value *** 0.735 *** 0.721 *** 0.935 *** 0.759 *** 0.379
(11.165) (10.735) (36.236) (11.014) (4.031)
News sentiment 3.843 3.191 *  0.117  0.149  4.563
(0.672) (0.522) ( 2.378) ( 0.525) ( 0.526)
Average degree *** 0.521 *** 0.563 * 0.002 *** 0.016 *** 0.740
(5.599) (5.637) (2.595) (3.618) (5.100)
First-order inter-
connectivity
0.834 0.934  0.013 0.022  0.179
(0.792) (0.839) ( 1.568) (0.510) ( 0.126)
Second-order inter-
connectivity
 37.142  36.772 0.194 *  1.884 58.903
( 1.583) ( 1.481) (0.972) ( 1.766) (1.578)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.819 0.821 0.972 0.825 0.497
Table 2.13: Regressions of several measures of financial uncertainty on their lagged values and con-
temporaneous values of the connectivity measures. The time series are monthly. Table 2.11 provides
summary statistics for all factors. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, *, and · denote
significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
network. The regressions also control for the aggregate sentiment of our news articles.
We find that the average degree is positively correlated with all five measures of financial
uncertainty. This holds when controlling for their strongly autoregressive nature and for
the other connectivity measures. Our results show that the average degree of the news-
implied firm network captures information about financial uncertainty. Given that financial
uncertainty is a key driver of risk premia in financial markets, the association between the
average degree of the news-implied firm network and the measures of financial uncertainty
explains why shocks to the average degree measure trigger short-term increases in the VIX
and the corporate credit spreads.
Second-order interconnectivity captures how strongly two largely connected firms are
connected to each other through intermediary firms. Given that the links reported in the
news facilitate the contagion of risks across firms (see Section 2.5), second-order intercon-
nectivity tells us something about how long the contagion chain can be. If the second-order
interconnectivity measure is large, then contagion can spread far in the economy across
clusters of firms. This suggests that second-order interconnectivity contains information
about the potential for contagion in the economy. Now, firms face elevated risk of de-
fault whenever they are hit with contagion (see (Azizpour et al., 2018), (Jorion and Zhang,
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2009), and others). As a result, we evaluate whether periods of elevated second-order in-
terconnectivity are associated with high default activity due to credit risk contagion.
We estimate a monthly one-lag vector-autoregressive (VAR) model for the joint dy-
namics of the GDP growth rate, the aggregate default rate, a credit risk contagion factor
estimated by (Azizpour et al., 2018) that measures the component of the conditional arrival
rate of defaults in the U.S. economy that is due to contagion of credit risk across econom-
ically linked firms, as well as our three connectivity measures.14 Figure 2·13 shows the
implied impulse response functions for the aggregate default rate and the contagion factor,
together with 95% confidence intervals, after one-standard deviation orthogonal shocks to
each of the three connectivity measures of the news-implied network. Our identification is
based on a Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix, where we
assume that GDP growth is the most exogenous variable and the news-implied connectivity
measures are the most endogenous variables.
Figure 2·13 shows that shocks to second-order interconnectivity predict significant and
persistent increases in the aggregate default rate and the contagion factor of (Azizpour et al.,
2018) that materialize after 6 months and persist for at least 12 months. We further find
that neither shocks to the average degree nor shocks to first-order interconnectivity trigger
increases in default activity. These results confirm that second-order interconnectivity in
the news-implied network gives a measure of the contagion potential in the U.S. economy.
2.7 Relationship with alternative networks
We assess the informational content of news-implied networks compared to networks de-
rived from alternative data sets. Aside of the BEA input-output networks discussed in
Section 2.4, we consider four additional alternative networks. A network derived from cus-
tomer segments data provided by Compustat, where the width of a link is proportional to
14The VAR model can be viewed as a discrete-time version of the reduced-form portfolio credit risk model
of (Azizpour et al., 2018).
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the total sales associated with a firm pair. A network derived from the 10-K textual sim-
ilarity scores of (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) in which the size of a link is proportional to
the similarity score between the 10-K’s of two firms. A network proposed by (Lee et al.,
2015) in which the width of a link is proportional to the frequency with which investors
look up information in consecutive order about the two linked firms on the SEC’s EDGAR
website. And, finally, a variance decomposition network for cross-sectional stock returns
obtained using the methodology of (Demirer et al., 2018). For the largest 50 firms by mar-
ket capitalization in our data sample, Figures 2·14 and 2·15 plots the alternative networks
and compares them to the network implied by our approach. We mark in green any link that
is included in an alternative network and our news-implied network. Red links are links
that are included in the alternative network but not in our news-implied network.
It is visible that our news-implied network differs from the competing networks. Our
approach is able to extract many more firm links than would be extracted from the Com-
pustat segments data or from the 10-K similarity scores of (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016).
We capture all of the customer-supplier implied by the Compustat segments data. We also
capture 83.87% of the links implied by the 10-K similarity scores of (Hoberg and Phillips,
2016), 77.47% of the links in the EDGAR co-search network of (Lee et al., 2015), and
55.94% of the links in the variance decomposition network. We see that the network im-
plied by a stock return variance decomposition is very dense. It shows a mesh architecture
rather than a star architecture. All the links in the news-implied network are also included
in the variance decomposition network. This suggests that the news reports about stock
market shocks that are transmitted across firms.
We proceed to analyze whether the differences highlighted in Figure 2·14 are signifi-
cant. For each of the alternative networks, we compute monthly time series of the connec-
tivity measures described in Section 2.4.15 We then regress each connectivity measure for
15We interpolate with the most recently available observation whenever the data is available in lower fre-
quencies. We exclude the EDGAR co-search network from this analysis because it only overlaps with our
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Average degree First-order IC Second-order IC
Intercept ** 84.617 *** 10.218 0.236
(2.992) (3.797) (0.957)
Segments network  0.001  0.151  0.146
( 0.266) ( 0.492) ( 0.638)
(Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) network *  3.263 **  0.345 *  1070.403
( 2.316) ( 2.725) ( 2.041)
Variance decomposition network  0.032 0.004  2.628
( 0.996) (0.257) ( 0.236)
BEA input network  0.620  0.293 *  0.028
( 0.311) ( 1.489) ( 2.241)
Number of observations 71 71 71
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.164 0.078
Table 2.14: Regressions of our connectivity measures on the analogous connectivity measures of the
alternative networks. The time series are monthly. “IC” stands for interconnectivity. The values in
parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence levels, respectively.
our news-implied network on the analogous connectivity measures of the alternative net-
works. Table 2.14 summarizes our results. We find that the connectivity measures of our
news-implied network are negatively related to the connectivity measures of the (Hoberg
and Phillips, 2016) network. We also find a negative relationship between the second-order
interconnectivity of our news-implied network and that of the BEA input network. The R2
are low, however, maxing out at 16% for the first-order interconnectivity measure. These
findings show that the connectivity measures of the news-implied network contain infor-
mation that is not fully captured by alternative networks.
2.7.1 Horse race
In a final step, we evaluate the predictive power of news-implied networks in conjunction
with alternative networks. We run one-step ahead predictive regressions for the S&P 500
returns, the VIX, the AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, and the growth rate of GDP at
the monthly frequency. We found in Section 2.6 that the connectivity measures of the news-
implied network are predictive of these variables. We proceed to verify whether news-
implied connectivity is a better predictor of these variables than the connectivity measures
of alternative networks.
Table 2.15 summarizes the results of the predictive regressions. We find that measures
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of connectivity of the news-implied network predict the S&P 500 returns, the VIX, the
AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, and the GDP growth rates one month ahead even
when controlling for the connectivity measures of the alternative networks. In contrast,
we generally do not find that the connectivity measures of the alternative networks pre-
dict these proxies of aggregate distress. The out-of-sample R2 suggest significantly higher
predictive power when a model includes the connectivity measures of the news-implied net-
work. F-tests reject the null hypothesis that the connectivity measures of the news-implied
network are not predictive when also controlling for the connectivity of the alternative net-
works. The signs of the statistically significant estimates suggest that a more connected
news-implied network predicts aggregate distress in the next month, consistent with the
theoretical results of (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
All in one, the results of this section show that news-implied networks are better pre-
dictors of measures of aggregate risks than networks derived from currently available data
sets.
2.8 Conclusion
We show that the news is a primary source of data on distressed firm links that drive firm-
level and aggregate risks. Our results demonstrate that the news tends to report about
links that facilitate contagion and induce asset price predictability. Measures of news-
implied firm connectivity are correlated with measures of financial uncertainty and credit
risk contagion, and predict aggregate outcomes out-of-sample. The information contained
in news-implied networks is complementary to the information contained in alternative
networks. To obtain our results, we develop a machine learning methodology that takes
news articles as input and extracts a network of firm connections implied by the news. The
























































































































































Industrials (11.65%)Consumer Discretionary (12.09%)
Consumer Staples (3.69%)
Health Care (14.68%)




Whole CRSP / Compustat universe
(c) GICS sector distributions in our sample and in the CRSP / Compustat universe.
Figure 2·2: Graphical summary of the sample of firms in our data. The sample includes 2,961 distinct
firms and covers the time period between October 20, 2006, and November 20, 2013. In Figure (c), we
obtain data for the whole universe of firms in the CRSP / Compustat database and display the distribution
of sectors in those data.
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Figure 2·3: Network of firms implied by the full news data sample covering the years 2006 through
2013. We only plot the largest 50 firm nodes in our network. The size of a node is proportional to the
number of times that firm is identified to be connected to another firm. The width of a link between two
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Year 2006. (b) Year 2007.
(c) Year 2008. (d) Year 2009.
Figure 2·5: Time series of news-implied networks in our data sample for the years 2006 through 2009.
For any given year, we collect the links identified in news articles published in that year and aggregate
to a network. The size of a node is proportional to the number of times that firm is identified to be
connected to another firm in a year’s data. The width of a link between two firms is proportional to the
number of times that link is identified in a year’s data.
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(a) Year 2010. (b) Year 2011.
(c) Year 2012. (d) Year 2013.
Figure 2·6: Time series of news-implied networks in our data sample for the years 2010 through 2013.
For any given year, we collect the links identified in news articles published in that year and aggregate
to a network. The size of a node is proportional to the number of times that firm is identified to be
connected to another firm in a year’s data. The width of a link between two firms is proportional to the
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Average sentiment of news articles
Correlation =  −0.3
Figure 2·7: Time series of the average degree, first-order interconnectivity, and second-order intercon-
nectivity for the networks implied by our news data. For any given month, we collect all news article
published in that month and extract firm links using the methodology of Section 2.2. Given a monthly




t , where Nt is the number of nodes in the
network of month t and dnt = ÂNj=1 w
j,n
t is the degree of node n is the number of links of node n on
month t (w j,nt is the number of links that connect nodes j and n on month t). We also evaluate the first-









and the second-order interconnectivity









. In any given month, we consider only the largest 200 nodes with
size measured by the degree of a node.
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(a) Post-link performance of the larger of the two linked firms.
Cumulative monthly stock return
Months since observed link
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(b) Post-link performance of the smaller of the two linked firms.
Figure 2·8: Post-link performance of linked firms. Each time we observe a link between two firms, we
collect for each of the firms their realized stock returns, credit rating changes, and reported net incomes
over the subsequent six months after the link is observed in the data. The above plots show the cross-
sectional averages (black lines) for each of the variables in the months following the link month, which
we denote month 0. The grey areas show 95% asymptotic confidence intervals for the cross-sectional
averages.
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(a) Post-link performance of the larger of the two linked firms.
Cumulative monthly stock return
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(b) Post-link performance of the smaller of the two linked firms.
Figure 2·9: Post-link performance of linked firms, where the link is drawn at random if one of the two
firms experiences financial distress. Here, we consider a firm to be distressed is one of the following
conditions applies: (i) its monthly stock return lies in the bottom quintile of the observed distribution
of monthly stock returns in our sample, (ii) its monthly realized volatility lies in the top quintile of
the observed distribution of monthly realized volatilities in our sample, (iii) its net income lies in the
bottom quintile of the observed distribution of monthly net incomes in our sample, or (iv) it experiences
a credit downgrade. We draw links among the set of firms that satisfy these properties at random from
a Bernoulli distribution, where the probability of success is equal to the unconditional probability of
observing a link in our data. Each time we draw a link, we collect for each of the firms their realized
stock returns, credit rating changes, and reported net incomes over the subsequent six months after the
link is drawn. The above plots show the cross-sectional averages (black lines) for each of the variables
in the months following the link month, which we denote month 0. The grey areas show 95% asymptotic















































































Figure 2·10: Cumulative impulse response functions to orthogonal shocks to the average degree mea-
sure of a news-implied network for a one-lag vector autoregressive model of the joint dynamics of GDP
growth, S&P 500 returns, the VIX, the AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, the level and slope
of the yield curve, the aggregate default rate in the U.S., and news-implied connectivity. The red line
give the impulse responses and the grey areas give 95% confidence bands computed via bootstrap with
1000 bootstrap samples. We consider one-standard deviation shocks to the orthogonal component of
the impulse variable. We base our identification on a Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-
covariance matrix, where the variables are ordered as follows: (1) GDP growth, (2) S&P 500 returns,
(3) VIX, (4) Yield curve level, (5) Yield curve slope, (6) AAA credit spread, (7) BAA credit spread,
(8) Aggregate default rate, (9) Average degree, (10), The residual of a regression of first-order intercon-
nectivity on average degree, and (11) the residual of a regression of second-order interconnectivity on





















































































Figure 2·11: Cumulative impulse response functions to orthogonal shocks to the first-order intercon-
nectivity measure of a news-implied network for a one-lag vector autoregressive model of the joint
dynamics of GDP growth, S&P 500 returns, the VIX, the AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, the
level and slope of the yield curve, the aggregate default rate in the U.S., and news-implied connectivity.
The red line give the impulse responses and the grey areas give 95% confidence bands computed via
bootstrap with 1000 bootstrap samples. We consider one-standard deviation shocks to the orthogonal
component of the impulse variable. We base our identification on a Cholesky decomposition of the
residual variance-covariance matrix, where the variables are ordered as follows: (1) GDP growth, (2)
S&P 500 returns, (3) VIX, (4) Yield curve level, (5) Yield curve slope, (6) AAA credit spread, (7)
BAA credit spread, (8) Aggregate default rate, (9) Average degree, (10), The residual of a regression
of first-order interconnectivity on average degree, and (11) the residual of a regression of second-order

















































































Figure 2·12: Cumulative impulse response functions to orthogonal shocks to the second-order inter-
connectivity measure of a news-implied network for a one-lag vector autoregressive model of the joint
dynamics of GDP growth, S&P 500 returns, the VIX, the AAA and BAA corporate credit spreads, the
level and slope of the yield curve, the aggregate default rate in the U.S., and news-implied connectivity.
The red line give the impulse responses and the grey areas give 95% confidence bands computed via
bootstrap with 1000 bootstrap samples. We consider one-standard deviation shocks to the orthogonal
component of the impulse variable. We base our identification on a Cholesky decomposition of the
residual variance-covariance matrix, where the variables are ordered as follows: (1) GDP growth, (2)
S&P 500 returns, (3) VIX, (4) Yield curve level, (5) Yield curve slope, (6) AAA credit spread, (7)
BAA credit spread, (8) Aggregate default rate, (9) Average degree, (10), The residual of a regression
of first-order interconnectivity on average degree, and (11) the residual of a regression of second-order





























































(b) Impulse response functions of the contagion factor to orthogonal shocks in the con-
nectivity measures.
Figure 2·13: Impulse response functions for the aggregate default rate in the U.S. and the contagion
factor of (Azizpour et al., 2018) based on one-standard deviation orthogonal shocks to the connectivity
measures of the news-implied network. The impulse response functions are implied by a monthly one-
lag VAR model for the joint dynamics of GDP growth, the aggregate default rate, the contagion factor,
and the three connectivity measures. We estimate the VAR model using default timing data obtained
from Moody’s Default Risk Service; Table 2.11 provide summary statistics. The red lines in the impulse
response functions give the average responses and the grey areas give 95% confidence bands computed
via bootstrap with 1000 bootstrap samples. Our identification is based on a Cholesky decomposition of
the residual variance-covariance matrix, where the variables are ordered as follows: (1) GDP growth,
(2) Aggregate default rate, (3) Contagion factor of (Azizpour et al., 2018), (4) Average degree, (5),
The residual of a regression of first-order interconnectivity on average degree, and (6) the residual of a
regression of second-order interconnectivity on average degree and first-order interconnectivity.
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(a) Compustat segments network. (b) News-implied network.
(c) Variance decomposition network ((Demirer
et al., 2018)).
(d) News-implied network.
Figure 2·14: Comparison of alternative networks. Green marks a link that is included in our news-
implied network and the corresponding competing network. Red marks a link that is in a competing
network but not in our news-implied network. The competing networks are paired row-wise.
58
(a) 10-K similarity network ((Hoberg and
Phillips, 2016)).
(b) News-implied network.
(c) EDGAR co-search network ((Lee et al.,
2015)).
(d) News-implied network.
Figure 2·15: Comparison of alternative networks. Green marks a link that is included in our news-
implied network and the corresponding competing network. Red marks a link that is in a competing
network but not in our news-implied network. The competing networks are paired row-wise.
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Chapter 3
Peer Co-Movement in Crypto Markets
3.1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies are a new asset class that has drawn significant investor capital. By
November 2020, there were more than 6,000 cryptocurrencies traded on over 400 ex-
changes around the globe. The aggregate market cap of cryptocurrencies exceeded $1
trillion in January 2021 with over $150 billion in daily trading volume. There are also
close to 100 actively managed funds that currently operate in crypto markets ((Bianchi and
Babiak, 2020)). As cryptocurrencies become more mainstream, an important question for
investors is: what drives co-movement across cryptocurrencies? Gaining an understanding
of the drivers of crypto co-movement is of key relevance for portfolio construction and risk
management in this nascent market.
The literature has posited two channels that explain the co-movement of cryptocurren-
cies. One channel posits that common risk factors drive the pricing of the cross section of
cryptocurrencies; see (Liu and Tsyvinski, 2020), (Liu et al., 2019), and others. Another
channel, advocated by (Shams, 2020), posits that correlated demand shocks among cryptos
that are co-listed in an exchange are an additional source of co-variation. In this paper, we
propose a third channel: co-movement due to peer linkages. Our results are threefold. First,
we show that crypto peers exhibit strong co-movement after accounting for common risk
factors and correlated demand shocks. The co-movement we uncover aligns with a com-
petition effect that is also present in traditional financial markets. Second, we show that
peer linkages yield return predictability in crypto markets that can be exploited through
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trading strategies with significant Sharpe ratios. And, third, we propose a natural language
processing methodology that identifies peer linkages in crypto markets from co-mentions
in online news.
We run event-based difference-in-difference panel regressions to study the co-movement
of cryptocurrency peers. We analyze the weekly performance of the 100 largest cryptos by
market capitalization between October 1, 2017, and November 30, 2020, and say that a
crypto experiences a shock if, during an event week, it experiences a weekly abnormal
return (in excess of common risk factors) that falls in the bottom decile of the distribu-
tion of abnormal returns across cryptos and time. We identify peer cryptos if they are
co-mentioned with a shocked crypto in online news published during an event week using
a novel machine learning methodology. We then keep track of shocked, peer, and non-peer
cryptos in the weeks surrounding an event. We analyze the total and abnormal returns, to-
tal and idiosyncratic volatilities, trading volumes, as well as news and social media activity
for all cryptos in our sample in the weeks surrounding an event. Our analysis is based on
data collected from Coingecko, CoinAPI, and Cryptocompare. These data sources have
recently been employed for the empirical analysis of cryptocurrency markets; see (Griffin
and Shams, 2020), (Li et al., 2020), and (Lyandres et al., 2020), among others.
Our regressions show that the abnormal returns of shocked and peer cryptos move in
opposite directions during an event week. Shocked cryptos record excess abnormal returns
of  16% during event weeks. The peers of shocked cryptos record statistically significant
excess abnormal returns of 4.5% during event weeks. We find that peer cryptos also ex-
perience abnormally large total returns and are more frequently mentioned in online news
during event weeks. We establish these measurement while controlling for several char-
acteristics of the cryptos as well as for crypto and industry-date fixed effects. Our results
suggest that crypto peers co-move in accordance to what is commonly understood to be a
competition effect in traditional financial markets (as opposed to a contagion effect).1
1The competition effect among peers implies that prices of peer assets co-move in opposite directions
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Our results are highly robust. They hold after accounting for the market, size, and mo-
mentum factors of (Liu et al., 2019). Our findings are not explained by co-listing linkages
that account for correlated demand shocks as in (Shams, 2020). We find weaker evidence
in support of a competition effect among crypto peers if we consider intra-industry peers
rather than news-comentioned peers. This suggests that investors primarily learn from the
news about crypto peer linkages. We also find significant albeit weaker evidence in support
of a competition effect governing the co-movement of peer cryptos when we consider pos-
itive rather than negative abnormal return shocks. A weakened response to positive shocks
is consistent with behavioral biases against downside risk ((Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
(Kuhnen, 2015), and others).
Next, we show that peer linkages give rise to return predictability in crypto markets.
We find that the co-movement we uncover primarily arises when shocks occur that are not
informational in nature. That is, peer co-movement is strongest in response to events that
are not accompanied by abnormally high news activity, trading volumes, or idiosyncratic
volatilities for shocked cryptos. This observation suggests that the co-movement we un-
cover is not due to a release of pricing-relevant information. Our results imply that peer
cryptos are temporarily mispriced. We find that the mispricing is concentrated among peer
cryptos with smaller market capitalizations than shocked cryptos. Smaller peers face lower
levels of investor attention, which exacerbates mispricing due to a slower processing of in-
formation ((Hou, 2007)). Based on these findings, we conjecture that the prices of smaller
peer cryptos must experience reversal in the weeks after an event.
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that it takes more than a month after a shock
when large shocks hit one asset because investors move their funds away from shocked assets and into similar
unaffected assets. Evidence of competition effects in equity and bond markets has been established by (Ferris
et al., 1997), (Hsu et al., 2010), (Jorion and Zhang, 2007), (Slovin et al., 1999), and others. An alternative
effect is contagion, which posits that the prices of peer assets co-move in the same direction when large
shocks hit because investors extrapolate that peer assets may be experiencing similar shocks as shocked
assets (see (Gande and Parsley, 2005), (Lang and Stulz, 1992), (Li, 2017), and (Song and Walkling, 2000),
among others).
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for the mispricing to vanish. Over this time period, the prices of smaller peer cryptos dif-
fuse down. We build trading strategies that exploit the predictable reversal of performance
among smaller peer cryptos. Our strategies short-sell smaller peer cryptos while going long
on Bitcoin as a proxy for the market. We keep the positions open for several weeks and
account for realistic trading fees.
We find that strategies that keep the positions open between 14 and 18 weeks generate
significant alphas of 60 basis point per week without loading on the market, size, or mo-
mentum factors. These strategies have annualized Sharpe ratio of around 2 after fees. We
find that the predictability among peer cryptos can be attributed to attention constraints.
Investors react to large abnormal return shocks by shifting their investments from shocked
to peer cryptos, raising the prices of peer cryptos as implied by a competition effect. Then,
they slowly process that the shocks do not reveal pricing-relevant information for peer
cryptos. They trade to undo the price increases over the span of several weeks, resulting
in return predictability. We find that these effects are stronger for cryptos that face trading
frictions, such as short-selling constraints. Our results suggest that trading frictions com-
pound the mispricing of smaller peer cryptos, complementing similar results by (Hou and
Moskowitz, 2005) established for equities.
Our findings hinge on how we identify peer linkages in crypto markets. Inspired by
the recent approaches of (Scherbina and Schlusche, 2016) and (Schwenkler and Zheng,
2019), who document that financial news often reports about economic linkages between
firms, we use online news to identify crypto peer linkages. We develop an extension of
the natural language processing methodology of (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019) to analyze
over 200,000 online news articles collected from Cryptocompare. We say that two cryptos
are peers if (i) they are mentioned in the same sentence of an article, and (ii) the sentence
describes a competitive relation according to a novel BERT classification model ((Devlin
et al., 2018)).
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Several robustness checks validate our approach. First, we use a subsample of 460 sen-
tences that mention at least two cryptos and we manually assign a label of competition or
non-competition depending on whether these sentences clearly describe a competitive rela-
tionship.2 We train our BERT labeling model on this subsample of sentences and estimate
its accuracy via cross validation.3 The resulting model has an out-of-sample accuracy rate
of 85%, suggesting that our approach is highly accurate at identifying competitive links
in crypto news. We use our few-shot trained model to label the remaining sentences, and
hand-check the output to make sure the results are accurate.
Next, we take all possible crypto pairs and build an indicator of whether a given pair
was ever labeled as peer in our sample. We find that the likelihood that the peer indicator
is positive is significantly higher if the two cryptos have similar ages, Alexa ranks, market
betas, or size betas. The link likelihood is also higher if the two cryptos operate in the
same industry, if they are co-listed in common exchanges, or if they are similarly popular
in online news. These results hold when controlling for characteristics of the two cryptos
and the crypto pair, as well as crypto fixed effects. They also hold conditionally in the
time series. Our findings suggest that it is more likely that our methodology links two
cryptos if they share similar characteristics – that is, if they are peers. These results validate
our approach to identify cryptocurrency peers from online news. In a robustness check,
we establish similar co-movement when we consider intra-industry peers rather than news
co-mentioned peers. We find, however, that co-movement is strongest among news co-
mentioned peers, providing further validity for our approach.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this introduction discusses the
related literature. Section 3.2 provides an overview of our data. Section 3.3 describes the
network of cryptocurrencies extracted from our news data and shows that the linkages we
identify in the news correspond to peer links. The event-based regressions can be found
2The training sample of sentences is available at www.gustavo-schwenkler.com.
3The model was fitted using a pre-trained BERT model with code from Sanjiv Das.
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in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 provides robustness analyses. Section 3.6 studies the return
predictability among crypto peers in response to large shocks. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1.1 Related literature
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. We primarily contribute to the
growing literature on cryptocurrencies. Several papers study the statistical properties of
cryptocurrency returns ((Griffin and Shams, 2020), (Li et al., 2020), (Liu et al., 2019), and
(Scaillet et al., 2018)), initial coin offerings ((Benedetti and Kostovetsky, 2021), (Chod and
Lyandres, 2021), (Davydiuk et al., 2020), (Gan et al., 2021), (Howell et al., 2020), and
(Lee et al., 2019)), and blockchain-based asset pricing ((Cong et al., 2021a), (Cong et al.,
2020), and (Pagnotta and Buraschi, 2018)). Our paper focuses on the co-movement of
cryptocurrencies. We show that peer linkages drive crypto co-movement after controlling
for the common risk factors (Liu et al., 2019) and the correlated demand channel of (Shams,
2020).4 We also establish return predictability in crypto markets due to peer linkages,
complementing recent predictability findings by (Cong et al., 2021b), (Liu and Tsyvinski,
2020), and (Makarov and Schoar, 2020).
We contribute to the literature on return predictability due to economic linkages. In an-
alyzing supply chains, (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016), (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), (Menzly
and Ozbas, 2010), and others show that the asset prices of one counterparty slowly incor-
porate information about shocks that impact the other counterparty. (Jorion and Zhang,
2009) consider trade credit relationships and show that creditors exhibit persistently de-
pressed returns and inflated CDS spreads in response to the default of a debtor. (Boone and
Ivanov, 2012) and (Cao et al., 2016) document return predictability for firms in strategic
partnership alliances. Supplementing these prior studies that consider explicit contractual
linkages, we find that implicit linkages such as peer relationships can also induce return
4Our paper is closely related to (Shams, 2020), who studies whether correlated demand shocks, as proxied
by co-listings in common exchanges, yields crypto co-movement. We, on the other hand, study co-movement
only in response to large shocks and only among peer cryptos.
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predictability.5 Our findings are aligned with the literature on lead-lag relationships in eq-
uity markets. (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) document that the returns of large stocks lead
those of small stocks, and (Hou, 2007) show that this lead-lag relationship is concentrated
among intra-industry peers. (Brennan et al., 1993), (Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000), and
(Parsons et al., 2020) explain the lead-lag relationship with investor inattention, while (Hou
and Moskowitz, 2005) argue that market frictions are the reason for the lead-lag relation-
ship. We find that the predictability among crypto peers is strongest among smaller peers
that likely face short-selling constraints. Our results point to trading frictions exacerbating
return predictability among peer cryptos, similarly as (Boehmer and Wu, 2012) and (Saffi
and Sigurdsson, 2011) establish for equity markets.
Finally, we contribute to the literature that studies contagion and competition effects
among peer assets. This is a rich literature that has mostly focused on equity and bond
markets; see (Hsu et al., 2010), (Jorion and Zhang, 2007), (Lang and Stulz, 1992), (Slovin
et al., 1999), (Song and Walkling, 2000), and others.6 In contrast to the existing studies, we
provide novel evidence of competition effects among peer assets in cryptocurrency markets.
3.2 Data
We obtain daily data on crypto returns and news as well as defining characteristics of the
different cryptos for the time between October 1, 2017, and November 30, 2020. We col-
lect these data from websites called CoinAPI (https://www.coinapi.io), CoinGecko
(https://www.coingecko.com/en), and Cryptocompare (http://www.cryptocompare.
com). CoinAPI and Cryptocompare are well-known crypto data aggregators that are often
used for academic research; see (Griffin and Shams, 2020), (Li et al., 2020), (Shams, 2020),
5(Lee et al., 2015) show that peer linkages explain a large fraction of the cross-sectional stock return
variation.
6There is a large literature that also studies how peers affect corporate policies; see (Cao et al., 2019),
(Dessaint et al., 2018), (Foucault and Fresard, 2014), and (Leary and Roberts, 2014), among others. Our
results are silent about the behavior of issuers of cryptocurrencies. We only focus on the behavior of market
prices.
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and others. However, these sources do not provide reliable historical data on prices, mar-
ket capitalizations, and aggregate trading volumes. We turn to CoinGecko to obtain those
data. Data from CoinGecko has been used by (Chuen et al., 2017), (Lee et al., 2019), and
(Lyandres et al., 2020), among others. Below, we describe in detail how we collect our
data.
We construct weekly time series from daily data. Weeks in our data begin on Wednes-
days and end on Tuesdays.
3.2.1 Asset-level data
We obtain from Cryptocompare information on characteristics of the different cryptos, such
as the maximal number of mineable coins, the date in which content about a crypto asset
was first published on Cryptocompare, and the industry classification of the crypto asset
according to Cryptocompare.7 We obtain these data using the Coinlist API. We obtain
from CoinAPI data on the date when a crypto asset first started trading on an exchange as
well as a list of all exchanges on which cryptos are traded. For each crypto asset and each
day in our sample, we keep track of all exchanges on which the asset was traded.
For each crypto asset and day in our sample, we collect end-of-the-day closing prices,
market capitalizations, and traded volumes in USD from Coingecko.8 We compute daily
log-returns based on these data, and censor for each crypto the top and bottom one percent
daily return realizations as these are likely to be abnormal outliers. Weekly returns and
trading volumes are computed as the sum of all available daily log-returns and daily trading
volumes of a week. We compute time series of weekly volatilities for all cryptos as the
standard deviation of the daily log-returns over the course of a week.
7We complement Cryptocompare’s industry classification with data from Coingecko and (Lyandres et al.,
2020).
8Prices on Coingecko are computed as global value-weighted averages of the last traded prices before
midnight GMT on all tracked exchanges. When the last available price in an exchange is not quoted in USD,
Coingecko uses exchange rates from https://openexchangerates.org to convert to USD. Market capi-
talizations are computed as the product of the available supply and the closing price. Volumes are measured
in USD and aggregated across exchanges at the end of the day.
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Coingecko also records daily social media following data. For each crypto asset and
week in our sample, we collect the number of followers on Twitter and Reddit, respectively,
as well as the Alexa rank of the main crypto asset website. We also collect the hourly
number of active users, posts, and comments on Reddit for each crypto asset. Finally,
we collect from Coingecko some additional characteristics about the different cryptos. We
obtain information about whether the crypto asset is a currency or a token. If it is a currency,
we obtain the date when the white paper was published. If it is a token, we obtain the start
and end dates of the token’s initial coin offering (ICO).
We compute the age of a crypto asset as the difference in years between the last day
of a week and the earliest date among the following set of dates: 1) The first date in our
sample for which Coingecko recorded a closing price, 2) The day when the white paper
of a cryptocurrency was published according to Coingecko, 3) The start date of the ICO
for a crypto token according to Coingecko, 4) the end date of the ICO for a crypto token
according to Coingecko, 5) the first date on which a crypto asset was traded on an exchange
according to CoinAPI, and 6) the date in which content about the crypto asset was first
published on Cryptocompare. For a crypto asset that has missing market capitalization
in our data, we compute a proxy of its market capitalizations as follows. We first take the
product of the end-of-the-day price and the end-of-the-day floating coin supply, and replace
the missing market capitalization with this value if available. When not available, we take
the product of the end-of-the-day price and the total coin supply. All coins that are left with
missing market capitalizations even with these proxies are excluded from our analysis. We
also exclude all cryptos that traded at an average price of less than five U.S. cents over the
sample horizon, as well as all stablecoins.
Out of the set of cryptos that survive all of these steps, we keep in our analysis only
the largest 100 cryptos by average market capitalization throughout the sampling period.9
These 100 cryptos cover over 95% of the total market capitalization in crypto markets. The
9The original data set includes over 4,500 cryptos.
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Arts, Entertainment and Recreation (2%)
Wholesale and Retail Trade (2%)
Decentralized Finance (6%)
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (7%)
Information and Communication (10%)
Coin (15%)
Blockchain−Specific Application (23%)
Financial and Insurance Activities (35%)
Figure 3·1: Classification of the industries in which cryptos in our data sample operate. We obtain
industry classification data from Cryptocompare. Whenever unavailable, we complement the data with
industry classifications from Coingecko and from (Lyandres et al., 2020). We manually classify any
asset that remains unclassified after the previous steps.
final data set that we consider includes 87,827 crypto-week observations.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the cryptos in our data set. Our data spans a
wide cross section of assets, covering large and well-established cryptos, such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum, as well as smaller and newer cryptos, such as Sushi (a decentralized finance
platform for the trading of crypto assets) and Keep3rV1 (a decentralized task delegation
platform). Most of the assets in our data base have a limited supply of coins. A notable
exception is Ethereum, which has no hard cap on the number of mineable coins. About
half of the assets in our sample went through an ICO. Figure 3·1 shows a classification
of the industries in which our cryptos operate. About one-fourth of the assets in our sam-
ple are blockchain-specific applications, one-third provide financial or insurance solutions,
and fifteen percent are coins. The remaining cryptos relate to decentralized finance, arts,
entertainment, recreation, IT, communication, or wholesale and retail trade applications.
3.2.2 Risk factors
We follow (Liu et al., 2019) and construct market, size, and momentum factors to explain
the cross section of cryptocurrency returns. We begin by constructing a value-weighted








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































constant maturity rate from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED website and use this as a proxy
for the risk-free rate after scaling the rate for daily or weekly time horizons. We compute
the market factor as the difference between the return of the market index and the risk-
free rate. The size factor is the difference between the returns of the bottom and the top
equally-weighted quintile portfolios of the market capitalization distribution during that
week, in excess of the risk-free rate. For the momentum factor, we follow (Jegadeesh and
Titman, 1993) and sort cryptos into quintiles according to their prior week’s returns. The
realization of the momentum factor is then computed as the difference between the current
week’s returns of the top and bottom equally-weighted quintile portfolios, also in excess of
the risk-free rate.
Figure 3·2 shows the cumulative market return and weekly market volatility over our
sampling horizon, together with the weekly realizations of the size and momentum factors.
It also shows the market-cap-based weights that Bitcoin and Ethereum carry over time
in the composition of the market index. We see that our data spans periods in which the
market boomed and periods in which the market busted. We also see that our sample covers
periods of high aggregate volatility and low aggregate volatility. Bitcoin and Ethereum are
key drivers of aggregate performance, composing between 70% and 90% of the total market
capitalization in the market.
We estimate factor betas as well as abnormal returns and idiosyncratic volatilities for
each of the cryptos in our sample. We take all daily returns available for an asset and regress
these on the same-day factor realizations. The estimated regression coefficients are the fac-
tor betas and the residuals are the abnormal returns. We compute the weekly idiosyncratic
volatility of a crypto asset as the standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns during a
given week. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the factor betas, abnormal returns, and
idiosyncratic volatilities. We see that there are cryptos, such as LEO Token (a token that
can be used to carry out transaction on the Bitfinex exchange), that have low market betas
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99bitcoins AMB Crypto Bitcoin Magazine Bitcoin.com
Bitcoinerx Bitcoinist Blokt CCN
Chaindd Chaintimes CoinDesk CoinGape
CoinJoker Coinnounce CoinSpeaker CoinTelegraph
Cointelligence CriptoNoticias Crypto Briefing Crypto CoreMedia
Crypto Potato Crypto Watch CryptoCompare CryptoGlobe
CryptoInsider CryptoNewsReview CryptoNewsZ Cryptopolitan
CryptoSlate CryptoVest Decrypt DiarioBitcoin
EspacioBit Ethereum World News ETHNews.com Finance Magnates
Live Bitcoin News NewsBTC NullTx The Daily Hodl
TheBlock TimesNext TrustNodes Yahoo Finance Bitcoin
Table 3.2: News sources aggregated on the Cryptocompare News API.
and provide hedges against market fluctuations. There are also cryptos that provide market
betas larger than one. Sushi, a DeFi crypto exchange, is one such crypto asset. Idiosyn-
cratic volatilities can be large, ranging anywhere from 1.8% for RenBTC (a protocol that
replicates Bitcoin in the Ethereum network) to over 46% for Sushi.
3.2.3 News data
We apply machine learning tools to identify cryptos mentioned in news media. For every
week in our sampling horizon, we download all news articles available on the Cryptocom-
pare News API. This API provides crypto news articles that are published in a series of
online publications. Table 3.2 lists all the news sources aggregated in the Cryptocompare
News API. In order for a news article to appear in the Cryptocompare News API, it needs
to include specific keywords that suggest that the article is related to crypto markets. Cryp-
tocompare categorizes news articles that are included in its data based on the keywords that
it includes. Table 3.3 shows the list of news categories and associated keywords that used
by the Cryptocompare News API to select which news articles enter its database. We only
consider news articles that are written in English. The ultimate news data we use in our
analysis includes 200,932 articles.
We apply a variation of the machine learning methodology developed by (Schwenkler
and Zheng, 2019) to extract the names of cryptos in the news data. The methodology of
(Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019) is a three-step methodology that identifies firm names in





Asia ASIA, CHINA, KOREA, JAPAN, HONG, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN
BCH BCH, BITCOINCASH
(must include “BITCOIN CASH”)
Blockchain BLOCKCHAIN, PROTOCOL, SCALING
BTC BTC, BITCOIN, SATOSHI
(exclude if “BITCOIN CASH” appears)
Business BUSINESS, INVESTOR, INVESTORS, REVENUE, PROFIT,
ENTERPRISE, COMMERCE, STOCK
Commodity COMMODITIES, OIL, OIL-BACKED
DASH DASH, DIGITALCASH
ETC ETC, ETHEREUMCLASSIC
(exclude if “ETHEREUM CLASSIC” appears)
ETH ETH, ETHEREUM, VITALIK, FOUNDATION
(exclude if “ETHEREUM CLASSIC” appears)
Exchange EXCHANGE, BITFINEX, POLONIEX, BINANCE
Fiat FIAT, RESERVE, GOLD, GOLD-BACKED, BANK,
DOLLAR, POUND, EURO, YEN
ICO ICOS, ICO, OFFERING, TOKEN, TOKENS, RAISE, RAISED
LTC LTC, LITECOIN
Market MARKET, MARKETS, ANALYSIS, INDEX, PRICES
Mining MINING, HASHRATE, HASHING, POOLS, REWARD
Regulation REGULATION, LEGAL, LAW, TAX, TAXES, SENATE,
LEGISLATION, PRESIDENT, TREASURY, SEC, BOE
Sponsored SPONSORED, FEATURED, PRESS RELEASE, PRESS RELEASES
Trading TECHNICAL, TRADING, FUNDAMENTALS, PRICE, BULL,
BEAR, BULLISH, BEARISH, RALLY
Technology SOFTWARE, TECHNOLOGY, TECH
TRX TRX, TRONIX
USDT USDT, TETHER






Table 3.3: News categories and associated keywords for the news data available on the Cryptocompare
News API. For a news article to be included in the Cryptocompare News API, it needs to have been
published in one of the sources listed in Table 3.2 and include at least one of the keywords listed in this
table. Cryptocompare categorizes news articles as highlighted above depending on their keywords.
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organizations in text data. In the second step, it exploits a proprietary machine learning
methodology to select the named organizations that are firms and cluster all firm mentions
that correspond to the same entity. In a final step, it matches the recognized firms with the
firms contained in the CRSP / Compustat universe by using both firm names and tickers.
The methodology of (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019) is highly accurate, with accuracy rates
in the order of 70%. We extend this methodology to identify crypto peers. We only alter the
third step of the methodology. We match the recognized cryptos in our news data with those
contained in the Coingecko universe. We keep track of the article and sentence identifiers,
as well as publishing date for all cryptos recognized in our news data.
We identify 90 cryptos in our news data which are also included in the set of the largest
100 cryptos by market capitalization. These 90 cryptos are mentioned 607,098 times in the
news. Summary statistics in Table 3.1 show that the distribution of crypto mentions in the
news is highly skewed. Figure 3·3 shows that popular cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin,
are mentioned very frequently in the news. Smaller and lesser known cryptos, such as Civic
(a token used in a personal identity verification platform), are rarely mentioned.
We run zero-inflated negative binomial regressions to understand what characteristics
drive the frequency with which cryptos are mentioned in the news. Letting mi denote the
number of times crypto i is mentioned in our news data, our regression specifies












, µi = eb
0
pXi , and q is an over-dispersion parameter. Table 3.4 reports the
estimates of bp, bz, and q. The estimates suggest that the news is more likely to mention
cryptos with large market capitalizations and large online following. They also suggest
that the news is less likely to report about cryptos that are traded in few exchanges. These
findings suggest that news reporting tilts towards well-established cryptos, an empirical
fact that is also observed in traditional financial news; see (Solomon and Soltes, 2012).
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Intercept ***  10.053  0.825 *** 8.861  0.422
( 7.345) ( 0.551) (3.308) ( 0.106)




Log weekly volume *** 0.509 0.040
(4.852) (0.276)
Weekly return 5.830 2.423
(1.559) (0.519)
Weekly volatility **  4.635  0.912
( 2.659) ( 0.404)
|bmarket  1|  1.246  1.232
( 1.696) ( 1.522)
# Exchanges 0.005 0.009
(1.172) (1.598)
Log Twitter followers *** 0.657 0.106
(5.335) (0.878)













Intercept * 15.692 2.034 4.610 5.976
(2.027) (0.376) (0.634) (0.269)




Log weekly volume  0.026  0.029
( 0.070) ( 0.050)
Weekly return 9.938 2.721
(0.728) (0.106)
Weekly volatility  1.590  4.701
( 0.236) ( 0.512)
|bmarket  1| 0.199  0.127
(0.093) ( 0.046)
# Exchanges *  0.240 *  0.260
( 2.574) ( 2.262)
Log Twitter followers  0.533 0.562
( 1.388) (0.813)
Log Alexa rank  0.110 0.222
( 0.310) (0.389)
Number of cryptos 100 100 97 97
Over-dispersion parameter (logq)  0.090  0.142  0.517 0.109
Table 3.4: Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions of the number of times a crypto asset is identified
in the news data. All characteristics are measured as averages across weekly observations in the data;
see Table 3.1 for summary statistics. “# Exchanges” counts the number of exchanges on which a crypto
asset is traded. “Log shape parameter” is the logarithm of the estimated shape parameter of the negative
binomial distribution. The values in parentheses give the z-values of the different estimates. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence levels, respectively.
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3.3 Crypto peer networks
Following (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019), we consider two cryptos to be linked if they
are mentioned in the same sentence of a news article.10 However, to make sure that the
two cryptos indeed share a competitive link, we extend the approach of (Schwenkler and
Zheng, 2019) by running all sentences in which at least two cryptos are mentioned through
a BERT labeling model. BERT stands for Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers and is a novel natural language processing technology that uses the word
surroundings to identify context ((Devlin et al., 2018)). We use a BERT model to determine
whether a sentence describes a competitive and or a non-competitive relationship. We say
that two cryptos that are mentioned in the same sentence of an article are peers if our BERT
model classifies that sentence as competitive. We keep the peer link alive during the week
in which the article is published. That is, all peer links are reestablished at the beginning of
a week using our BERT model.
The BERT model we use is fitted to a subsample of 460 manually selected sentences
that clearly describe either competitive or non-competitive relationships using Amazon
AWS tools. The subsample of sentences used for fitting the model is available https://
www.gustavo-schwenkler.com/research. Cross validation of our trained model shows
that its out-of-sample accuracy for identifying competitive relationships is 85%, suggesting
that the BERT model is highly accurate in identifying peer linkages. Once the model has
been fitted to the 460 pre-selected sentences, we use the BERT model to label all remaining
sentences in our data. We double-check that the labels are accurate by manually evaluating
a subset of the output.
Our methodology identifies 6,221 peer links. Many links are repeatedly identified in the
10In analyzing how the news reports about relationships between firms, (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019)
show that the majority of the economically relevant information about firm linkages is communicated within
sentences rather than across sentences. Those findings motivate our approach to identify connected cryptos
when they are co-mentioned in the same sentence of a news article.
76
data. In total, we observe 328 unique connections between the 100 cryptos in our sample.
Figure 3·4 shows the resulting network of crypto interconnections extracted from our data.
The size of a node in the figure is proportional to the logarithm of the number of times a
crypto asset is mentioned in the news. The width of a link is proportional to the logarithm of
the number of times a link is identified in the news data. It is visible that the news-implied
crypto network has a star architecture, with few large nodes that are highly interconnected
in the core and smaller nodes in the periphery.11 We see that the core of the network consist
of the largest cryptos by market capitalization, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, and
Binance Coin. These four coins are also the most central nodes according to the centrality
measures and the number of links for different cryptos in the network highlighted in Table
3.5. Consistent with the sheer supremacy of Bitcoin in terms of market capitalization,
currently representing close to 70% of the total market capitalization in crypto markets, we
observe that Bitcoin is much more frequently mentioned and linked in the news than other
cryptos.
3.3.1 Peer identification
We run several analyses to assess whether we truly identify peer linkages with our ap-
proach. We begin by reporting sample sentences in which we identify some of the network
links; see Table 3.6. Many of the sentences establish comparisons across cryptos. Some
sentences compare their fundamental characteristics. For example, we establish a peer link
between Neo and EOS when the news compares their underlying algorithms. Other sen-
tences compare the market performance of different cryptos. For example, we link Bitcoin
and Litecoin when the news reports that some market participants perceive Litecoin to be
overvalued relative to Bitcoin. The sample sentences of Table 3.6 suggest that many of the
links in the network of Figure 3·4 correspond to linkages between cryptos with comparable
characteristics.
11A star architecture is characteristic of economic networks ((Acemoglu et al., 2012)).
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) BTC 207329 13598 0.017 0.280
ETH 88456 9131 0.018 0.247
XRP 86254 3690 0.015 0.083
BNB 50009 4158 0.017 0.075
BCH 38797 4464 0.013 0.124
BSV 12095 822 0.012 0.016
LTC 10787 1246 0.012 0.030
ADA 9184 822 0.013 0.012
XLM 8947 1002 0.013 0.011










) ARDR 40 1 0.007 0.000
TRAC 32 0 0.000 0.000
MLN 27 2 0.009 0.000
DCR 22 2 0.009 0.000
RLC 20 2 0.009 0.000
MAID 18 5 0.009 0.000
NRG 17 1 0.007 0.000
GLM 14 2 0.009 0.000
MATH 11 0 0.000 0.000
STRAX 7 0 0.000 0.000
Table 3.5: Number of mentions in the news, number of links, and eigenvalue and harmonic centrality
scores for the 10 most and least frequently mentioned cryptos in our data. “HC” stands for harmonic
centrality and “EVC” stands for eigenvector centrality. Both centrality scores are normalized to sum
up to one across the 100 cryptos in our sample. The harmonic centrality of node i is given by Â j 6=i 1di, j ,
where di, j is the length of the shortest path that connects nodes i and j, and 1di, j = 0 if no path exists
between i and j. If A = (ai, j) is the adjacency matrix of a network so that ai, j = 1 if there exists at least
one link between nodes i and j, then the eigenvector centrality of node i is given by the i-th entry of the
eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of A.
Link Sample sentence
(IOTA, Mobius) “Among companies that aim at using Blockchain to disrupt the app market are Mobius, Chain-
Link, and IOTA”
(Bitcoin, Qtum) “The Bitcoin and Ethereum alternative, QTUM, recently completed its main net upgrade on
Binance, allowing users to have access to coins .”
(Bitcoin, Ethereum) “Unless BTC faces its scalability issues, he said, the next five years will see ETH surge.”
(Ethereum, Stellar Lumens) “While NEM, NEO, Waves, and Stellar attracted a lot of attention in 2017, no other
blockchain platform managed to rival Ethereum.”
(Ethereum, Neo) “The rally was led by NEO, the “Chinese Ethereum”, a network that has lagged in develop-
ment compared to other blockchains, and hardly hosts any distributed apps.”
(Bitcoin, XRP) “He continues, adding that BTC is expensive and XRP is designed for global cross border
payments because it is cheap and settlement is almost instantaneous: ‘There is basically no
value for Bitcoin.”’
(Dash, Maker) “There are now several functional DAOs for cryptocurrencies such as Digix, Dash (DASH) ,
or Maker (MKR).”
(Bitcoin, Litecoin) “In fact, Mike Novogratz, the head of Galaxy Digital, recently explained that LTC is overval-
ued and that investors should buy BTC instead.”
(Ethereum, XRP) “Additionally, UK ’s Financial Conduct Authority analogized XRP to ETH, which it recog-
nized as a hybrid utility / exchange token, not a security token.”
(EOS, Neo) “Shin has a good point here, although we do have cryptocurrencies that use more energy-
efficient algorithms, such as NEO, which use a ‘Proof-of-Stake’ (PoS) algorithm, and EOS,
which uses a ‘Delegated Proof-of-Work’ (DPoS) algorithm.”
Table 3.6: Sample sentences in which we identify links between two cryptos.
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We run logit regressions to dissect what factors drive whether two cryptos are linked in
the network of Figure 3·4. We estimate a logit model of the type
P
⇥










d|Xi Xj|+b0IIi, j. Here, Xi and Xj are characteristics
of cryptos i and j such as those summarized in Table 3.1. The term |Xi  Xj| includes
component-wise absolute differences of the characteristics of cryptos i and j. We include
this term in our regression to assess whether it is more likely to observe a link between
cryptos with similar characteristics. The variable Ii, j includes indicators that characterize
the crypto pair, such as whether one of the peer cryptos is either Bitcoin or Ethereum,
whether the two cryptos are in the same industry, or whether they are co-listed in common
exchanges. Finally, the parameters ai and a j are crypto fixed effects. Our estimates are
summarized in Table 3.7, where the cryptos in a pair are labeled “Crypto i” and “Crypto j”
in random order.
The estimates show that it is more likely to observe a link between two cryptos that
are popular online (as measured by their Alexa rank) or that are often mentioned in the
news. We also find that it is more likely to observe a link between cryptos that have low
momentum betas and large trading volumes. These observations provide further evidence
of a tilt in news reporting towards established and well-regarded assets, as also documented
in Table 3.4. We find that the likelihood of observing a link between two cryptos is higher
if the two cryptos share similar news mentions, ages, market betas, size betas, and Alexa
ranks. The link likelihood is also higher if the two cryptos operate in the same industry or
if they are co-listed in common exchanges. The results are robust to alternative regression
specifications. Our findings suggest that it is more likely to observe a link between cryptos
that are similar in terms of their ages, factor exposures, and popularity. They show that we
are more likely to establish a peer link between cryptos with comparable characteristics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept ***  18.295 ***  18.125 ***  19.466 ***  18.440 ***  19.446








News mentions *** 11.945 *** 8.383 *** 7.924 *** 10.771 *** 6.972
(9.160) (6.550) (6.201) (10.182) (6.472)
Age *** 0.506 ** 0.385 * 0.350 *** 0.531 0.306
(3.720) (2.860) (2.384) (4.159) (1.828)
Log market cap. *** 0.680 0.469
(3.937) (1.250)
Log weekly volume * 0.529 0.377
(2.335) (1.534)
Weekly return 0.574 0.372
(1.834) (1.251)
Weekly volatility  0.576  0.569
( 1.084) ( 1.124)




bmomentum **  1.042 **  1.162
( 2.868) ( 3.287)









News mentions *** 12.699 *** 9.042 *** 8.325 *** 11.365 *** 7.343
(9.219) (6.784) (6.486) (9.991) (6.618)
Age * 0.378 0.255 0.148 ** 0.463 0.221
(2.452) (1.700) (0.893) (2.978) (1.225)
Log market cap. *** 0.488 0.111
(4.742) (0.436)
Log weekly volume *** 0.773 ** 0.643
(5.225) (3.324)
Weekly return * 0.490 0.268
(2.551) (1.678)
Weekly volatility *  0.925  0.478
( 2.421) ( 1.195)
|bmarket  1|  0.022  0.162
( 0.146) ( 0.846)
bsize * 0.742 0.535
(2.305) (1.466)
bmomentum ***  0.882 ***  1.008
( 3.479) ( 3.899)
















News mentions ***  15.414 ***  10.657 ***  10.005 ***  13.767 ***  8.876
( 8.616) ( 6.251) ( 5.886) ( 9.374) ( 6.178)
Age ***  1.093 ***  1.061 ***  1.000 ***  1.180 ***  1.000
( 7.894) ( 7.774) ( 6.752) ( 7.929) ( 6.003)
Log market cap. ***  0.445  0.178
( 3.493) ( 1.107)
Log weekly volume 0.018 0.169
(0.119) (1.030)
Weekly return  0.324  0.074
( 1.247) ( 0.376)
Weekly volatility  0.443  0.392
( 1.026) ( 0.766)
bmarket *  0.437 *  0.460
( 2.385) ( 2.270)












I) Links Bitcoin ***  2.738 **  2.081 *  1.839 ***  2.515  1.087
( 3.761) ( 2.648) ( 1.997) ( 3.638) ( 1.350)
Links Ethereum 0.073 0.227  0.405 0.125  0.193
(0.196) (0.573) ( 0.735) (0.323) ( 0.355)
Same industry *** 0.902 *** 0.775 *** 0.678 *** 0.881 ** 0.689
(5.053) (4.065) (3.508) (4.595) (3.393)
Co-listing *** 14.462 *** 14.056 *** 14.243 *** 14.318 *** 14.017
(56.100) (54.406) (39.952) (50.710) (35.013)
Table 3.7: Logit regressions of the probability that a pair of cryptos is linked in the news. Eq. (3.1)
describes the regression specification. Cryptos in a pair are labeled “Crypto i” and “Crypto j” at random.
All characteristics are measured as time series averages at the crypto level; see Table 3.1 for summary
statistics. We standardize all regressors (except the indicators) with their cross-sectional means and
standard deviations. The indicator “Links Bitcoin” (“Links Ethereum”) is equal to 1 is one of the two
cryptos is Bitcoin (Ethereum). The indicator “Same industry” is 1 is both cryptos are in the same
industry (see Figure 3·1). The indicator “Co-listing” is 1 if the two cryptos are traded on common
exchanges. All regressions include crypto fixed effects and assume that the distribution of link indicators
is overdispersed. Standard errors are based on sandwich estimators clustered at the crypto level. The
values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95%
confidence levels, respectively.
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Next, we study what factors drive the conditional probability of observing a link be-
tween two cryptos over time. For the 328 crypto peer pairs in our data, we construct weekly
time series of an indicator `i, j,t that takes the value of one when we observe the peer link
between cryptos i and j in news published in week t. The link indicator is highly persis-
tent. We have P[`i, j,t = 0 |`i, j,t 1 = 0] = 0.97 and P[`i, j,t = 1 |`i, j,t 1 = 1] = 0.38. These
measurements suggest that it is unlikely to observe random links among cryptos. However,
whether or not the news reports about a link between two cryptos can change from week to
week.
We run logit regressions for the weekly link indicators to understand what determines
whether we observe a link in a given week. More precisely, we estimate models of the type
Pt
⇥













d|Xi,t  Xj,t |+b0IIi, j,t . (3.2)
Here, `hi, j,t = (`i, j,t 1,`i, j,t 2) is the lag-2 history of the link indicator, and Xi,t , Xj,t , |Xi,t  
Xj,t | and Ii, j,t are weekly measurements of the same variables defined in Eq. (3.1). The
models include date fixed effects and either crypto fixed effects (in which case FEi, j,t =
ai +a j +at) or link fixed effects (FEi, j,t = ai, j +at). Table 3.8 reports our estimates.
Complementing the findings of Table 3.7, which indicate that the news is more likely
to report about cryptos with similar characteristics, the estimates of Table 3.8 highlight
the persistence of the link indicator. Holding all other regressors constant, the odds of
observing a link in a given week are three-times higher if a link was observed in one of the
previous two weeks.
3.4 Event-based analysis
Now that we have established that the network of cryptos extracted from the news is a
network of peers, we proceed to analyze co-movement among crypto peers. We run event-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept ***  12.937 ***  11.959 ***  18.602 ***  13.175 ***  11.789 ***  18.090
( 12.260) ( 8.076) ( 10.066) ( 11.594) ( 7.337) ( 9.677)
LI
(b
`) Lag 1 *** 1.425 *** 1.427 *** 1.055 *** 1.390 *** 1.397 *** 1.047
(11.767) (11.430) (9.011) (11.518) (11.273) (8.923)
Lag 2 *** 1.213 *** 1.185 *** 0.833 *** 1.192 *** 1.195 ** 0.854








News mentions *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.003
(5.196) (4.675) (4.326) (8.500) (8.202) (4.982)
Log market cap. 0.099 0.094  0.025 0.110 0.093  0.612
(1.597) (1.547) ( 0.358) (1.609) (1.376) ( 1.622)
Log weekly volume 0.093 0.100 0.075 0.186 0.161 0.224
(1.771) (1.960) (1.445) (1.511) (1.286) (2.084)
Weekly return 0.298 0.230 0.160 0.296 0.147 0.153
(0.994) (0.728) (0.443) (0.784) (0.356) (0.350)
Weekly volatility 0.356 0.483 0.620  0.077 0.461 1.164
(0.459) (0.603) (0.743) ( 0.085) (0.482) (1.425)
Log Alexa rank  0.035  0.054 0.208  0.145








News mentions ** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.003 ** 0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.003
(3.130) (3.333) (4.836) (2.639) (2.450) (5.506)
Log market cap. * 0.131 0.093 0.109 * 0.150 0.095 0.073
(2.462) (1.643) (1.620) (2.463) (1.450) (0.197)
Log weekly volume *** 0.133 *** 0.158 0.027 0.153 0.158 0.148
(3.506) (3.793) (0.520) (1.392) (1.462) (1.373)
Weekly return 0.509 0.646 ** 0.703 0.326 0.507 0.460
(1.654) (1.886) (2.789) (0.877) (1.219) (1.644)
Weekly volatility 0.862 0.775 0.696 0.670 0.502  0.074
(1.158) (0.974) (0.963) (0.780) (0.527) ( 0.077)
Log Alexa rank  0.028 0.026  0.012 0.098



















Log market cap. *  0.148  0.148
( 2.105) ( 2.024)
Log weekly volume *  0.109  0.103
( 2.313) ( 1.949)
Weekly return  0.026  0.358
( 0.055) ( 0.558)
















I) Links Bitcoin * 0.889 * 0.982
(2.531) (2.861)
Links Ethereum * 0.742 * 0.702
(2.761) (2.581)
Same industry *** 0.648 ** 0.670
(3.972) (4.163)
Co-listing *** 11.654 *** 11.801
(16.798) (15.524)
Includes lagged regressors? N N N Y Y Y
Fixed effects Link, Date Link, Date Crypto, Date Link, Date Link, Date Crypto, Date
Crypto-week obs. 22350 21120 21120 16506 15164 18015
Link obs. 1351 2583 1302 1302 1014 1067
Unique crypto pairs 315 314 314 302 302 313
Unique cryptos 59 58 58 51 51 58
Table 3.8: Logit regressions of the indicator that a crypto link is observed in the news in a given week.
Eq. (3.2) describes the regression specification. Cryptos in a pair are labeled “Crypto i” and “Crypto j”
at random and the order in a pair is kept fixed over time. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for all
regressors. We remove the top and bottom 1% cross-sectional observations for each time series prior
to running the regressions to ensure robustness. The panel “LI” gives the regression coefficients for the
lagged link indicator; all other panels are described in the caption of Table 3.7. All regressions include
fixed effects and assume that the distribution of link indicators is overdispersed. Some regressions
include one and two-week lagged observations of the regressors. Clustered standard errors are based on
sandwich estimators. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on




We begin by visually analyzing the performance of peer cryptos when large abnormal return
shocks take place. We consider the distribution of standardized weekly abnormal returns,
where we standardize on a rolling basis using the prior 60-day average and standard devia-
tion for each crypto asset. We say that a crypto with standardized weekly abnormal return
that falls in the bottom decile of the full-sample distribution is shocked and has experienced
a shock event. We take the week in which such a shock is observed as the event week. We
identify 380 distinct events, affecting 66 distinct cryptos over 132 distinct weeks. Figure
3·5 displays the quarterly frequency of events, together with all cryptos that experience
shocks in a given a quarter. Events are roughly uniformly distributed over quarters in our
sample. We observe the fewest shock events in Q4 2017 when crypto markets were boom-
ing (see Figure 3·2). The highest numbers of shock events are recorded in Q2 2019 and Q3
2020, which were periods of calm gains in crypto markets in which even small abnormal
returns may have been perceived as large given the prior history.
We break down the universe of cryptos during an event week into three disjoint groups:
A group of cryptos that are shocked, a group of cryptos that are identified as peers of
shocked cryptos during the event week (as defined in Section 3.3), and the remaining non-
peer cryptos.12 We keep track of the weekly performance of the three groups in each of
the two weeks before and after an event week. To enable a comparison of performance
across cryptos, we standardize all performance measures on a rolling basis at the crypto
level using the prior 60-day mean and standard deviation.
Figures 3·6 through 3·8 show sample means of different standardized measures of mar-
12Given that more than one asset may be shocked in an a given week, we orthogonalize the three asset
groups by removing from the group of peer assets any asset that has also been shocked during the event
week, and removing from the group of non-peer cryptos any that are either shocked or peers during the event
week.
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ket, news, and social media performance in the weeks surrounding an event week for the
sample of shocked, peer, and non-peer cryptos, together with 95% confidence bands and
population means in the whole crypto asset universe. We see that shocked cryptos expe-
rience unusual negative abnormal and total returns as well as high volatilities during the
event week. They also experience elevated trading volume during the event week and the
two weeks before an event. These observations confirm that shocked cryptos experience
significant shocks during event weeks.
Non-peer cryptos do not experience unusual performance in the weeks surrounding
an event week, suggesting that these cryptos are not affected by the distress experienced
by shocked cryptos. Peer cryptos, on the other hand, do appear to be affected. We find
that their abnormal and total returns are unusually high during the event week. Figure
3·6 suggests that peer cryptos experiences about one-fourth of the shock that hits shocked
cryptos, but in the opposite direction. Figure 3·7 shows that volatilities are also large during
and after an event week. This suggests that the uncertainty caused by the shock also affects
peer cryptos.
Figure 3·8 shows several standardized measures of online activity for the different asset
groups. We see that peer and shocked cryptos experience more frequent mentions in online
news and more commenting activity on Reddit than an average crypto during the event
week. The patterns in Figure 3·8 support an interpretation that a large abnormal return
shock triggers a higher production and dissemination of information about shocked and
peer cryptos, which results in increased volatilities and significantly large returns for the
peer assets.
All in one, Figures 3·6–3·8 provide graphical evidence that peer linkages facilitate the
spread of shocks across assets. The fact that abnormal returns move in opposite directions
for peer and shocked cryptos during an event week point to a competition effect governing
the co-movement of peers in cryptocurrency markets.
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3.4.2 Regressions
To rigorously disentangle how large shocks affect crypto peers, we run difference-in-difference
panel regressions during the weeks surrounding an event, controlling also for crypto and
industry-date interacted fixed effects that account for potential omitted factors. We again
standardize all variables to ensure comparability across cryptos.
We regress the weekly abnormal return of an asset on characteristics of the asset, an
indicator of whether the asset experienced a shock during the event week, and an indicator
of whether the asset was identified as peer of a shocked crypto during an event week.13
Letting (e, j) denote an event in which crypto j is shocked on week e, we estimate the
following panel model for all cryptos i and window weeks t 2 { 2, 1,0,1,2}:
E
⇥
Yi,e+t |Xi,e+t , event = (e, j)
⇤
= FEi,t,e, j +b0X Xi,e+t +be {t=0}+ba {t>0}
+bP {i is peer of j}+bP,e {t=0} {i is peer of j}+bP,a {t>0} {i is peer of j}
+bS {i= j}+bS,e {t=0} {i= j}+bS,a {t>0} {i= j}. (3.3)
Here, Yi,e+t denotes the standardized abnormal return of crypto i and Xi,e+t is a set of con-
temporaneous and lagged regressors measured in week e+ t. We include crypto, shocked
crypto, and industry-date interacted fixed effects so that FEi,t,e, j = ai +a j +aindustry(i),e+t .
These fixed effects account for omitted variation at the crypto and event levels, as well
as omitted industry-wide shocks. Finally, we cluster standard errors by event week and
industry.
The coefficients bS,e, bS,a, bP,e, and bP,a capture the excess abnormal return due to being
shocked and peer during an event week or in the weeks after an event. We expect these
regression coefficients to be statistically significant and large if an asset is impacted by the
shock that hits a peer. This should particularly hold during the event week; that is, for bS,e
13More precisely, the peer indicator takes on the value of 1 if a crypto is co-mentioned with a shocked
crypto in a sentence of a news article published during the event week, and the sentence is labeled as a
describing a competitive relationship according to our BERT model (see Section 3.3).
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and bP,e. The signs of the coefficients are indicative of the kind of effect driving the spread
of shocks across peer cryptos. If bS,e and bP,e share the same sign, then this advocates for
the contagion effect. In contrast, opposite signs for bS,e and bP,e point to a competition
effect.
Table 3.9 displays the estimates of our regressions. Consistent with Figures 3·6–3·8,
we find that the peer and shocked cryptos experience large excess abnormal returns during
an event week. The excess abnormal return of a shocked crypto during an event week is
significantly negative, consistent with a shocked asset experiencing a significant and unan-
ticipated abnormal return shock in that week. In contrast, the excess abnormal return of a
peer crypto during an event week is significantly positive. These results hold when con-
trolling for standard predictors and fixed effects. After scaling with the mean and standard
deviation of weekly abnormal returns of Table 3.1, the estimates of Table 3.9 imply in
nominal terms that shocked cryptos showcase excess abnormal returns of around  16%
and peer cryptos showcase excess abnormal returns of close to 4.5% during an event week.
These estimates are both statistically and economically significant.
To further understand how shocks spread across peer cryptos, we estimate diff-in-diff
panel regressions analogous to (3.3) for the standardized total returns, volatilities, log vol-
ume, and log number of news mentions. Table 3.10 summarizes our findings. We find
that shocked cryptos experience elevated trading activity and elevated news reporting in
the weeks surrounding event.
The news also reports significantly more frequently about peer cryptos during an event
week. This elevated reporting activity facilitates information diffusion: We find that the
volatilities of all cryptos are elevated during an event week. Ultimately, only peer cryptos
benefit from this information dissemination. Table 3.10 indicates that the total returns of




Lag 1  0.030  0.029  0.030
( 1.953) ( 1.939) ( 1.943)




Lag 0 0.050 0.050 0.050
(2.334) (2.333) (2.331)
Lag 1 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.775) (0.752) (0.753)







Lag 0 *** 0.189 *** 0.189 *** 0.189
(9.207) (9.233) (9.229)
Lag 1 *  0.037 *  0.037 *  0.037
( 3.413) ( 3.347) ( 3.342)








Lag 0 *** 0.248 *** 0.247 *** 0.247
(17.618) (17.885) (17.889)
Lag 1 ***  0.222 ***  0.220 ***  0.220
( 13.892) ( 13.898) ( 13.899)
Lag 2 *  0.036 *  0.036 *  0.036
( 2.628) ( 2.607) ( 2.610)
M
C Lag 0 **  0.137 **  0.135 **  0.135
b X
( 5.358) ( 5.283) ( 5.282)
















Crypto-week obs. 8240 8240 8240
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.108 0.108
Table 3.9: Difference-in-difference panel regressions of abnormal returns in the weeks surrounding a
large negative abnormal return shock. We estimate the model in Eq. (3.3). All regressions include
crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date fixed effects. All regressors except the indicators and log
market capitalization are standardized. We standardize a time series at the crypto-level using the mean
and standard deviation in the 60-day window prior to any given week. We remove the top and bottom 1%
cross-sectional observations for each time series prior to running the regressions to ensure robustness.
“IR” stands for abnormal return, “Vol.” for total volatility, “Idio. vol.” for idiosyncratic volatility, and
“MC” for log market capitalization. Standard errors are clustered by event week and industry. The
values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95%
confidence levels, respectively.
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Lag 1 ** 0.125
(4.561)






Lag 0 0.032 * 0.103 *  0.045
(0.736) (3.124) ( 2.399)
Lag 1  0.024 0.108 * 0.091  0.029
( 1.776) (1.676) (3.396) ( 1.872)
Lag 2  0.008  0.002  0.019 0.014
( 0.731) ( 0.056) ( 1.397) (0.802)
IR
Lag 0 *** 0.185 0.052 0.048
(5.413) (2.049) (2.087)
Lag 1  0.061 0.007 ** 0.038
( 1.171) (0.332) (5.268)




Lag 0 0.037 0.040  0.008
(2.340) (2.360) ( 0.872)
Lag 1 0.005 *** 0.107 *  0.024  0.011
(0.242) (8.633) ( 2.677) ( 0.623)
Lag 2 0.001 * 0.028  0.012 0.003






Lag 0 *** 0.143 *** 0.146 *** 0.058
(9.000) (9.867) (8.230)
Lag 1 *  0.031 **  0.033 * 0.022
( 2.785) ( 4.073) (3.047)








Lag 0 *** 0.209 *** 0.307 ** 0.067
(12.001) (11.602) (5.126)
Lag 1 ***  0.196 ***  0.132 *** 0.581  0.013
( 13.168) ( 14.329) (29.160) ( 0.803)
Lag 2  0.026 *  0.047 ** 0.056  0.009
( 2.085) ( 2.704) (3.724) ( 1.186)
M
C Lag 0 ***  0.129  0.030 ** 0.046 0.049
b X
( 6.671) ( 1.660) (3.891) (1.837)
be  0.003 * 0.014  0.000 0.005
( 1.129) (3.131) ( 0.054) (1.202)
ba 0.004 0.005 *  0.003 * 0.005
(1.795) (1.144) ( 2.609) (2.704)
bP  0.018  0.006 0.012 0.015
( 1.197) ( 0.280) (0.592) (0.648)
bS 0.061  0.020 *** 0.082 ** 0.088
(2.187) ( 0.574) (8.020) (5.087)
bP,e *** 0.241  0.008 0.038 * 0.074
(7.193) ( 0.233) (0.822) (3.298)
bP,a 0.029 0.039  0.031 *  0.085
(1.428) (1.341) ( 1.851) ( 3.327)
bS,e ***  0.945 *** 0.321 0.064 0.087
( 10.588) (5.594) (2.069) (1.702)
bS,a *  0.092 0.081  0.046 ***  0.119
( 3.411) (1.706) ( 1.604) ( 5.598)
Crypto-week obs. 10007 10116 9816 9298
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.123 0.456 0.034
Table 3.10: Difference-in-difference panel regressions of total returns, volatility, log trading volume,
and the log number of mentions in the news in the weeks surrounding a large negative abnormal return
shock. All regressions include crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date interacted fixed effects. Data
are standardized as in 3.9. “AR” stands for the autoregressive coefficients, “Ret.” for total return, “Idio.
ret.” for abnormal return, “Vol.” for total volatility, “Idio. vol.” for idiosyncratic volatility, “MC” for
log market capitalization, “ALV” for abnormal log trading volume, and “News” stands for standardized
log news mentions. Standard errors are clustered by event week and industry. The values in parentheses




If shocks revealed information that is relevant for the pricing of peer cryptos, then we would
expect that the prices of peer cryptos move in the same direction as the prices of shocked
cryptos during event weeks. However, our evidence points in the opposite direction. We
conclude that our negative abnormal return shocks must not contain pricing-relevant infor-
mation and the competition effect we uncover is a temporary mispricing of peer assets.
To test whether our conclusion is justified, we study the behavior of peer and shocked
cryptos in the weeks surrounding events when controlling for the informational content of
a shock. We consider a shock to be informational in nature if, during the event week, the
shocked crypto experiences either abnormally frequent news mentions, large trading vol-
ume, or large idiosyncratic volatility. More precisely, we say that a shock is informational
in nature if the standardized number of news mentions, the standardized log trading vol-
ume, or the standardized idiosyncratic volatility of a shocked crypto during an event week
falls in the top decile of its full-sample distribution.
We estimate the following extension of Model (3.3):
E
⇥
Yi,e+t |Xi,e+t , event = (e, j)
⇤
= FEi,t,e, j +b0X Xi,e+t +bP {i is peer of j}+bS {i= j}
+be,in f {t=0} {(e, j) is informational}+be,nonin f {t=0} {(e, j) is not informational}
+bP,e,in f {t=0} {i is peer of j} {(e, j) is informational}+bP,e,nonin f {t=0} {i is peer of j} {(e, j) is not inf.}
+bS,e,in f {t=0} {i= j} {(e, j) is informational}+bS,e,nonin f {t=0} {i= j} {(e, j) is not informational} (3.4)
for an event week e and window weeks t 2 { 2, 1,0}. Table 3.11 reports our estimates.
We find that the excess abnormal performance of peer cryptos during an event week
only occurs when events are not informational in nature. We conclude this regardless of
whether we determine that a shock is informational in nature by looking at the number of
news mentions, the log trading volume, or the idiosyncratic volatility of the shocked crypto
during the event week. These results support our conclusion that the co-movement of peer
cryptos in response to large abnormal return shocks reflects a temporary mispricing of peer
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Criterion to identify informational events
Log mentions Log volume Idio. vol.
IR
Lag 1  0.025  0.024  0.025
( 1.988) ( 1.857) ( 1.885)




Lag 0 0.046 0.043 0.043
(2.152) (1.927) (1.976)
Lag 1 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.338) (0.402) (0.349)







Lag 0 *** 0.185 *** 0.186 *** 0.187
(9.012) (8.610) (8.911)
Lag 1 *  0.035 *  0.038 *  0.036
( 2.755) ( 2.996) ( 2.767)








Lag 0 *** 0.261 *** 0.263 *** 0.262
(16.623) (15.000) (15.501)
Lag 1 ***  0.223 ***  0.222 ***  0.225
( 12.418) ( 12.951) ( 13.502)
Lag 2 *  0.040 *  0.042 *  0.040
( 2.448) ( 2.554) ( 2.573)
M
C Lag 0 ***  0.136 ***  0.134 ***  0.137
b X
( 5.691) ( 5.685) ( 5.524)
bP 0.023 0.013 0.016
(1.546) (0.646) (0.921)
bS 0.042 0.047 0.051
(0.969) (1.321) (1.355)
be,in f  0.004  0.006 **  0.022
( 1.751) ( 1.515) ( 3.525)
be,nonin f *  0.013 *  0.012 *  0.010
( 3.127) ( 3.396) ( 3.040)
bP,e,in f 0.272 0.201 0.139
(1.733) (0.831) (1.879)
bP,e,nonin f *** 0.358 ** 0.397 *** 0.434
(6.068) (5.260) (6.330)
bS,e,in f ***  1.820 ***  1.678 ***  1.939
( 10.960) ( 12.785) ( 8.618)
bS,e,nonin f ***  1.260 ***  1.336 ***  1.277
( 23.624) ( 27.878) ( 22.819)
Crypto-week obs. 8240 9641 9641
Number of events 264 277 277
Number of informational events 45 26 39
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.134 0.135
Table 3.11: Difference-in-difference panel regressions of abnormal returns a large negative abnormal
return shock that is informational in nature. We brake down the study according to how we determine
whether an event is informational, which is when either the standardized weekly log mentions in the
news, the standardized log trading volume, or the standardized idiosyncratic volatility of a shocked
crypto lands in the top decile of the corresponding historical distribution across cryptos and time. We
estimate models of the type (3.4). All regressions include crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date in-
teracted fixed effects. All regressors except the indicators and log market capitalization are standardized
at the crypto-level using the rolling prior 60-day means and variances. We remove the top and bottom
1% cross-sectional observations for each time series prior to running the regressions to ensure robust-
ness. “IR” stands for abnormal return, “Vol.” for total volatility, “Idio. vol.” for idiosyncratic volatility,
and “MC” for log market capitalization. Standard errors are clustered by event week and industry. The





If the peer co-movement we uncover is indeed reflective of mispricing, then prior studies
of equity markets tell us that co-movement should be stronger among smaller peers. (Lo
and MacKinlay, 1990) establish that stock returns of large firms lead those of small firms.
(Brennan et al., 1993), (Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000), and (Parsons et al., 2020) ex-
plain the lead-lag relationship with investor inattention: Firms with lower levels of investor
attention experience slow information diffusion, which leads to a delayed response to the
information that is revealed by unexpected shocks. (Hou, 2007) show that the lead-lag
phenomenon is concentrated among intra-industry peers. Based on these prior results, we
analyze whether our results are concentrated among peers with smaller market capitaliza-
tions than shocked cryptos.
In Figure 3·9, we breakdown the standardized abnormal return of peer cryptos accord-
ing to whether they have larger or smaller market capitalizations than shocked cryptos. We
see that the strongest co-movement is exhibited by peers with smaller market capitaliza-
tions that shocked cryptos. Consistent with (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), (Hou, 2007), and
others, these observations indicate that the crypto co-movement we document is concen-
trated among smaller peers.
All in one, the results of this section show that peer cryptos experience abnormally
positive performance while shocked cryptos experience abnormally negative performance
when large abnormal return shocks occur. Our results provide strong evidence in support
of a competition effect driving the co-movement of peer cryptos in response to negative
shocks. We interpret from our results that crypto peer co-movement in response to large
abnormal return shocks is due to a slow diffusion of information among smaller peers. This
gives rise to temporary mispricing across peer assets. We exploit this mispricing through
trading strategies in Section 3.6.
91
3.5 Robustness
We carry out several experiments to assess the robustness of our findings.
3.5.1 Alternative links
We investigate whether crypto co-movement after large shocks primarily takes place among
the peer linkages we identified from online news. There exist other connections among
cryptos that may also yield co-movement. (Shams, 2020) shows that cryptos that are traded
in common exchanges tend to co-move due to correlated demand shocks. (Florysiak and
Schandlbauer, 2019) find large commonalities between the white papers of cryptos that
operate in the same industry, which may also drive crypto price co-movement. We therefore
study whether same-industry or exchange co-listing linkages subsume our findings.
We run difference-in-difference panel regressions similar to those of Section 3.4.2 in
which we also control for whether a crypto operates in the same industry as a shocked
crypto and whether a crypto is co-listed in the same exchange as a shocked crypto. How-
ever, we now leave out the two weeks after an event (window weeks t = 1 and t = 2 in Eq.
(3.3)) given that we found no abnormal performance during those weeks in Section 3.4.2.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 3.12 summarize our results. We find that peer cryptos,
as we define them in this paper, exhibit the most statistically and economically significant
abnormal price reaction during an event week. Cryptos that operate in the same industry as
shocked cryptos also experience significant abnormally positive performance. Their price
reaction, however, is much less economically significant than that of peer cryptos. Peer
cryptos record an excess abnormal return of around 4.3% during an event week, while
same-industry cryptos only record an excess abnormal return of around 0.7%. Cryptos that
are co-listed in the same exchanges do not experience significant excess abnormal returns
during an event week. These results suggest that the co-movement we have documented
primarily runs through peer linkages, such as those we identify from the news or intra-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole sample Excluding BTC or ETH events
IR
Lag 1  0.024 0.007  0.024  0.026  0.026  0.026
( 1.826) (0.338) ( 1.709) ( 2.054) ( 1.844) ( 1.849)
Lag 2  0.007 0.005  0.007  0.010  0.010  0.010
( 0.587) (0.247) ( 0.522) ( 0.735) ( 0.638) ( 0.636)
Vo
l.
Lag 0 0.043 0.002 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.046
(1.973) (0.057) (1.886) (2.021) (1.929) (1.928)
Lag 1 0.007 * 0.065 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.366) (3.010) (0.363) (0.376) (0.368) (0.367)
Lag 2 0.020 * 0.066 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020






Lag 0 *** 0.187 ** 0.142 *** 0.187 *** 0.184 *** 0.184 *** 0.184
(8.936) (4.213) (8.604) (9.254) (8.747) (8.779)
Lag 1 *  0.037 **  0.061 *  0.037 *  0.040 *  0.040 *  0.040
( 2.903) ( 4.158) ( 2.635) ( 3.101) ( 2.916) ( 2.915)
Lag 2 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014







Lag 0 *** 0.261 *** 0.262 *** 0.261 *** 0.261 *** 0.261 *** 0.261
(15.502) (15.733) (15.205) (16.852) (16.416) (16.450)
Lag 1 ***  0.224 ***  0.227 ***  0.224 ***  0.224 ***  0.224 ***  0.224
( 13.182) ( 10.363) ( 12.366) ( 11.937) ( 11.119) ( 11.160)
Lag 2 *  0.040 *  0.058 *  0.040  0.038  0.038  0.038
( 2.544) ( 2.884) ( 2.396) ( 2.087) ( 1.930) ( 1.933)
M
C Lag 0 ***  0.135 **  0.094 **  0.135 ***  0.140 ***  0.141 ***  0.141
b X
( 5.562) ( 5.284) ( 5.332) ( 5.864) ( 5.616) ( 5.578)
be **  0.025  0.127 0.038 **  0.023 0.050 0.038
( 5.088) ( 2.292) (0.845) ( 4.930) (1.013) (0.829)
bindustry 0.001 0.000  0.002  0.003
(0.339) (0.081) ( 0.857) ( 0.831)
bcolisted  0.023 0.030 0.034 0.034
( 0.599) (0.679) (0.749) (0.766)
bP 0.015  0.040 0.014 0.044 0.042 0.043
(0.682) ( 1.475) (0.592) (1.595) (1.473) (1.538)
bS 0.050 0.025 0.078 * 0.100 * 0.132 * 0.132
(1.151) (0.338) (1.368) (2.482) (2.766) (2.780)
bindustry,e *** 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.063
(13.973) (11.517) (18.913) (13.696)
bcolisted,e  0.147  0.068  0.064  0.066
( 1.828) ( 1.347) ( 1.180) ( 1.282)
bP,e *** 0.364 ** 0.511 *** 0.368 ** 0.323 ** 0.344 ** 0.327
(6.556) (5.295) (6.836) (3.678) (3.856) (3.776)
bS,e ***  1.349 ***  1.621 ***  1.412 ***  1.328 ***  1.407 ***  1.389
( 22.001) ( 20.340) ( 23.510) ( 17.002) ( 17.763) ( 17.875)
Crypto-week obs. 9642 9642 9642 9580 9580 9580
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.119 0.135 0.133 0.133 0.133
Table 3.12: Difference-in-difference panel regressions of abnormal returns in the weeks surrounding a
negative abnormal return shock, controlling for alternative implicit linkages across across cryptos. We
estimate extensions of the model in Eq. (3.3) that include controls for whether two cryptos are colisted
on the same exchange (subscript “colisted”) and whether two cryptos operate in the same industry
(subscript “industry”). All regressions include crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date interacted
fixed effects. All regressors except the indicators and log market capitalization are standardized at the
crypto-level using the rolling prior 60-day means and variances. We remove the top and bottom 1%
cross-sectional observations for each time series prior to running the regressions to ensure robustness.
“IR” stands for abnormal return, “Vol.” for total volatility, “Idio. vol.” for idiosyncratic volatility, and
“MC” for log market capitalization. Standard errors are clustered by event week and industry. The




Next, we evaluate whether our results are primarily driven by shocks that affect Bitcoin
or Ethereum. These two cryptos command up to 90% of the market capitalization in our
market (see Figure 3·2). They are also among the most frequently identified cryptos in
our news data (Table 3.5). As a result, shocks that affect Bitcoin or Ethereum may be
unique in the way they affect all other cryptos. We re-run our difference-in-difference panel
regressions in a subsample of our data in which we exclude all cases in which Bitcoin
or Ethereum are shocked to understand whether our effects are primarily driven by the
uniqueness of these cryptos. Columns (4) through (6) of Table 3.12 report our results. We
observe similar estimates when we exclude all events in which Bitcoin or Ethereum are
shocked, reenforcing our results.
All in one, the results of Table 3.12 validate our findings. Peer cryptos co-move after
large shocks in accordance to a competition effect, and this co-movement occurs most
strongly among crypto peers identified from the news.
3.5.2 Positive shocks
We further investigate the co-movement of peer cryptos after positive shocks. We now
consider a crypto to be shocked if its weekly standardized abnormal return falls in the top
decile of the distribution across cryptos and time. This approach yields 394 shock events,
covering 70 distinct shocked cryptos over 135 distinct weeks. As in Section 3.4.3, we
regress several measures of market performance on characteristics of the cryptos in our
sample while controlling for industry, crypto, and time fixed effects. Table 3.13 summarize
our findings.
Our estimates provide evidence that, when positive shocks occur, peer cryptos also re-
act in a way that is consistent with a competition effect. While shocked cryptos experience
significantly large and positive abnormal returns during an event week, peer cryptos expe-
rience significantly large and negative abnormal returns. In nominal terms, the estimates
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Lag 1 *** 0.107
(7.159)






Lag 0 0.022 * 0.100  0.029
(0.499) (2.584) ( 1.810)
Lag 1 0.107 * 0.079  0.023
(1.487) (3.480) ( 0.989)
Lag 2 0.081  0.002 ** 0.036
(1.872) ( 0.302) (4.180)
IR
Lag 0 *** 0.193 0.049 0.032
(5.826) (1.739) (1.566)
Lag 1  0.035  0.062 0.019 0.032
( 1.925) ( 1.066) (1.047) (2.164)
Lag 2  0.002  0.045 0.007 ***  0.033
( 0.163) ( 1.177) (1.085) ( 19.787)
Vo
l.
Lag 0 0.031 * 0.038  0.004
(1.808) (2.453) ( 1.169)
Lag 1 0.007 *** 0.109  0.017  0.013
(0.613) (9.479) ( 1.285) ( 0.942)
Lag 2 0.009 ** 0.036  0.004 ** 0.021






Lag 0 *** 0.212 *** 0.164 *** 0.057
(8.825) (17.911) (9.547)
Lag 1  0.028 **  0.049 *** 0.029
( 2.271) ( 4.711) (9.239)








Lag 0 *** 0.220 *** 0.314 *** 0.082
(12.565) (11.868) (7.148)
Lag 1 ***  0.202 ***  0.133 *** 0.572  0.021
( 13.949) ( 8.401) (36.145) ( 1.464)
Lag 2 **  0.035 *  0.044 ** 0.059  0.005
( 4.493) ( 2.965) (4.544) ( 0.797)
M
C Lag 0 **  0.129 *  0.050 ** 0.055 0.049
b X
( 4.184) ( 2.769) (3.827) (2.154)
be  0.001  0.002 0.002  0.001
( 0.248) ( 0.576) (1.196) ( 0.425)
ba  0.002  0.000 ** 0.005 0.001
( 0.995) ( 0.164) (4.642) (0.874)
bP  0.015 **  0.060 0.031 0.006
( 0.455) ( 4.173) (2.133) (0.283)
bS 0.039 0.002 0.006 * 0.033
(1.309) (0.154) (0.298) (2.635)
bP,e **  0.307 0.094 0.039 * 0.095
( 3.625) (2.074) (0.937) (2.487)
bP,a  0.019 * 0.067 *  0.050 *  0.058
( 0.305) (2.877) ( 2.796) ( 3.051)
bS,e *** 1.371 ** 0.231 0.073 *** 0.207
(18.184) (5.250) (1.448) (10.100)
bS,a  0.052 ** 0.087  0.026 *  0.044
( 0.650) (3.639) ( 1.039) ( 2.409)
Crypto-week obs. 8232 8378 8075 7659
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.098 0.401 0.025
Table 3.13: Difference-in-difference panel regressions of abnormal returns, volatility, log trading vol-
ume, and the log number of mentions in the news in the weeks surrounding a large positive shock. We
estimate models of the type (3.3). All regressions include crypto, shocked crypto, and industry-date
interacted fixed effects. All regressors except the indicators and log market capitalization are standard-
ized at the crypto-level using the rolling prior 60-day means and variances. We remove the top and
bottom 1% cross-sectional observations for each time series prior to running the regressions to ensure
robustness. Standard errors are clustered by event week and industry. The values in parentheses give
t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence levels, respec-
tively.
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of Table 3.13 indicate that shocked and peer cryptos record excess abnormal returns of
16.3% and  3.6% when positive informational shocks take place, respectively. We find
that peer cryptos are mentioned more frequently in the news during an event week, and that
the volatilities of peer and shocked cryptos are also abnormally large after an event takes
place.
All in one, the results of this section show establish co-movement across peer cryptos
also in response to positive abnormal return shocks. The co-movement is also consistent
with a competition effect that posits that the prices of peer assets co-move in opposite di-
rections. However, co-movement is weaker after positive shocks than after negative shocks.
Such an asymmetric response to negative versus positive shocks is consistent with behav-
ioral loss aversion theories (see (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), (Kuhnen, 2015)).
3.6 Trading strategies
Our results suggest that the crypto co-movement we uncover is due to mispricing that
arises because of slow information processing among smaller peer cryptos. As a result,
our effects should be transient. Investors should eventually realize that abnormal return
shocks do not reveal pricing-relevant information about peer cryptos and trade away their
abnormal performance. We therefore conjecture that the prices of peer cryptos revert after
negative abnormal return shocks.
We evaluate this conjecture in Figure 3·10, which shows the cumulative returns of peer
cryptos in the weeks after a negative abnormal return shock, broken down according to
whether a peer has smaller or larger market capitalization than a shocked crypto. Consis-
tent with our conjecture, we see that the returns of smaller peer cryptos are positive during
an event week. This positive performance fades away in the weeks after an event. After
four weeks, the cumulative returns of smaller peer cryptos are statistically indistinguish-
able from those of an average crypto in our sample. These observations suggest that the
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returns of smaller peer cryptos are predictable in the weeks after a large abnormal return
shock. That is, when we observe an abnormal return shock, we can predict that the prices
of smaller peer cryptos will move downward in the weeks after the shock. Motivated by
these observations, we develop event-based trading strategies that exploit this return pre-
dictability.
We construct our trading strategies as follows. At the end of any any given week, we
compute standardized abnormal returns and say that a crypto is shocked if the observed
standardized abnormal return lands in the bottom decile of the at-that-moment historically
observed distribution of standardized abnormal returns across time and cryptos.14 We then
collect all cryptos that we identify to be peers of a shocked crypto during the week. We
short all peers that have smaller market capitalizations than shocked cryptos in an event
week in order to exploit the reversal documented in Figure 3·10. We also long Bitcoin in
the equivalent amount in order to keep the strategy market neutral. We keep our short and
long positions open for several weeks.
The short positions are equally weighted. We assume that shorting occurs on margin at a
1x leverage ratio, with Bitcoin as collateral. Because of this, each week we can only invest a
fraction of wealth in new short positions. If we hold the positions open for H weeks, then on
any given week we can only invest a fraction of 1H+1 of the available wealth into new short
positions. We include several fees in our analysis. We take a bid-ask spread of 50 bp, which
is a conservative estimate for crypto markets based on prior studies.15 We also assume that
opening a short position costs 2 bp and that maintaining a short position open for a week
costs an additional 84 bp. Our estimates are based on the margin fee schedule outlined by
Kraken, one of the largest crypto exchanges in the world. See https://support.kraken.
com/hc/en-us/articles/206161568-What-are-the-fees-for-margin-trading
for Kraken’s margin fee schedule.
Table 3.14 summarizes the performance of our trading strategy, where we vary the
14We base the selection of shocks on the at-the-moment historically observed distribution data rather than
97
Short all smaller peers
Holding Alpha Beta Cumulative Average Volatility Sharpeperiod Market Size Momentum return return ratio
4 0.000 -0.026 0.015 0.033 5.09% 0.03% 3.46% 0.002
(0.026) ( 0.832) (0.342) (0.679)
5 0.002 -0.020 -0.015 0.012 43.31% 0.22% 3.14% 0.439
(0.767) ( 0.703) ( 0.384) (0.264)
6 0.002 -0.031 -0.058 -0.012 56.19% 0.28% 2.87% 0.617
(1.059) ( 1.179) ( 1.607) ( 0.284)
7 0.003 0.027 0.006 0.003 67.08% 0.32% 2.65% 0.788
(1.339) (1.109) (0.182) (0.082)
8 0.004 -0.015 -0.006 0.026 86.00% 0.40% 2.42% 1.068
(1.821) ( 0.663) ( 0.186) (0.717)
9 * 0.004 -0.008 0.009 0.029 104.61% 0.46% 2.34% 1.297
(2.246) ( 0.373) (0.299) (0.805)
10 * 0.005 0.007 -0.024 -0.057 120.54% 0.51% 2.40% 1.416
(2.527) (0.304) ( 0.793) ( 1.555)
11 ** 0.005 -0.009 -0.024 0.010 130.88% 0.54% 2.26% 1.608
(2.694) ( 0.408) ( 0.823) (0.278)
12 ** 0.006 -0.034 -0.031 -0.030 161.57% 0.63% 2.34% 1.811
(3.130) ( 1.555) ( 1.007) ( 0.829)
13 ** 0.006 -0.007 -0.017 0.012 152.14% 0.61% 2.26% 1.815
(3.031) ( 0.322) ( 0.580) (0.341)
14 ** 0.006 -0.024 -0.015 -0.002 159.42% 0.63% 2.20% 1.936
(3.281) ( 1.149) ( 0.503) ( 0.047)
15 ** 0.006 -0.002 -0.041 -0.001 153.56% 0.62% 2.15% 1.941
(3.197) ( 0.118) ( 1.348) ( 0.023)
16 ** 0.006 * -0.043 -0.038 0.063 158.63% 0.64% 2.11% 2.034
(3.230) ( 2.152) ( 1.239) (1.873)
17 ** 0.006 0.019 -0.018 -0.019 145.54% 0.61% 2.13% 1.919
(3.205) (0.920) ( 0.566) ( 0.538)
18 ** 0.005 -0.014 -0.012 0.002 135.49% 0.58% 2.01% 1.946
(3.229) ( 0.697) ( 0.382) (0.047)
19 ** 0.005 0.016 0.011 0.003 117.36% 0.53% 1.96% 1.815
(3.030) (0.802) (0.378) (0.086)
20 ** 0.004 -0.006 -0.012 0.053 112.02% 0.52% 1.85% 1.867
(2.843) ( 0.342) ( 0.427) (1.659)
Table 3.14: Performance metrics for event-based trading strategies that exploit the predictability docu-
mented in Figure 3·10. Each week, we short-sell cryptos that are peers of a crypto that is shocked, and
go long on Bitcoin. We short-sell on margin only those peer cryptos that have smaller market capital-
izations than shocked cryptos. We hold the positions open for several weeks (the holding period). All
short positions are equally weighted. If the strategy keeps a position open for H weeks, then each week
the strategy only invests a fraction of 1/(H + 1) of the available wealth into new short positions. The
long positions are of an equivalent amount to keep the strategy market neutral. Returns are computed as
follows. Each week, we compute the P&L of the short positions that are closed on that week. We then
compute the return in that week as the ratio of the P&L with respect to the terminal wealth of the prior
week. We subtract from the returns the following fees: A 50 bp bid-ask spread for each transaction, a
2 bp point fee to open a short position, and a 84 bp fee to keep a short position open for a week. In
total, if a short position is held open for H weeks, then we assume a fee of 50 + 2 + 84H bp. The alpha,
average return, and volatility are measured on a weekly scale while the Sharpe ratio is annualized. The
betas are computed with respect to a 3-factor model that includes market, size, and momentum factors
as used by (Liu et al., 2019). The construction of the market, size, and momentum factors is described
in Section 3.2.2. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the
99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence levels, respectively.
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number of weeks over which we hold the long and short positions open (i.e., the holding
period). We find that trading strategies that exploit the reversal of the peer effects we un-
cover and hold the short positions open for at least 9 weeks generate significant alphas of
40 to 60 bp per week at annualized Sharpe ratios of 1.3 and higher. The strategies that hold
the positions open between 14 and 18 weeks achieves the highest Sharpe ratio of around 2
with statistically insignificant market, size, and momentum betas. These trading strategies
significantly outperform the crypto market and Bitcoin, which only have annualized Sharpe
ratios of 0.53 and 0.73 over the sample period, respectively. Our results show that the mis-
pricing of peer cryptos after large abnormal return shocks is temporary. It takes investors
more than 9 weeks to trade away the effects.
3.6.1 Market frictions
It is surprising that it takes investors several weeks to trade away the peer effects we un-
cover. However, persistent mispricing across peer assets has also been observed in equity
markets. (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) show in a supply chain setting the it takes about a year
for the stock prices of suppliers to incorporate information about shocks that hit their cus-
tomers. (Hou, 2007) documents that the returns of small intra-industry peers adjust slower
to industry shocks than large intra-industry peers. (Hou and Moskowitz, 2005) attribute
the slow adjustment process to market frictions. Stocks that are hard to short-sell, illiquid,
highly volatile, or less visible should inherently showcase slower information processing.
Based on these prior studies, we study whether the crypto peer mispricing we document
can be attributed to market frictions.
In Table 3.15, we report performance metrics for a variant of the event-based trading
strategy which short-sell only smaller peers that are available for margin trading on Kraken.
Kraken is one of the largest and most liquid crypto exchanges in the world, and it allows for
the full-sample distribution to avoid forward-looking biases.
15(Makarov and Schoar, 2020) estimate the average bid-ask spread across crypto exchanges to be 10 bp.
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Short only smaller peers with margin trading on Kraken
Holding Alpha Beta Cumulative Average Volatility Sharpeperiod Market Size Momentum return return ratio
9 0.004 -0.023 -0.014 0.029 85.01% 0.39% 2.27% 1.135
(1.927) ( 1.083) ( 0.473) (0.821)
10 * 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.058 92.68% 0.42% 2.39% 1.165
(2.168) ( 0.119) (0.176) ( 1.575)
11 * 0.004 0.017 -0.004 0.005 94.64% 0.43% 2.20% 1.294
(2.200) (0.832) ( 0.134) (0.146)
12 * 0.004 * -0.051 * -0.069 0.005 112.75% 0.49% 2.23% 1.469
(2.390) ( 2.492) ( 2.401) (0.137)
13 * 0.004 0.007 -0.014 0.018 105.90% 0.48% 2.06% 1.526
(2.514) (0.355) ( 0.526) (0.556)
14 ** 0.005 -0.008 -0.012 0.009 112.25% 0.50% 2.08% 1.597
(2.663) ( 0.401) ( 0.427) (0.260)
15 * 0.004 -0.003 -0.041 -0.021 103.38% 0.47% 2.01% 1.557
(2.586) ( 0.158) ( 1.460) ( 0.653)
16 * 0.004 * -0.046 -0.028 0.056 103.42% 0.48% 2.00% 1.577
(2.502) ( 2.472) ( 0.952) (1.745)
17 * 0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.013 90.74% 0.44% 1.90% 1.515
(2.550) ( 0.223) (0.272) (0.407)
18 * 0.004 -0.020 -0.010 0.031 83.66% 0.41% 1.79% 1.520
(2.440) ( 1.123) ( 0.354) (1.001)
19 * 0.004 0.024 -0.023 -0.052 72.81% 0.37% 1.76% 1.383
(2.439) (1.360) ( 0.890) ( 1.706)
20 0.003 -0.006 -0.045 * 0.058 69.72% 0.36% 1.64% 1.443
(1.943) ( 0.370) ( 1.845) (2.066)
Table 3.15: Performance metrics for event-based trading strategies that exploit the predictability docu-
mented in Figure 3·10. Each week, we short-sell cryptos that are peers of a crypto that is shocked, and
go long on Bitcoin. We short-sell on margin only those peers that have smaller market capitalizations
than shocked cryptos and are available for margin trading with a USD account on Kraken (Bitcoin,
Bitcoin Cash, Cardano, Chainlink, Dash, EOS, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Litecoin, Monero, XRP,
Tezos, and Tron). We hold the positions open for several weeks (the holding period). All short positions
are equally weighted. If the strategy keeps a position open for H weeks, then each week the strategy
only invests a fraction of 1/(H +1) of the available wealth into new short positions. The long positions
are of an equivalent amount to keep the strategy market neutral. Returns are computed as follows. Each
week, we compute the P&L of the short positions that are closed on that week. We then compute the
return in that week as the ratio of the P&L with respect to the terminal wealth of the prior week. We
subtract from the returns the following fees: A 50 bp bid-ask spread for each transaction, a 2 bp point
fee to open a short position, and a 84 bp fee to keep a short position open for a week. In total, if a
short position is held open for H weeks, then we assume a fee of 50 + 2 + 84H bp. The alpha, average
return, and volatility are measured on a weekly scale while the Sharpe ratio is annualized. The betas are
computed with respect to a 3-factor model that includes market, size, and momentum factors as used by
(Liu et al., 2019). The construction of the market, size, and momentum factors is described in Section
3.2.2. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%,
and 95% confidence levels, respectively.
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short-selling on margin. Market frictions should therefore be of little relevance for cryptos
that are available for margin trading on Kraken.
Table 3.15 shows that the strategies that are constrained to cryptos with margin trading
on Kraken generally have weaker performance metrics. The Sharpe ratios of the con-
strained strategies are about 25% lower than those of the unconstrained strategies that hold
the positions open for the same amount of time. The weekly alphas of the constrained
strategies are also 10 to 20 bp lower than those of the unconstrained strategies. The highest
Sharpe ratio of the constrained strategy is achieved for shorter holding periods, suggest-
ing that information processing is faster for the cryptos that can be shorted on margin
on Kraken. These results suggest that trading frictions exacerbate mispricing across peer
cryptos, complementing similar results for equity markets by (Boehmer and Wu, 2012) and
(Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). Nevertheless, we still find evidence of predictability among
the more liquid cryptos that can be shorted on margin on Kraken. This can be observed
by the statistical significance of the weekly alphas of the constrained strategies in Table
3.15. We conclude that trading frictions contribute to the return predictability across peer
cryptos, but are not the sole responsible.
All in one, the results of this section show that peer linkages induce predictable returns
in crypto markets in the weeks after large shocks. Predictability is concentrated among
smaller peers that face trading frictions, such as short-selling constraints. Our findings
highlight that co-movement among peer cryptos is a transient phenomenon that can be
exploited with profitable trading strategies.
3.7 Conclusion
We document significant co-movement in cryptocurrency markets due to peer linkages.
When large abnormal return shocks hit one crypto, peers of that crypto experience unusu-
ally large abnormal returns of the opposite sign. This co-movement aligns with a com-
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petition effect that is common in traditional financial markets. It vanishes after about 4
weeks and results in predictable returns among peer cryptos. We develop trading strategies
that exploit the return predictability we uncover, and show that the strategies are profitable
even after accounting for realistic trading fees and frictions. Our results are based on peer
linkages identified by co-mentions in online news. We facilitate the identification of crypto
peer linkages from news data by implementing novel natural language processing tools.
Our results highlight peer linkages as a key channel explaining the co-movement of cryp-
tocurrencies in addition to common risk factors and correlated demand shocks.
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Cumulative weekly market return
































(a) Cumulative weekly market returns and volatility, together with size and
momentum factors.


















(b) Market capitalization weights for Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Figure 3·2: Market index, market volatility, size and momentum risk factors, and market-capitalization
weights. For a given week, we consider all cryptos in our sample that were available for trade on at
least one exchange in that week and compute a market index as the market-cap-weighted average of the
returns of all such cryptos. We compute the aggregate volatility as the standard deviation of market-
cap-weighted daily returns in a week, and we take into account the return correlation across different
assets. The market capitalizations weights corresponds to the weights that Bitcoin and Ethereum carry
in our market index. The construction of the size and momentum factors is described in Section 3.2.2.
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(a) Number of daily mentions of Bitcoin in our news data.



















(b) Number of daily mentions of Civic in our news data.






















































































































Figure 3·4: Network of cryptos implied by the full news data sample covering the period October 1,
2017, through November 30, 2020. The size of a node is proportional to the logarithm of the number of
times that crypto is mentioned in the news. The width of a link between two cryptos is proportional to
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3·5: Shock events in our sample. We collect all cryptos that at some point in a quarter experience
standardized weekly abnormal returns that land in the lowest decile of the empirical distribution across
time and cryptos in our data. The red line shows the quarterly number of shock events identified this






































(a) Standardized abnormal return in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Peer cryptos
t



















(b) Standardized return in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Figure 3·6: Sample means of standardized idiosyncratic and total returns for the sample of shocked,
peer, and non-peer cryptos in the weeks surrounding an event. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics
of the unstandardized return measures and Section 3.2 describes how the unstandardized measures are
constructed. We standardize a time series for each asset on a rolling basis using the mean and standard
deviation of each performance measure in the 60-day window prior to any given week. We remove the
top and bottom 1% cross-sectional observations for each time series when computing cross-sectional
moments. The black lines give the weekly sample mean in each asset group, while the red line gives the
weekly population mean in the whole universe of cryptos. The grey shaded areas give 95% asymptotic
confidence bands. Note that we do not record the exact day of the event week in which the shock occurs.



















































(a) Standardized volatility in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Peer cryptos
t














































(b) Standardized log-volume in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Figure 3·7: Sample means of standardized volatility and log-volume for the sample of shocked, peer,
and non-peer cryptos in the weeks surrounding an event. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of id-
iosyncratic volatilities and Section 3.2 describes how the unstandardized measures are constructed. We
standardize a time series for each asset on a rolling basis using the mean and standard deviation of each
performance measure in the 60-day window prior to any given week. We remove the top and bottom 1%
cross-sectional observations for each time series when computing cross-sectional moments. The black
lines give the weekly sample mean in each asset group, while the red line gives the weekly population
mean in the whole universe of cryptos. The grey shaded areas give 95% asymptotic confidence bands.
Note that we do not record the exact day of the event week in which the shock occurs. As a result, Week
































(a) Standardized log-mentions in news in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Peer cryptos
t








































(b) Standardized number of comments on Reddit in week e+ t, where e is the event week.
Figure 3·8: Sample means of standardized log-mentions in news and number of comments on Reddit for
the sample of shocked, peer, and non-peer cryptos in the weeks surrounding an event. Table 3.1 provides
summary statistics of the unstandardized measures and Section 3.2 describes how the unstandardized
measures are constructed. We standardize a time series for each asset on a rolling basis using the mean
and standard deviation of each performance measure in the 60-day window prior to any given week.
We remove the top and bottom 1% cross-sectional observations for each time series when computing
cross-sectional moments. The black lines give the weekly sample mean in each asset group, while the
red line gives the weekly population mean in the whole universe of cryptos. The grey shaded areas give
95% asymptotic confidence bands. Note that we do not record the exact day of the event week in which
the shock occurs. As a result, Week “e” is the week in which the event occurs, not the exact day in


















































(a) Standardized abnormal returns in week e + t, where e is the event week.
Larger peer cryptos
t


































(b) Standardized total returns in week e + t, where e is the event week.
Figure 3·9: Sample means of standardized abnormal and total returns for the sample of shocked, non-
peers, larger peers, and smaller peers in a given event week. We say a peer crypto is larger (smaller) if,
during the event week, the market capitalization of the crypto is larger (smaller) than the market capi-
talization of the shocked crypto. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the unstandardized measures
and Section 3.2 describes how the unstandardized measures are constructed. We standardize a time
series for each asset on a rolling basis using the mean and standard deviation of each performance mea-
sure in the 60-day window prior to any given week. We remove the top and bottom 1% cross-sectional
observations for each time series when computing cross-sectional moments. The black lines give the
weekly sample mean in each asset group, while the red line gives the weekly population mean in the


















































Figure 3·10: Cumulative total returns for larger and smaller peer cryptos in the weeks after a shock
event. We say a peer crypto is larger (smaller) if, during the event week, the market capitalization of
the crypto is larger (smaller) than the market capitalization of the shocked crypto. The black lines give
the weekly cumulative total return in week e+ t, where e is an event week and 1  t  6, on average
across all cryptos that are identified as larger or smaller peers during an event week. The grey shaded
areas give 95% asymptotic confidence bands. The red line gives the average weekly cumulative return
in the whole universe of cryptos. We remove the top and bottom 1% cross-sectional observations for




Time-varying Media Coverage and Stock
Returns
4.1 Introduction
How do we choose what to read when there are thousands of papers and articles in the
world? As described in (Kahneman, 1973), attention is a scarce resource. Therefore, as
scholars, we delegate a part of our selection to editors at top journals. By choosing which
papers to publish, editors inform us what topics they think have the most potential or largest
impact from their professional points of view. The same thing happens to investors. With
countless events occurring everyday, each of them having the potential to affect investors’
consumption and investment, it is almost impossible for individuals to extract useful infor-
mation. As a result, investors also delegate part of their selection to news editors.
(Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) show under general conditions that agents in an economy
can reduce their information entropy by outsourcing their information choice to an entity
that makes state-dependent reporting decisions, compared to a situation in which they se-
lect by themselves. In this model, agents receive information in two distinct ways: via
the content of news reporting about events, and via the editorial decision on what events
to cover. If this theory holds true, then editors’ coverage decisions should have an im-
pact on agents’ investment decisions. For instance, under a similar theoretical framework,
(Chahrour et al., 2019) shows that if state-dependent editors believe riskier sectors are more
newsworthy, then time-varying media focus can explain additional aggregate fluctuations
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seen in the data due to the under- or overreaction of firms. In this paper, I show more
empirical evidence from stock returns to support this channel. My results are threefold.
First, I show that news editors have time-varying preferences for different characteristics
of firms. Second, I show that firms with high editor preference earn higher returns than
firms with low preference. A related trading strategy attains an annualized alpha of 12%
after controlling for common risk factors. Lastly, I show that such return patterns not only
exist among firms that are covered in news, but also among those that are never reported in
my news data. However, this excess return is relatively short-lived.
To estimate editor preferences that are important for investors, I use business news ar-
ticles from the New York Times between January 1995 and December 2015. I apply a
natural language processing methodology introduced in (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019) to
identify any mentions of firms and match them in the Compustat/CRSP database. Then,
I use the natural logarithm of the number of mentions in a given month as a media cov-
erage measure for each firm. I find that the news unconditionally prefers firms with large
market capitalizations. Therefore, I restrict my focus to the largest 500 firms in the Com-
pustat/CRSP universe sorted by market value every month. I monthly run a cross-sectional
regression with firm fixed-effect to study the correlation between media coverage and 9
common features (including market value) of firms.
My regression first shows that, over 20 years, media coverage constantly has a signifi-
cant and positive loading on market value, which is consistent with the existing literature.
It implies that news editors consistently prefer larger firms and thus any related reporting
decisions convey very limited information about current states to investors. I therefore
primarily consider media coverage in excess of firm size.
Media coverage has highly changeable loadings on the other eight features, either in the
sense of coefficient sign or of significance level. This shows that, at different times, editors
focus on different types of firms. If the news selection function used by editors is consistent
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with (Chahrour et al., 2019) – that is, riskier firms are considered more newsworthy – then
such focus shift implies the editors’ judgement on the risks that are associated with different
types of firms. For example, if the news tends to cover value firms in month t, then it
reflects editors’ concurrent concern of the value factor. On the other hand, in month t + k
the concern can be flipped such that the news prefers growth firms instead. Consequently, I
use the time-varying projection of media coverage on the eight firm features as my estimate
of editor preferences for risks.
After sorting on editor preference at the end of each sample month, I find that firms in
the high group outperform those in the low group in the following month, indicating that
the former require more compensation in the market. This result is robust to controlling
for risk factors in (Fama and French, 1993), (Carhart, 1997) and (Frazzini and Pedersen,
2014). More than that, this return difference exists among firms covered previously in the
news and also non-covered firms, while for the former the difference is larger. A long-short
strategy that holds covered firms with high editor preference and shorts non-covered firms
with low editor preference earns a significant 12% annualized alpha. Such result should be
expected if the theory in (Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) holds true. If the news starts to cover
one type of firms more than others, it signals to investors that this type of firms are riskier
than the rest. As long as investors believe this signal is credible, they will react accordingly
and affect asset prices even though the underlying fundamentals may not change yet.1
I study what is the determinant of the coverage-induced return difference. First, I show
that this return difference is not determined by any specific features that compose the editor
preferences. I construct high and low portfolios based on the time-varying projection of
media coverage on each single feature.2 I find that half of these features alone cannot
produce any significant return difference, while the most successful one only obtains a
6.72% annualized alpha. This is about half the size of the alpha based on all features.
1Since the New York Times is one of the biggest news outlets in the United States, it is reasonable to
believe this is true.
2Here, the editors play an active and state-dependent signaling role for individual risks.
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I also apply the elastic regularization methodology of (Fama and French, 2020) to show
that editor preferences explain the return variation between the 500 largest firms better
than any single feature. Next, I show that time-varying selection by editors is crucial for
my results. Based on the time series average of editor preferences, I show that the return
difference between high and low portfolios shrinks largely and no longer exists without
knowing which firms are covered in the news. These tests reflect that my results are caused
by two combined facts. First, news editors monitor different aspects of firms. Second, news
editors adjust their focus dynamically over time.
Lastly, I inspect the information quality of editorial selection. I test if editor preference
is limited to the 500 largest firms that I choose every month, and cannot produce similar
results among more other firms. Using the coefficients I estimated for the 500 largest firms,
I calculate editor preferences for the largest 1000, 3000, and 5000 firms in the Compus-
tat/CRSP by market value. I show that the results are very close to the baseline, especially
among non-covered firms. This comparison suggests that, when making general coverage
decisions, news editors judge on the basis of more comprehensive concerns about common
risks, rather than any specific firms. Otherwise, my estimation for editor preferences will
be sensitive to any outliers in my firm samples, and thus have limited return prediction
power for a broader group of firms. Still, I find that the news editors in my data are myopic.
If I hold the long-short portfolio open for 12 months, the annualized alpha will decrease
to 5.36%. This suggests that editor preferences capture short-term risks. This myopia
could be caused by the capacity of editors. But It could also be the case that investors who
subscribe to newspapers mostly expect to learn about short-term risks. In order to fulfill
that demand, editors need to provide myopic information accordingly (see (Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005)). In an equilibrium between editors and investors, however, these two
explanations are not distinguishable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces my data and
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methodology. Section 4.3 presents my empirical results. Section 4.4 present the robustness
checks. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between media coverage and asset
prices. One strand of this literature studies how news sentiment affects the market. For ex-
ample, (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), (Solomon and Soltes, 2012), (Niessner and So,
2018) and others document that news media tends to cover negative news about firms. (Tet-
lock, 2007) and (Tetlock et al., 2008) show that the media pessimism predicts downward
stock returns in the short-term. (García, 2013) verifies that this predictability concentrates
in recessions3. (Ahern and Sosyura, 2015) also document that investors cannot identify
merger rumors, which lead to short-term mispricings.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the interaction between attention-limited
investors and media coverage, and how this affects investment decisions. For example,
(Engelberg and Parsons, 2011) find that local media coverage for earnings announcements
of S&P 500 Index firms strongly predicts the level and the timing of local trading. (Barber
and Odean, 2008) and (Peress, 2014) find that investors tend to buy stocks in the news and
cause buying pressure. (Ben-Rephael et al., 2017) construct an index for abnormal insti-
tutional investor attention using news searching and news reading activity on Bloomberg
terminals, and find that it correlates with the speed of price adjustments.
Although the literature agrees on the relationship between media coverage and trading
behavior, when it comes to the cross-section of asset prices there are two seemly opposite
conclusions. The first type of argument use media coverage as a proxy for investor recogni-
tion since the intensity of news coverage influences the cost of information acquisition (see
(Carroll, 2003), for example). In an incomplete market modeled by (MERTON, 1987),
investors only have information access to a limited number of securities, such that there
3In Section 4.4 I show that my results are not related to similar sentiment effect.
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exists an imperfect diversification in their investment allocations. As a consequence, secu-
rities that have lower investor recognition need to offer higher risk compensation. (Fang
and Peress, 2009) document that stocks with no media coverage earn higher returns than
stocks with high media coverage even after controlling for common risk factors. This return
difference is particularly large among firms with more information friction such as firms
with a high fraction of individual ownership. (Gao et al., 2020) finds similar evidence in the
bond market: media coverage is negatively correlated with firms’ cost of debt and is robust
to controlling for standard yield determinants. On the other hand, based on typical atten-
tion stories, (Hillert et al., 2014) show that momentum is stronger among covered firms
than among non-covered firms, and is monotone in the degree of coverage. (Hillert and
Ungeheuer, 2021) find that highly covered firms outperform less covered firm in the short
run, which directly contradicts the recognition story. The authors argue that their results
are in line with the theory in (Tetlock, 2014), which suggests news reporting can benefit
sales as product advertising. They further explain that the different empirical conclusions
from previous literature are caused by a longer holding period and the way to control for
the size effect.
Although this paper is inspired by (Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) and (Chahrour et al.,
2019), which introduce a new editor-based mechanism, the empirical setting is close to
(Fang and Peress, 2009), (Hillert et al., 2014) and (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2021). Never-
theless, my paper differs from them in three major ways. First and most importantly, the
editor preference measure I construct is orthogonal to the definition of media coverage in
their papers. In any given month, we all run regressions of media coverage on firm charac-
teristics. While I use the projection part (except for the part that is related to market value)
as my measure for editor preference, they use the residual part to measure characteristic-
free coverage or “coverage shock". Theoretically, these two measures should have little
correlation, which means a highly covered firm in their settings can be a firm with low
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editor preference in my definition.4 Second, in Section 4.3.2, I show that the return dif-
ference I observe cannot be explained by any characteristic alone, and hence is beyond the
exaggerated momentum effect discovered by (Hillert et al., 2014). At last, editor prefer-
ence can also be estimated for firms that are not covered in the news, and related return
patterns are also discovered among non-covered firms. However, in their settings, there is
no way to measure either investor attention or editor preference among non-covered firms,
and consequently they are treated as the same.
My paper also contribute to a growing literature on the prediction power of news se-
lection by editors on the economy. (Blinder and Krueger, 2004) and (Curtin, ) document
that households mainly rely on either TV news shows or newspapers to get information of
the economy. Therefore, the news has incentives to monitor the state of the economy for
households. Using an LDA model and LASSO regression, (Larsen et al., 2021) show that
news topics are good predictors of both inflation and inflation expectations. With a more
comprehensive topic modeling, (Cong et al., 2019) and (Bybee et al., 2020) show that news
topics have incremental forecasting power for several macroeconomic outcomes, above and
beyond standard numerical predictors. These discoveries altogether support the argument
that news editors make state-dependent coverage decisions, and we can better understand
the economy by studying these decisions. My paper analyzes such prediction power for
stock returns.
4.2 Data & empirical setup
4.2.1 News data
I obtain daily news for the time between January 1, 1995, and December 30, 2015, through
The New York Times’ API (https://api.nytimes.com). I only select articles from the
“Business" and “Business Day" sections and filter out any company announcements. I am
4In an unreported test, I also sort on the residual of my regression and find evidence consistent with (Fang
and Peress, 2009).
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left with 140,227 articles in total. Panel (a) of Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of the
news articles and Panel (b) displays a sample article.
For every article in my data, I apply the company identification methodology introduced
in (Schwenkler and Zheng, 2019) to recognize any mentions of firms. This methodology
has two basic steps: Firstly, I use Natural Language Processing (NLP) toolkit provided by
(Manning et al., 2014) and (Arnold, 2017) called coreNLP to identify any named entity
appearing in my articles (I use the Named Entity Recognition algorithm, or NER). These
entities will be tagged as different types, such as persons, locations, organizations, etc. For
those entities that are marked as organizations, I follow a series of rules to clean and match
them with the Compustat/CRSP database over the same period. The approach I use has
been proven to have more than 87% matching accuracy.
Panel (a) of Table 4.1 gives some basic statistics of my recognition results. Notice that,
in most of the cases, one company can be mentioned multiple times within an article. I
believe that the number of mentions contains useful information. If two companies are
both mentioned in the same article while the former one shows up more times, then in my
analysis it will have a higher media coverage than the latter one instead of being equal.
This difference separates my paper from former text-based asset pricing studies such as
(Hillert et al., 2014), (Scherbina and Schlusche, 2016), and (Chahrour et al., 2019) to some
extent. In those studies, each news article is marked with several company tags by the
databases they use, meaning the article is mainly talking about these companies. They
count the number of tags for each company as their media coverage. One can imagine that
the outcomes of my method should be similar to such tag-counting method: the primary
tagged firm usually will be mentioned more times in the article. The advantage of my
counting method is, however, that I do not rely on these post processed tagging service,
which may not be provided by all news databases. In Section 4.4.2, I show that these two
measures for media coverage do not change the main results of this paper.
119
Panel (a)
Variables Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
Number of articles per month 558 139 327 980
Number of articles per year 6677 1417 4782 9845
Number of unique firms per article 3 2 1 62
Number of mentions per article 7 8 1 167
Total mentions of each firm 344 1510 5 33440
Panel (b)
I.B.M. and Partner May Offer Broadband from a Wall Plug
2005-07-11T00:00:00Z
By Ken Belson
I.B.M. will announce a partnership today with CenterPoint Energy, a utility based
in Houston, to develop broadband services to be delivered over electric power
lines. The companies will open a technology center in Houston to test and demon-
strate the technology for consumers and other utility providers. CenterPoint En-
ergy will also set up a pilot program in about 220 Houston homes that will run
through August. Because power lines can carry data as well as electricity, utilities
and broadband companies are hoping the technology will allow consumers to get
high-speed Internet connections simply by plugging a special adapter into a wall
outlet. Some utilities, including Con Edison in New York, have started offering
such services on a limited basis. By relying on the adapters – which currently cost
about $200 but are expected to become less expensive – utilities do not need to
send a worker to install equipment. Consumers can use the adapters in any room
with an outlet. The Federal Communications Commission is backing the devel-
opment of this technology in hopes of creating a counterweight to the cable and
phone industries, which provide the bulk of the 36 million broadband lines now
being used in American homes. The service could also be cheaply deployed in ru-
ral areas where phone and cable companies have not yet expanded. CenterPoint
says it will be one of the first utilities to test new technology, including faster chips
that roughly triple connection speeds. With these chips, consumers will be able to
receive Internet connections at about 7 megabits a second, equal to some of the
fastest speeds available from cable companies. Utilities are interested in offering
broadband services, not only because it could help them generate new revenue
but also because it would allow them to read meters remotely, pinpoint problems
throughout their network and monitor power surges as they take place rather than
long afterward. Utilities say they could save millions of dollars if they could avoid
long power failures and if they did not have to send workers to read meters. “Peo-
ple don’t understand how little the utilities can see of their network," said Ray
Blair, vice president for broadband over power lines at I.B.M., which is advising
CenterPoint on the project. “If your power goes out, they don’t know about it until
you call. This will tell them exactly where to go and what to fix."
Table 4.1: Panel (a) contains summary statistics of news articles in my data set and are rounded to be
integers. I download 140,227 news articles between January 1, 1995, and December 30, 2015, from the
“Business" and “Business Day" sections of The New York Times. In the last row, I only consider firms
that are mentioned at least once in my data. Panel (b) provides a sample article in my data.
Also, notice that the total mentions of each firm in my data have heavy tailed distribu-
tions. To control for this issue, I define the measure
coveragei,t = ln(1+mentioni,t),
where i is the firm index and t stands for the counting period. Here, mentioni,t is the number
of mentions of firm i in the news articles in month t. I will heavily rely on this measure in
the rest of this paper.
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4.2.2 Prior coverage preference
In this paper, I study the state-dependent preferences of editors. I am not only interested in
which companies are covered by news, but also in which are not. Ideally, I want to focus
on a group of firms sharing similar prior probabilities of being covered. Then, if some of
them (rather than others) are considered to be newsworthy by editors, it suggests that these
firms have some features that need to be paid attention to in the current state of the world.
Although it is almost impossible to estimate such group in practice, we can instead look
for what common features of firms can constantly and consistently affect media coverage
in any state. As pointed out in (Fang and Peress, 2009), (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011),
(Solomon and Soltes, 2012), and (Hillert et al., 2014), size (market value) is the most
dominant feature of firms that determines prior media coverage on average: larger firms
are more likely to get covered by any news outlet and in any situation. Therefore, I only
consider the 500 largest firms by market value in the Compustat/CRSP universe. Since all
of these firms are large, we can expect them to have similar chance of media coverage if
everything else is equal. I therefore focus on editors’ preferences after conditioning on size.
There are two more reasons of doing this. First, the number of covered firms versus the
non-covered ones is more balanced among largest 500 firms. Second, picking 500 rather
than fewer firms yields a wider industry coverage (see Figure 4·1).
For every month t in my sample period, I use market value at the end of the previous
month t   1 to select the 500 largest firms. This leaves me with 1,426 unique firms over
the whole period; see Panel (a) of Table 4.2 for summary statistics. After I determined the
top 500 group, I divide the group into two sub-groups: the covered group (all the firms that
are reported at least once in month t) and the non-covered group (the rest of the top 500).
In every month, roughly 20 to 40% of the largest 500 firms are in the covered group.5 See
Figure 4·2 for details.
5However, there is one outlier on February 2015, in which I was not able to download enough business
news from the New York Times archive.
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Panel (a) Top 500
Variables Mean Median Std Dev. Min. Max.
Market value (million USD) 16242.07 7052.98 31816.73 9.86 345013.39
Total asset (million USD) 3307.55 1157.91 7076.50 16.17 103359.08
Total debt (million USD) 6427.03 1724.90 25356.76 0.00 538837.27
Book leverage (long-term debt/total asset) 122.35% 60.41% 232.05% 0.00% 4832.04%
Cash holding (million USD) 1507.33 259.73 7840.15 0.00 224841.63
Net income (million USD) 670.12 218.80 1409.15 0.02 19173.23
Sales (million USD) 8482.00 2926.15 18837.09 7.86 361489.00
Number of firms that operate internationally 1013 (71.04%)
Number of firms whose stocks are traded in U.S. exchanges 1295 (90.81%)
Panel (b) Top 500 - most covered
Variables Mean Median Std Dev. Min. Max.
Market value (million USD) 34917.12 18020.97 50581.42 299.13 345013.39
Total asset (million USD) 6727.04 2792.57 10860.16 40.93 103389.08
Total debt (million USD) 11925.00 4736.46 27114.77 0.00 265261.26
Book leverage (long-term debt/total asset) 119.00% 57.00% 310.00% 0.00% 4832.00%
Cash holding (million USD) 3137.10 658.34 10095.92 0.00 155513.40
Net income (million USD) 1295.18 502.52 2098.38 1.67 19173.23
Sales (million USD) 17140.11 7962.21 28023.60 198.81 361489.00
Number of firms that operate internationally 233 (52.13%)
Number of firms whose stocks are traded in U.S. exchanges 409 (91.50%)
Panel (c) Top 500 - non-covered
Variables Mean Median Std Dev. Min. Max.
Market value (million USD) 6592.87 4752.02 6983.87 9.86 62911.71
Total assset (million USD) 1579.18 728.14 3303.56 17.80 36373.00
Total debt (million USD) 3118.36 940.18 19299.86 0.00 460952.00
Book leverage (long-term debt/total asset) 123.00% 63.00% 167.00% 0.00% 1482.00%
Cash holding (million USD) 754.39 154.20 7755.56 0.00 224841.63
Net income (million USD) 294.90 143.79 599.47 0.92 7515.06
Sales (million USD) 3968.72 1659.77 10600.06 7.86 225987.20
Number of firms that operate internationally 150 (22.56%)
Number of firms whose stocks are traded in U.S. exchanges 598 (89.92%)
Table 4.2: Panel (a): Summary statistics of all firms from Compustat/CRSP database that at least once
be counted as one of 500 largest firms by monthly market value. The 500 largest firms are updated on
a monthly basis between January 1995 and December 2015 using data from the previous month, which
leaves me with 1,426 unique firms over the sample period. The above statistics are time series moments
over firm lifetimes that overlapped with my sample period. Total debt is the sum of current and long-
term debt. Panel (b): summary statistics of the 447 firms in Panel (a) that are covered by media in at
least 6 months of the sample period. Panel (c): summary statistics of the 665 firms in Panel (a) that are
















































Figure 4·1: Graphical summary of industry distributions of 4 different firms groups from January 1995
and December 2015. I use the last available 2-digit GIC Sectors code for each firm before December
2015.
There are 665 out of 1,426 firms that are never covered by my news data over the sample
period. This may be expected because, even within the top 500 group, there is significant
size dispersion and the news still prefers to report about larger firms. The characteristics
comparison between the covered and non-covered groups can be found in Panel (b) and (c)
of Table 4.2, and Figure 4·1 reports differences in their industry distributions.6. I conclude
that indeed the covered firms on average are larger than the non-covered ones no matter
what measures I use (market value, asset size, sales, etc.). Moreover, the covered group has
a larger portion of firms operate internationally, which is also natural for big firms. Lastly,
when compared to either the top 500 group or the CRSP/Compustat universe, the covered
group tends to have more firms in both consumer staples and health care sectors, while less
firms in information technology industry.
6Notice that here the group definition is a little different: for such a long period, every top 500 firm has a
fair chance to be covered at least once. Therefore in firm’s characteristic comparisons I calculate how many
times a firm is included in the covered group and compare the top 30% (6 times, “most covered") versus the
firms that were never covered over the sample period.
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4.2.3 Editor preference and portfolio construction
I now estimate the state-dependent preference of editors. More plainly, I estimate what
features of a firm (except for size) can cause a higher media coverage in different periods.
Following a similar procedure as in (Fang and Peress, 2009), (Hillert et al., 2014), and
(Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2021) but in order to include more data points, in every month t
I run the following cross-sectional regression among the 500 largest firms on a 3-month
rolling window:
coveragei,t = at + gt ⇤ ln(sizei,t)+Â
k
bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t +fixed effecti + ei,t (4.1)
where size stands for market value and f eature includes other common features of firms
that can affect media coverage. I then keep the tail 500 data points as the estimation for
month t. In my test a longer rolling window gives similar results in later sections but a
shorter window is worse. Therefore in the rest of this paper I use this setting as default
if there is no further explanation. Here, fixed effect controls for whether a firm i is ever
covered in the most recent 3 months. The reason I want to take it into consideration is
that industry sector, along with other omitted firm features such as headquarter address and
rating, can cause prior non-coverage in the recent period and hence the conditional non-
coverage in month t. This potential endogeneity issue is also the reason why I run this
regression using both covered and non-covered firms (which have zeros at the left hand
side) instead of using only covered firms. Although the Hausman test is not applicable
here, Figure 4·3 demonstrates the sample correlation between Âk bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t and ei,t
when using different firm pools. Including all 500 firms and fixed effect definitely mitigate
the issue.
In f eaturek,i,t , I consider eight different variables that are correlated with media cover-
age: cumulative return in past three months (CumRet) and its absolute value (|CumRet|),
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), book-to-market ratio (B/M), and firms’ factor loadings in
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the (Carhart, 1997) 4-factor model.7
I verify the correlation between size and coverage. Figure 4·4 reports the t-statistic of
g in my regression (4.1). One can see that indeed size positively, persistently, and signif-
icantly affects the media coverage of a firm, even after controlling for other features and
fixed effects. This observation justifies my narrowing down to the largest firms and not con-
sidering size as a feature reflecting the editors’ state-dependent preferences. On the other
hand, f eaturek,i,t tell a different story. Figure 4·5 shows the t-statistics of their coefficients,
bk. The coefficients are not always significant over the sample period, implying that none
of them are decisive factors that drive the media coverage. Moreover, the sign of the coeffi-
cients switches through different periods, which provides more supportive evidence for the
argument that the co-movement between these features and media coverage is changing
over time. Therefore, I consider this time-varying part Âk bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t to reflect the
editors’ preference for features of a firm that they believe investors should pay attention to
at time t. I denote editors’ preferences as EP and define this measure as follows:
EPi,t = Â
k
bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t
At the end of month t, I construct 4 equal-weighted portfolios and rebalance them one
month later. I construct the high EP portfolio using the 30% percentile among the covered
firms. This portfolio has the largest EPi,t measurement. I also construct the analogous low
EP portfolio, as well as equivalent high and low EP portfolios among non-covered firms.
This is the key difference between my methodology and the existing literature, which uses
ei,t in Eq. (4.1) to construct the high and low portfolios. Since the dependent variables and
the residual provide orthogonal information, the return patterns of my portfolios should be
caused by different factors.
7I use a 24-month rolling window to estimate each firm’s factor loadings and use the residual as IVOL. A
longer rolling window has been tested, but it has negligible impact on the results.
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4.3 Empirical results
4.3.1 Post-news: baseline performance
In the equilibrium of the models of (Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) and (Chahrour et al.,
2019), if risk-averse investors outsource their information choice to news editors, then
news editors view more risky firms as more newsworthy. Based on these models, we expect
high EP firms to earn a higher expected return than low EP firms. Moreover, this return
difference should exist both among the covered firms and the non-covered firms. This is
because EP captures editors’ focus on firm features rather than idiosyncratic characteristics,
and even non-covered firms are differently exposed to the risky features that editors are
concerned with. This will be the major difference between media coverage and editor
preference in the setting, since one cannot measure the former one among non-covered
firms.
Figure 4·6 graphically demonstrate the corresponding return patterns. Some interesting
observations can be made. The covered firms with high EP have the highest overall returns
over my sample period and are followed by the non-covered firms with high EP. Mean-
while the low EP portfolios earn pronouncedly lower returns. These observations are in
line with my conjecture that newsworthy firms are the most risky ones for investors. The
fact that such return difference is more narrow among non-covered firms arguably suggests
that there are some other risky features causing media coverage, which I did not consider
in my regression when I estimated editor preferences.
One may argue that my analysis is misleading since EP contains features that are proven
to carry risk premia. For instance, when the book-to-market ratio has a more dominant and
positive impact on media coverage than other features, then sorting on EP is basically
sorting on book-to-market ratio. Consequently, the return difference between high EP
firms and low EP firms will mainly be caused by the value factor. In order to have a closer
scrutiny, I use the 4-factor model in (Carhart, 1997) plus the betting-against-beta (BAB)
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RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt -RF 1.2508⇤⇤⇤ 0.3428⇤⇤⇤ 1.1858⇤⇤⇤ 0.2348⇤⇤⇤ 0.2998⇤⇤⇤
(0.0402) (0.0699) (0.0503) (0.0703) (0.0778)
SMB 0.0450 0.0792 0.1401⇤⇤⇤ 0.0151  0.0800
(0.0636) (0.0917) (0.0515) (0.0945) (0.1025)
HML 0.3855⇤⇤⇤ 0.5286⇤⇤⇤ 0.0868 0.3558⇤⇤⇤ 0.6546⇤⇤⇤
(0.0967) (0.1330) (0.0907) (0.1365) (0.1494)
Mom  0.2949⇤⇤⇤  0.3333⇤⇤⇤  0.1652⇤⇤⇤  0.2082⇤⇤  0.3379⇤⇤⇤
(0.0636) (0.0986) (0.0475) (0.0909) (0.1000)
BAB  0.1233⇤  0.1954⇤  0.0851  0.2413⇤⇤  0.2795⇤⇤
(0.0691) (0.1130) (0.0724) (0.0987) (0.1126)
Alpha 0.0061⇤⇤⇤ 0.0074⇤⇤ 0.0026 0.0065⇤⇤ 0.0100⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Adjusted R2 0.9063 0.4907 0.8998 0.3982 0.4924
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.3: Results of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent variables
are the return differences between different high EP portfolios and low EP portfolios as defined in
Section 4.2.3, or their excess returns with respect to the 3-month Treasury bill. Independent variables
are common factors including the Fama-French 3 factors in (Fama and French, 1993) (Mkt-RF, SMB,
HML), the momentum factor in (Carhart, 1997) (Mom), and the betting-against-beta factor in (Frazzini
and Pedersen, 2014) (BAB). Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial autocorrelation
using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months.
factor in (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) to decompose the results as shown in Table 4.3.
Even after controlling for these common factors, one can still observe significant return
differences that are associated with EP and are consistent with the patterns in Figure 4·6.
Notice that a long-short portfolio that longs the covered firms with high EP and shorts
the non-covered ones with low EP has a sizable 12% annualized alpha. The factor model
test provides substantial evidence for the argument that news editors are guiding investors
attention to a basket of risky features, such that firms with larger exposure to these features
requires higher return compensation by investors.
4.3.2 Sorting decomposition
At first glance, the baseline results (or, more specifically, the alphas) in Table 4.3 are sur-
prising from a portfolio construction point of view. Why does sorting on EP give a much
different return pattern than sorting on the features that compose EP? To answer this ques-
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Market beta -0.0020 -1.1469
SMB beta -0.0008 -0.6388
HML beta -0.0010 -0.5691
Mom beta -0.0009 -0.5233
Table 4.4: Results of t-tests for the time series of the 8 long-short portfolios that are sorted on each
feature alone, adjusted using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months. The sample period is
February 1995 to January 2016. The sample includes the 500 largest firms and is updated every month.
tion, we need to firstly check if the 5-factor model I implement is a good benchmark before
moving any forward. That is to say, none of the feature itself contains pricing information
additional to the 5 risk factors. To test this hypothesis, I construct 8 long-short portfolios
among 500 firms that are sorted on each feature alone and want to see how the 5-factor
model explains the excess returns. Table 4.4 shows the results. One can see that the 5-
factor model explains the cross-section of returns well overall, with the only exception of
idiosyncratic volatility which has significant negative alpha. This is in line with the find-
ings in (Ang et al., 2006) and (Baker et al., 2011) that high IVOL firms earn lower returns.
However, since the loading of media coverage on idiosyncratic volatility is not constantly
negative,8 the EP-related alphas are not equal to low-risk anomalies. Later on, I will show
that the results remain similar without IVOL.
To answer the question that why we can observe alphas in Table 4.3, two nuances can
be found from the way I construct EP to explain this return pattern.
First, the loadings of coverage on each feature are state-dependent. More specifically,
both the level and the sign of the coefficients are time-varying (see Figure 4·5). This implies
that the EP-based sorting changes over time. For instance, in some months the loading of
coverage on book-to-market ratio can be negative, hence a high EP firm is more likely
8See Figure 4·5.
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to be a growth firm. However, we know that the value factor return is always negatively
correlated with the return of growth firms. Therefore, compared to the traditional static
sorting, sorting on EP is more similar to a factor timing strategy. The reason such timing is
generally successful is that news editors perform well in closely tracking the current state
of the market on behalf of investors. This timely reflection of the focus of news editors is
also in line with topic shifting observed by (Nimark and Pitschner, 2019) and (Bybee et al.,
2020), while the latter one also shows that news editors keep a good record of predicting
the macro environment.
To more formally test the importance of the timing dimension for my results, I construct
a static measure of editor preference using the time series average of bk in Regression (4.1):
Static EPi = Â
k
b̄k ⇤ f eaturek,i,t .
I then sort on this new static EP every month and construct corresponding portfolios. The
factor model results can be found in Table 4.5. In Panel (a) we can see that, among non-
covered firms, the static EP measure cannot contribute additional pricing information at
all. Only covered firms with high static EP contain alpha, but it is less pronounced. This
is consistent with the fact that being covered itself also reflects the timely focus of news
editors. Panel (b) shows a clearer evidence: high static EP firms no longer hold any alpha
against low static EP firms without knowing which firms are in the news. All combined,
news editors’ time-varying preferences indeed play a defining role in generating the excess
returns observed in Table 4.3.
Second, news editors not only monitor one specific feature but a combination of several
features. The dispersion in the coefficients bk reflects the different importance of these
features at that moment. Not only does the sign of bk matter, its level also decides whether
a firm of high f eaturek belongs to the high EP group or not. I show that one single feature
cannot contribute enough pricing information. Suppose we only consider one feature that
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Panel (a) Sort on static EP





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt-RF 1.2383⇤⇤⇤ 0.3416⇤⇤⇤ 1.1954⇤⇤⇤ 0.2735⇤⇤⇤ 0.3164⇤⇤⇤
(0.0336) (0.0588) (0.0503) (0.0515) (0.0436)
SMB 0.1527⇤⇤⇤ 0.2741⇤⇤⇤ 0.1478⇤⇤⇤ 0.0563 0.0612
(0.0581) (0.0612) (0.0569) (0.0993) (0.0928)
HML 0.2470⇤⇤⇤ 0.2193⇤⇤⇤  0.1269⇤  0.0525 0.3214⇤⇤⇤
(0.0689) (0.0843) (0.0690) (0.0817) (0.0766)
Mom  0.3306⇤⇤⇤  0.4055⇤⇤⇤  0.2734⇤⇤⇤  0.3542⇤⇤⇤  0.4114⇤⇤⇤
(0.0547) (0.0531) (0.0428) (0.0722) (0.0517)
BAB  0.2077⇤⇤⇤  0.2857⇤⇤⇤  0.1205⇤  0.2845⇤⇤⇤  0.3717⇤⇤⇤
(0.0515) (0.0651) (0.0646) (0.0624) (0.0541)
Alpha 0.0050⇤⇤⇤ 0.0031 0.0015 0.0021 0.0057⇤⇤⇤
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Adjusted R2 0.8891 0.6268 0.8889 0.5875 0.6297
Panel (b) Pooled and sort on static EP















Adjusted R2 0.9118 0.6464
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.5: Results of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent variables
are the return differences between different high static editor preference portfolios and low static editor
preference portfolios among the 500 largest firms, or their excess returns with respect to the 3-month
Treasury bill. In Panel (b), I do not distinguish between covered firms and non-covered firms. Inde-
pendent variables are common factors including the Fama-French 3 factors in (Fama and French, 1993)
(Mkt-RF, SMB, HML), the momentum factor in (Carhart, 1997) (Mom), and the betting-against-beta
factor in (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) (BAB). Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial
autocorrelation using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months.
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composes editor preference. Then, to construct the high/low EP portfolios, I only need to
sort on the projection of coveragei on this feature, i.e. bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t for firm i in month
t. Table 4.6 demonstrates the results. The alphas either no longer exist or take a large
discount when only considering one specific feature of editors’ preferences. Besides, these
alphas can be exaggerated considering that single-sorting doesn’t consider the correlation
between features of the same firms. For example, if IVOL is positive correlated with market
beta, then a high-beta firm is more likely to be in the high-IVOL group. In that case,
the additional pricing information contained in bIVOL,t ⇤ f eatureIVOL,i,t can be partially
replaced by bBeta,t ⇤ f eatureBeta,i,t , when bIVOL,t ⇡ bBeta,t . Therefore EPt should be less
sensitive to f eaturek,t than Table 4.6 suggests.
To verify this posit, I construct the Leave-One-Out editor preference:
EPLOOi,t = EPi,t  bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t
and construct long-short portfolios accordingly. In order to control for co-linearity between
features and then have less bias in estimating bk,t , I re-run my EP estimation with features
processed as followed in sequence: regress CumRet out of |CumRet|; regress size and beta
out of SMB beta, HML beta and Mom beta; finally regress all other features out of CumRet.
Table 4.7 shows the new return decomposition results. We can see that comparing to the
benchmark, alphas shrinks by 1%-17%. This result again consolidates the fact that none of
the features are dominant, although some of them make more marginal contribution than
others.
To further emphasize the explanation power of editor preference on the variation of
returns among my sample firms, I apply a methodology for estimating factor returns intro-
duced in (Fama and French, 2020). In their paper, they run a cross-sectional regression at
time t:
Ri,t  Rz,t = b1,t ⇤C1,i,t 1 +b2,t ⇤C2,i,t 1 + · · ·+ ei,t ,
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Panel (a): project on |CumRet|
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0052⇤⇤ 0.0022 0.0045 0.0031 0.0061⇤
Panel (b): project on CumRet
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0029  0.0018  0.0001  0.0038 0.0009
Panel (c): project on IVOL
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0026⇤ 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0027
Panel (d): project on B/M
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0037⇤⇤⇤ 0.0009 0.0034⇤ 0.0028⇤ 0.0056⇤⇤⇤
Panel (e): project on market beta
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0023  0.0016  0.0012  0.0018 0.0022
Panel (f): project on SMB beta
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0037⇤⇤⇤ 0.0008 0.0031⇤ 0.0027⇤⇤ 0.0055⇤⇤⇤
Panel (g): project on HML beta
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0018 0.0011  0.0009 0.0016 0.0022
Panel (h): project on Mom beta
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0032⇤⇤ 0.0007 0.0020 0.0017 0.0042⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.6: Alphas of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent variables
are the return differences between different portfolios among 500 largest firms, or their excess returns
with respect to the 3-month Treasury bill. Here “high" and “low" mean that I sort on the projection of
coverage on a certain feature k, i.e. bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t for each company i and choose the top and the
bottom terciles. The definitions of these eight features are consistent with the definitions in Section
4.2.3. Independent variables are common factors including the Fama-French 3 factors (Mkt-RF, SMB,
HML), the momentum factor (Mom), and the betting-against-beta factor (BAB). Standard errors are
adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months when calculate
significance levels.
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Panel (a) Leave |CumRet| out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0062⇤⇤⇤ 0.0069⇤⇤ 0.0036⇤ 0.0074⇤⇤⇤ 0.0101⇤⇤⇤
Panel (b) Leave CumRet out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0056⇤⇤⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0027 0.0056⇤⇤ 0.0085⇤⇤⇤
Panel (c) Leave IVOL out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0063⇤⇤⇤ 0.0077⇤⇤⇤ 0.0031 0.0071⇤⇤ 0.0103⇤⇤⇤
Panel (d) Leave B/M out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0063⇤⇤⇤ 0.0074⇤⇤ 0.0027 0.0064⇤⇤ 0.0099⇤⇤⇤
Panel (e) Leave market beta out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0056⇤⇤⇤ 0.0063⇤⇤ 0.0034⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0090⇤⇤⇤
Panel (f) Leave SMB beta out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0067⇤⇤ 0.0022 0.0050⇤⇤ 0.0083⇤⇤⇤
Panel (g) Leave HML beta out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0057⇤⇤ 0.0028 0.0057⇤⇤ 0.0084⇤⇤⇤
Panel (h) Leave Mom beta out
Covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0024 0.0057⇤ 0.0088⇤⇤⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.7: Alphas of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent vari-
ables are the return differences between portfolios sorted on leave-one-out editor preference, or their
excess returns with respect to the 3-month Treasury bill. Independent variables are common factors
including the Fama-French 3 factors (Mkt-RF, SMB, HML), the momentum factor (Mom), and the
betting-against-beta factor (BAB). Standard errors are adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey
and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months when calculate significance levels.
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where Ri, t is the stock return of firm i in month t, Rz,t is the benchmark return, Ci,t 1s are
the characteristics of firms observed previously and such that bt’s are the realized factor
return related to that characteristic at time t. Notice that, here, the characteristics are the
independent variables and the factor returns are the loadings. Once we have a time series
of realized factor return bk,t , we can test whether its time-series average is significantly
different from zero or whether it really contains pricing information. The intuition behind
this test is to see whether the variation of a feature k among I firms can explain the return
variation among these firms, even after controlling for other features. Following the same
idea, I design a similar test to verify the capability of editor preference in explaining the
return differences among 500 largest firms. In every month of my sample period, I run the
following regression:
Ri,t  Rz,t = gt ⇤ ln(sizei,t 1)+Â
k
bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t 1 +at ⇤EPi,t 1 + ei,t (4.2)
where f eaturek,i,t 1 are the same as in Regression (4.1), Ri,t is the monthly return of Firm
i in the top 500 group, and Rz,t is the average monthly return of the top 500 group.9 It
is obvious that there exists co-linearity between EP and f eaturek. Therefore, I use the
elastic net regularization which will push the coefficients of variables that have limited
explanation power toward zero. Once we obtain the time series of gt , bk,t and at , t-tests
can be applied to verify their significance. Table 4.8 gives the results. The only significant
coefficients here are the ones related to B/M, IVOL and editor preference (EP). Moreover,
the average coefficient of EP is at least ten times the average coefficients of other variables.
All combined, these results show that EP explains the cross-sectional return differences
among the 500 largest firms better than any specific feature that it consists of.
9Notice that, here, I do not use risk-free rate or other orthogonal portfolio returns. This is because the
focus of this test is not to estimate factor returns.
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Features Coefficient mean T-statistic
ln(size) ⇠ 0 -0.3383
B/M -0.0051 -1.7750




SMB beta -0.0009 -1.4796
HML beta -0.0004 -0.5310
Mom beta 0.0006 0.5138
EP 0.3400 2.3269
Table 4.8: Results of t-tests for the time series of the variable coefficients in Regression 4.2, adjusted
using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months. For Regression 4.2, the sample period is February
1995 to January 2016. The sample includes the 500 largest firms and is updated every month. The coef-
ficients are estimated using the elastic net method and hence the independent variables are standardized
to be under the same scale.
4.3.3 Comprehensive but myopic editors
It could be counterintuitive to some that news editors have such comprehensive reporting
preference on firms’ characteristics, and that they not just chase specific firms and their
events. One evidence I have shown to support this fact is that the EP-related return differ-
ence also exists among non-covered firms. To better test how universal the EP premium is,
I expand the size of my sample to see if the premium still exists among more non-covered
firms. More specifically, I estimate in every month the coefficients of different features in




b̂k,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t+1, i 2 N
Finally, based on their EP values and their coverage status, I construct equal-weighted
“covered/non-covered" and “high EP/low EP" portfolios as usual. In Table 4.9, it is very
interesting to see that the EP-related alphas persist to exist among more firms, especially
considering the fact that the coefficients used to construct EP are estimated using only
500 firms. Besides, in both the covered and the non-covered group, the alphas observed
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are comparable with my previous results in the senses of size and of statistical significance.
That is, constraining myself to the 500 largest firms every month is good enough to evaluate
editorial preferences.
Nevertheless, news editors seem to be myopic. From Panel (a) in Table 4.10 we can see
that the EP-related alphas die out quickly after 1 month. For instance, if I rebalance the
portfolios monthly (baseline), then the largest annualized alpha I obtained is around 1% ⇤
12 = 12%. However, if I hold the same portfolios for a longer period, the annualized alpha
decreases to 5.36%. This alpha discount suggests that editors are either more concerned
about short-term risks rather than long-term ones, or they are not capable of capturing long-
term trends. It does not help much if I expand my news formation period from one month
to a longer period. More past news also bring in more noisy information and impairs even
the short-term return predictability. This myopia should be expected due to the objective of
daily news reporting: to report events in a timely fashion. Thus, its readers will expect the
editors to be more sensitive to short-term risks such that in turn the editors want to fulfill
that expectation. In the future research in which other forms of information medium (for
instance journals) are used, we may observe editor preference over a longer time horizon.
This myopia may raise some concerns that if the news coverage can be biased by in-
dustry clustering around earning announcement. 10 For example if Tesla announces a big
fundamental change, news editors may choose to cover more firms of the electronic auto in-
dustry in that period. These firms usually share similar characteristics and then can largely
affect the EP estimation, which suggests the high EP firms in turn are likely from the same
industry. In that case, the EP-related alpha may be caused by some latent industry premium.
From the first panel in Figure 4·7 we can see that indeed the average EP-related alphas are
not consistent in different seasons. They are generally larger when news is formed in July
and October, in which most firms release their 10-Qs. However, I do not find evidence
10Although I have excluded company announcement in my news data and controlled for industry fixed
effect when estimating EP.
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Panel (a): Among top 500 firms (baseline)
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0061⇤⇤⇤ 0.0026 0.0074⇤⇤ 0.0065⇤⇤ 0.0100⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Adjusted R2 0.8587 0.8738 0.4294 0.3249 0.4490
Panel (b): Among top 1000 firms
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0061⇤⇤⇤ 0.0033⇤ 0.0078⇤⇤ 0.0067⇤⇤ 0.0095⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0031)
Adjusted R2 0.8643 0.9013 0.4111 0.3394 0.3986
Panel (c): Among top 3000 firms
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0066⇤⇤⇤ 0.0045⇤⇤ 0.0089⇤⇤⇤ 0.0088⇤⇤⇤ 0.0108⇤⇤⇤
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Adjusted R2 0.8615 0.9225 0.4295 0.4337 0.4389
Panel (d): Among top 5000 firms
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high - Non-covered high
-
Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
Alpha 0.0074⇤⇤⇤ 0.0050⇤⇤ 0.0090⇤⇤⇤ 0.0082⇤⇤ 0.0106⇤⇤⇤
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0031)
Adjusted R2 0.8541 0.8946 0.4495 0.4967 0.4922
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.9: Alphas of time series regression from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent variables
are return differences between different portfolios among N largest firms, or their excess returns to the
3-month Treasury bill. In every month, I estimate the coefficients in Regression (4.1) using the 500
largest firms, and calculate EP for each of the N largest firms. Based on their EP values and being
covered or not, I construct the corresponding equal-weighted portfolios as usual. Independent variables
are common factors including the Fama-French 3 factors (Mkt-RF, SMB, HML), the momentum factor
(Mom) and the betting-against-beta factor (BAB). Standard errors are adjusted for serial autocorrelation
using (Newey and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months.
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Panel (a): 1 month news formation
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
t +1 0.0061⇤⇤⇤ 0.0026 0.0074⇤⇤ 0.0065⇤⇤ 0.0100⇤⇤⇤
t +3 0.0120⇤⇤ 0.0042 0.0084 0.0086⇤ 0.0164⇤⇤
t +6 0.0240⇤⇤⇤ 0.0138⇤ 0.0144 0.0204⇤⇤ 0.0306⇤⇤⇤
t +12 0.0424⇤⇤⇤ 0.0307⇤⇤ 0.0275⇤ 0.0419⇤⇤⇤ 0.0536⇤⇤⇤
Panel (b): 3 months news formation
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
t +1 0.0047⇤⇤⇤ 0.0029⇤ 0.0075⇤⇤⇤ 0.0076⇤⇤ 0.0094⇤⇤⇤
t +3 0.0102⇤⇤⇤ 0.0008 0.0113⇤⇤⇤ 0.0062 0.0155⇤⇤
t +6 0.0191⇤⇤⇤ 0.0012 0.0148⇤⇤ 0.0055 0.0233⇤
t +12 0.0397⇤⇤⇤ 0.0098 0.0299⇤⇤ 0.0220 0.0519⇤⇤⇤
Panel (c): 6 months news formation
Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high - Non-covered high - Covered high -
RF RF Covered low Non-covered low Non-covered low
t +1 0.0017 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0020
t +3 0.0062 0.0021 0.0029 0.0045 0.0086
t +6 0.0119⇤⇤ 0.0079 0.0012 0.0071 0.0110
t +12 0.0266⇤⇤⇤ 0.0127 0.0069 0.0151 0.0290⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.10: Portfolio alphas from my 5-factor model under different news formation period. N months
news formation period means that in month t, I use the average media coverage in most recent N months
to calculate coveraget and EPt , then I constructed the corresponding portfolios at the end of month t
and rebalance it again at the end of month t + k. Therefore in Panel (a) the first row is the baseline
performance from Table 4.3. For portfolios held more than one month, factor returns are also extended
to a longer horizon accordingly. Standard errors are adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey
and West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months as before.
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of industry clustering in high EP firms. In each month, I calculate the standard deviation
between industry weights in the high EP portfolios, denoted as industry clustering. Based
on the 2-digit GIC sector codes, there are 12 industries in my sample and therefore indus-
try clustering is bounded between 0 (equal-weighted) and 0.28 (one industry takes 100%
weight). From the second panel in Figure 4·7 we can observe that the industry clustering in
my sample is quite small and consistent in different seasons. Therefore the seasonality we
observed in the alphas is not caused by industry effect discussed above.11 There are two
alternative explanations: news near earning seasons is more informative and/or investors
are more sensitive to them, but I will leave it to be discussed in the future.
Myopia also partially explains why the EP-related alpha is not exploited by active fund
managers. The trading strategy that longs high EP covered firms and shorts low EP non-
covered firms only achieves an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.89, implying that the return
volatility is too high and hence less attractive to investors than it appears.12 Besides, I ob-
serve a common phenomenon in both panels of Figure 4·6: the return gap between high
EP firms and low EP firms shrinks largely when the market is in distress.13 Myopia can
provide an explanation. In a distressed market, news editors will focus more on the cur-
rent state of the economy rather than providing forward-looking opinions. In that case,
editor preference will have very limited predictive powers but only reflect a current situ-
ation, especially for those firms with high EP. Once we realize that the news does not
always provide useful forward-looking information, the trading strategies can be adjusted
accordingly. For instance, a strategy that constantly longs high EP covered firms and shorts
low EP non-covered firms, if I flip the long-short positions after I observed two negative
monthly market return in a row, the annualized alpha will increase from 12% to 16.44%
11It also suggests that I control the industry fixed effect well enough in estimating EP.
12Although compared to the Sharpe ratios of other media-coverage-based trading strategies, such as 0.63
in (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2021), it is relatively high.
13There are two major bear markets in my data: the dot-com crash (2000-2002) and the financial crisis
(2007-2009).
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with a higher Sharpe ratio of 1.33.14 From this rough application one can see the impor-
tance to distinguish the content of news. In the future research, more sophisticated NLP
tools, like the topic modeling in (Bybee et al., 2020), can be applied to address this issue.
4.4 Robustness check
4.4.1 Tone of news
In this section, I test if my previous results are caused by some sentiment effects on in-
vestors behavior (for example, see (Shiller, 2015), (Tetlock, 2007) and (Tetlock et al.,
2008)). The coreNLP toolkit I applied to identify entities also provides sentiment for each
sentence in my news data. Based on a pre-trained database and the structure of target sen-
tences, the toolkit will give an integer sentiment score for each sentence ranging from 0 to
4. 0 stands for very negative and 4 stands for very positive. There are in total 10,145,101
sentences in my data with an average sentiment score of 1.3, therefore it would be reason-
able to set 1 as my benchmark neutral score. 819,109 (8.07%) of these sentences mention
at least one of the 500 largest firms in that month. Among these 819,109 sentences, 82.72%
of them have sentiment scores of 1 and 5.42% of them have scores of 0. One can already
observe that most of the media coverage of firms is not tilted toward pessimism. Next, I
only select those sentences that have scores of 1 to calculate coverage for each firm, es-
timate EP, and construct the corresponding portfolios as before. Panel (a) in Table 4.11
reports the regression results when only “neutral news" are used. Comparing to Table 4.3,
we see that there is not much difference in the sense of factor loadings. The effect on alphas
is minor.
(García, 2013) documents that the prediction power of news sentiment for stock returns
is concentrated in recessions. Following this idea, in Panel (b) I also include the NBER
recession indicator in the factor model regressions.15 Although the alphas shrink slightly,
14It happened 46 times in my sample period of 252 months.
15I also tested lagged recession indicator but the differences are even smaller.
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the loadings on the recession indicator are never significant. I conclude that the return
differences I document are not caused by the sentiment of my news data.
4.4.2 Editor preference estimation
In this section, I test the robustness of my results to the way I estimate EP. Firstly, I show
that my results do not rely on the definition of coverage. As I introduce in Section 4.2.1, one
of the most popular methods to measure news focus of firm i is to count how many news
articles are classified under the name of firm i using news tags. However news tagging
requires editorial classification (usually manually) and not every news database provides
such a service. To approximate this tag-based measure, if a firm is mentioned more than
2 times in a given article, I add tag “Firm i" to this article.16 For each firm i, I count how
many news articles during month t contain its tag and use the logarithm of this number as
coverage. After that, I estimate EPi and construct portfolios as usual. Panel (a) in Table
4.12 reports the regression results using this different definition of coverage. Again, both
the alphas and the factor loadings are similar in terms of scale and significance level. This
comparison implies that the results I document in this paper are robust to different mea-
surements of media coverage measurement, and thus this discovery supplements previous
results, such as those of (Fang and Peress, 2009) and (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2021).
Next, I use the ridge regularization to mitigate the effect of residuals in Regression 4.1.
The reason I choose ridge over elastic net or lasso is that I want to keep as many f eaturek as
possible in the regression, while having a correct order of the importance for these features.
Since size and fixed effect combined have dominant impact on media coverage, it is easy
for the regularization to push the coefficients of any other variables to zero. Then most of
the time, the corresponding editor preference will have very limited stock-picking capabil-
ity. Panel (b) in Table 4.12 shows the results with ridge regularization and they are again
16I choose this threshold because from Table 4.1 we know that the average mentions of a mentioned firm
in an article is approximately 2.33.
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Panel (a) Use neutral news





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt -RF 1.2669⇤⇤⇤ 0.3619⇤⇤⇤ 1.1910⇤⇤⇤ 0.2289⇤⇤⇤ 0.3049⇤⇤⇤
(0.0378) (0.0617) (0.0495) (0.0723) (0.0772)
SMB 0.0485 0.1187 0.1362⇤⇤⇤ 0.0215  0.0661
(0.0632) (0.0891) (0.0523) (0.0923) (0.1008)
HML 0.3722⇤⇤⇤ 0.4800⇤⇤⇤ 0.1057 0.3719⇤⇤⇤ 0.6384⇤⇤⇤
(0.0969) (0.1353) (0.0875) (0.1322) (0.1471)
Mom  0.2853⇤⇤⇤  0.3177⇤⇤⇤  0.1584⇤⇤⇤  0.1934⇤⇤  0.3203⇤⇤⇤
(0.0679) (0.0956) (0.0508) (0.0944) (0.1036)
BAB  0.1114  0.1956⇤  0.0916  0.2424⇤⇤  0.2622⇤⇤
(0.0697) (0.1071) (0.0721) (0.1042) (0.1161)
Alpha 0.0059⇤⇤⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0026 0.0064⇤⇤ 0.0097⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Adjusted R2 0.8603 0.4449 0.8780 0.3178 0.4386
Panel (b) Include recession indicator





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt 1.2572⇤⇤⇤ 0.3511⇤⇤⇤ 1.1837⇤⇤⇤ 0.2376⇤⇤⇤ 0.3111⇤⇤⇤
(0.0436) (0.0741) (0.0462) (0.0729) (0.0816)
SMB 0.0408 0.0737 0.1415⇤⇤⇤ 0.0132  0.0875
(0.0633) (0.0924) (0.0513) (0.0957) (0.1034)
HML 0.3858⇤⇤⇤ 0.5290⇤⇤⇤ 0.0867 0.3559⇤⇤⇤ 0.6551⇤⇤⇤
(0.0989) (0.1350) (0.0905) (0.1366) (0.1506)
Mom  0.2918⇤⇤⇤  0.3293⇤⇤⇤  0.1663⇤⇤⇤  0.2068⇤⇤  0.3323⇤⇤⇤
(0.0611) (0.0977) (0.0482) (0.0913) (0.0999)
BAB  0.1204⇤  0.1917⇤  0.0861  0.2401⇤⇤  0.2744⇤⇤
(0.0703) (0.1153) (0.0703) (0.0996) (0.1136)
IRec 0.0038 0.0050  0.0013 0.0017 0.0068
(0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0066)
Alpha 0.0056⇤⇤⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0027 0.0063⇤⇤ 0.0092⇤⇤⇤
(0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Adjusted R2 0.8584 0.4280 0.8733 0.3223 0.4483
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.11: Results of time series regression considering sentiment from February 1995 to January
2016. Dependent variables are return differences between different high EP portfolios and low EP
portfolios as defined in Section 4.4.1, or their excess returns to 3-month Treasury bill. Independent
variables are common factors including the Fama-French 3 factors (Mkt-RF, SMB, HML), the momen-
tum factor (Mom), the betting-against-beta factor (BAB) and the NBER based recession indicator (IRec).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey and West, 1987)
with a lag of 3 months.
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very similar to the baseline model. In unreported tests, I also construct EP under elastic
regularization with equal weighted `1-norm penalty (lasso) and `2-norm penalty (ridge).
The alphas are only about one third of their original sizes, and increase as the weight on
`2-norm penalty increases. In conclusion, similar to what I observe in Section 4.3.2, using
all f eatures to construct EP instead of one or two of them is essential to the results.
Finally, I test if the results hold when fitting an non-linear model. I run zero-inflated
negative binomial regressions to model the frequency (count number) of media coverage
and the probability of being covered at the same time:
E[mentioni|Xi,Zi] = (1 pi)µi and Var(mentioni|Xi,Zi) = (1 pi)(µi +µ2i /q)
where pi = e
b0Xi
1+eb0X
, µi = eb
0
ZZi . In Xi I include all the variables on the RHS of Regression 4.1
while in Zi I exclude fixed effects. Then analogously, I use the projection on the eight fea-
tures in Xi as my estimation for editor preference. Panel (c) in Table 4.12 shows the return
difference between portfolios sorting on this differently estimated EP. The alphas are very
significant and are only slightly smaller than the baseline ones. This nuance is expected
since compared to my original linear model, EP here only accounts for the correlation
between firm features and number of mentions conditioning on being covered already.
4.5 Conclusion
Using articles from the New York Times over 20 years, I show that editors have state-
dependent preference for different types of firms. Moreover, I construct a variable EP to
measure the editor preference for common characteristics of firms. After that, I show that
firms with high EP earn higher returns than firms with low EP, no matter if I consider news-
covered firms or non-covered ones. By constructing corresponding long-short portfolios, I
exploit sizable and significant alphas that cannot be explained by mainstream risk factors.
Our findings validate previous theories that argue that the news provide a larger service
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Panel (a) Using number of articles





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt-RF 1.2999⇤⇤⇤ 0.3945⇤⇤⇤ 1.1775⇤⇤⇤ 0.2244⇤⇤⇤ 0.3469⇤⇤⇤
(0.0538) (0.0692) (0.0439) (0.0537) (0.0799)
SMB  0.0196 0.1276 0.1704⇤⇤⇤ 0.1242⇤  0.0659
(0.0702) (0.0982) (0.0460) (0.0693) (0.0821)
HML 0.3960⇤⇤⇤ 0.4002⇤⇤⇤ 0.0476 0.1577 0.5062⇤⇤⇤
(0.1114) (0.1516) (0.0729) (0.1031) (0.1147)
Mom  0.2988⇤⇤⇤  0.2850⇤⇤⇤  0.1706⇤⇤⇤  0.1997⇤⇤⇤  0.3279⇤⇤⇤
(0.0620) (0.0776) (0.0468) (0.0614) (0.0710)
BAB  0.2182⇤⇤  0.3431⇤⇤⇤  0.1242⇤⇤  0.2915⇤⇤⇤  0.3855⇤⇤⇤
(0.0897) (0.1155) (0.0611) (0.0674) (0.0930)
Alpha 0.0059⇤⇤⇤ 0.0072⇤⇤ 0.0026 0.0063⇤⇤ 0.0095⇤⇤⇤
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0033)
Adjusted R2 0.9063 0.4907 0.8998 0.3982 0.4924
Panel (b) Ridge regularization





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt-RF 1.2420⇤⇤⇤ 0.3406⇤⇤⇤ 1.1708⇤⇤⇤ 0.2576⇤⇤⇤ 0.3288⇤⇤⇤
(0.0444) (0.0644) (0.0524) (0.0653) (0.0695)
SMB 0.0914 0.1485⇤ 0.1256⇤⇤ 0.0182  0.0160
(0.0673) (0.0864) (0.0574) (0.0961) (0.0996)
HML 0.3233⇤⇤⇤ 0.3222⇤⇤⇤  0.0242 0.1001 0.4476⇤⇤⇤
(0.1010) (0.1121) (0.0804) (0.1012) (0.1236)
Mom  0.2945⇤⇤⇤  0.3515⇤⇤⇤  0.1903⇤⇤⇤  0.2461⇤⇤⇤  0.3503⇤⇤⇤
(0.0710) (0.0858) (0.0478) (0.0923) (0.0961)
BAB  0.1576⇤⇤  0.2386⇤⇤  0.1115  0.2950⇤⇤⇤  0.3411⇤⇤⇤
(0.0738) (0.0964) (0.0747) (0.0901) (0.1003)
Alpha 0.0065⇤⇤⇤ 0.0069⇤⇤⇤ 0.0036⇤ 0.0068⇤⇤ 0.0096⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Adjusted R2 0.8603 0.4449 0.8780 0.3178 0.4386
(continue)
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Panel (c) Zero inflated negative binomial regression





RF Covered low RF Non-covered low Non-covered low
Mkt-RF 1.2177⇤⇤⇤ 0.3169⇤⇤⇤ 1.1475⇤⇤⇤ 0.1861⇤⇤⇤ 0.2563⇤⇤⇤
(0.0386) (0.0545) (0.0391) (0.0617) (0.0880)
SMB 0.1176⇤⇤ 0.1647⇤⇤ 0.1381⇤⇤⇤ 0.0046  0.0159
(0.0581) (0.0806) (0.0471) (0.0824) (0.1466)
HML 0.3290⇤⇤⇤ 0.3967⇤⇤⇤ 0.0711 0.2808⇤⇤ 0.5387⇤⇤⇤
(0.0911) (0.1144) (0.0979) (0.1399) (0.1562)
Mom  0.2468⇤⇤⇤  0.3110⇤⇤⇤  0.1561⇤⇤⇤  0.2187⇤⇤  0.3094⇤⇤⇤
(0.0626) (0.0873) (0.0482) (0.0992) (0.1071)
BAB  0.1184⇤⇤  0.1664⇤  0.0813  0.2050⇤⇤  0.2422⇤⇤
(0.0560) (0.0866) (0.0633) (0.0864) (0.1197)
Alpha 0.0053⇤⇤⇤ 0.0055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0027⇤ 0.0055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0081⇤⇤⇤
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0028)
Adjusted R2 0.8587 0.4434 0.8786 0.3052 0.4013
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 4.12: Results of time series regression using different methods to estimate editor preference
as in Section 4.4.2 from February 1995 to January 2016. Dependent variables are return differences
between different high EP portfolios and low EP portfolios, or their excess returns with respect to
the 3-month Treasury bill as before. Independent variables are common factors including the Fama-
French 3 factors (Mkt-RF, SMB, HML), the momentum factor (Mom), and the betting-against-beta
factor (BAB). Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for serial autocorrelation using (Newey and
West, 1987) with a lag of 3 months.
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to their readers than just reporting about current events. The motivation behind editors’
choices to cover some events over the others is also of importance. In the equilibrium
between news editors and rational investors who delegate their information collection to
them, editors help investors in monitoring what kind of firms are facing more risks. In this
paper, however, I do not decompose the editor preferences into finer parts: whether it indeed
reflects editors’ opinions on the state of the economy, or it simply reflects a motivation to
attract investors irrational attention. Although I have shown some positive evidence for the
former argument, I will leave a more detailed discussion of this topic for future research.
To obtain my results, I use a natural language processing toolkit to identify compa-
nies from news. My research lies among a new genre of machine learning applications





































































































































Figure 4·2: Graphical summary of how many firms in top 500 group are covered by the news data in








































































































































Covered only, mean 0.13
Pooled, mean 0.05
Pooled + fixed effect, mean 0.03
Figure 4·3: The time series of sample absolute correlation between Âk bk,t ⇤ f eaturek,i,t and ei,t in
regression (4.1) when I use covered firms only, when I use all firms, or when I use all firms plus fixed






























































































































Figure 4·4: The monthly time series of the t-statistics of the coefficient gt in the cross-sectional regres-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4·5: The monthly time series of t-statistics of the coefficients bk,t in the cross-sectional Regres-
sion (4.1) and the variables are defined in 4.2.3. The data is from January 1995 to December 2015. The






















































































































































































































































Figure 4·6: Cumulative returns of investing $1 into the portfolios with monthly rebalancing from Febru-
ary 1995 to January 2016. These portfolios are defined as in Section 4.2.3. All portfolios are constructed
at the end of each news forming month t in my data and the investment returns are calculated using the
simple stock return in the next month t +1. Pooled portfolios mean that the sorting is conducted among
all 500 largest firms without identifying covered firms. The grey lines mark months that are in recession
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Figure 4·7: Seasonal effect analysis. The first panel shows the average monthly alphas of three EP-
related long-short portfolios in different seasons. The second panel shows the average standard deviation




This dissertation examines an important topic in asset pricing using news data: how do the
linkages between assets drive the co-movement between them? In Chapter 2, we find that
news tends to report distressed links between firms, through which risks become contagious
and induce predictability on both firm level and aggregate level. In contrast, such news
implied links tell a competition story instead between cryptocurrencies, which shows an
opposite direction of predictability and is documented in Chapter 3.
These empirical findings are difficult to achieve if we want to figure out the links be-
tween firms or cryptos with more traditional data. The complicated economic nature of
business relationship in modern society makes such data less timely and hence less instruc-
tive for practice. Even though there ever exits a detailed network that is being updated on
a timely basis, information processing is equally challenging for each investor alone. Thus
to say, there is a trade off between timeliness and completeness of links data. News im-
plied links, however, hold a good balance by providing high frequency information without
sacrificing too much completeness. By reporting only distressed firms and their potential
competitors or partners, news direct investors attention to a highlighted local network that
plays more important role in the current state than the rest of a complete business network.
The reason that news outlets have such capability and willingness to gather information is
that investors cannot allocate their limited attentions to noisy information that is generated
every moment. Therefore they choose to delegate their information choices to news outlets
and let them to decide which news require more focus on.
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This theoretical assumption inspires Chapter 4, in which we look at what features of
firms are preferred by news in different periods. If we further posit that investors are more
sensitive to riskier firms and so are news editors, then a rational conclusion will be that firms
with higher editors preference should be required higher returns for risk compensation.
Chapter 4 verifies this posit empirically. We find that firms with more preferred features in
a given month earn significant higher returns in the next month than firms with less features.
Moreover, it does not matter much if the firms are reported at all in the news. It implies that
news coverage as a signal for current states indeed affects investors investment decisions,
and investors not just focus on those firms that are exactly reported by news outlets. All in
one, we consolidate news as a channel through which investors revise their perspectives of
markets from time to time.
All the empirical methods in this dissertation rely on textual analysis on news articles.
The development of machine learning algorithms and tools benefit more and more research
in many areas, including this dissertation. Without corresponding NLP tools, we can hardly
use news as an alternative data and apply any textual analysis in this dissertation. We
believe in the near future, more advanced tools will be developed and more interesting
alternative data will be discovered. As a result, many news questions will be asked, but
more answered will be provided by researchers.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Methodology
We lay out the steps that go into our methodology to take news articles as input and output
a network of firm connections implied by the news.
A.1.1 Processing the raw text data
The news article can be viewed as a collection of sentences, each of which is a collection of
words that play different roles in purveying information: nouns, verbs, adjectives, and so
on. Our goal is to extract from the news articles tupels of the type E = (F1,F2,T ), where F1
and F2 are connected firms and T is a time stamp indicating the date when the connection
was observed. Given that firms are by definition nouns, it is necessary that we take individ-
ual words from a news article and label each word as the part of speech they correspond to
(verb, noun, etc.). This goal can be accomplished using natural language processing (NLP)
algorithms, which are readily available nowadays. We use the Stanford coreNLP toolkit
available in R (see (Manning et al., 2014)). The coreNLP toolkit is one of the most popu-
lar natural language processing (NLP) toolkits among academics and practitioners. (Atdag
and Labatut, 2013) and (Pinto et al., 2016) demonstrate the high accuracy of the coreNLP
toolkit, which often outperforms available alternatives for the purpose of natural language
processing.
A benefit of using the coreNLP toolkit is that it does not require preprocessing the data.
We can feed in the raw news articles to the coreNLP algorithms, and it will output a matrix
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of words with its corresponding part-of-speech labels. It extracts words from the news
article and it assigns a universal part-of-speech tag (“upos”).1 The output contains one row
per token, which can be either an individual word or a collection of words that naturally
belong together. For each token, the output also keeps track of the document in which the
token can be found (“id”), the number of the sentence (from top to bottom) in which the
token can be found in the article (“sid”), and a unique identifier for the token within the
article (“tid”). We refer to (Arnold, 2017) for a detailed overview of the coreNLP package
and its output.
A.1.2 Identifying firms
We process the output of the coreNLP toolkit to identify firms from our text data. For
this, we use a specially developed algorithm called named entity recognition (NER) that is
available within the coreNLP toolkit (see (Finkel et al., 2005) for an introduction). Given
a collection of tokens extracted from the data, NER can identify whether a token refers to
an “entity.” It can also classify the type of entity the token is referring to. More precisely,
the NER algorithm in the coreNLP toolkit aims to recognize named entities (“PERSON”,
“LOCATION”, “ORGANIZATION”, “MISC”), numerical entities (“MONEY”, “NUM-
BER”, “ORDINAL”, “PERCENT”), and temporal entities (“DATE”, “TIME”, “DURA-
TION”, “SET”). The NER algorithm of the coreNLP toolkit has been demonstrated to be
highly accurate, with accuracy rates in the order of 80% (see (Costa et al., 2017)). Section
2.3.1 also shows that the NER algorithm has an accuracy rate of 84% in a subsample of our
data. We feel confident delegating the recognition of firms to the NER algorithm given its
demonstrated accuracy.
We run the NER algorithm on our data and collect all tokens with the classification
“ORGANIZATION.” We then remove from the set of recognized organizations all entities
1The definitions of the different upos tags can be found at http://universaldependencies.org/u/
pos/.
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administration agency airport charities
charity commission committee congress
congressional cooperation council court
democrats department embassy exchange
federal federation foundation group of eight
group of seven group of twenty guardian institute
journal league media ministry
news parliament parliamentary policy
republicans school senate times
university USA Today
Table A.1: Words that indicate that an organization identified by the NER Algorithm is not a corpo-
ration. We exclude from our analysis any organization whose name includes any of the words in this
table.
that are not corporations (we say an organization is a non-corporate if its name includes
any of the words in Table A.1). Even though the NER algorithm has high accuracy for
recognizing whether a token is an organization or not, the output of NER may contain
a non-negligible amount of error in identifying the name of the organization due to they
way the article is written or just because different names can refer to one and the same
organization (think of this as being “rounding” errors). For example, for an article about
Toyota, NER may recognize “Toyota”, “$700 million Deal by Toyota,” “Toyota USA,”
“Toyota Motor Corporation,” “Toyota Motor Credit,” “Toyota Motors,” and “Japan-based
Toyota Motor Corporation” as different organizations. As human beings, we immediately
realize that all of these tokens refer to the same firm, namely “Toyota.” But how can we
teach this to a computer? One way is to construct a dictionary containing all the names
that people may use for each company. But constructing and maintaining such a dictionary
would require a large amount of manual work. It would also yield a static dictionary that
would have to be updated every time a new firm enters the market. To circumvent these
issues, we propose an alternative procedure.
We remove from the name assigned by NER to a firm all special symbols, and unrea-
sonable postfixes such as “-based.” We then remove all words that indicate business types
(like “Co.,” “Inc.,” and “Ltd.”). In the example above, this approach would leave us with
“Toyota,” “Deal Toyota,” “Toyota USA,” “Toyota Motor,” “Toyota Motor Credit,” “Toyota
Motor,” and “Toyota Motor". In a final step, we create a cluster of all firms with common
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words in their names and consider the most frequently mentioned entity name as the stem.
Let FS be the collection of firms in the cluster whose name is equal to the stem. For any
firm j /2 FS, we check whether the name of j is fully contained in the stem or the stem is
fully contained in the name of j. If so, we add j to the FS and we update the stem to be
either the name of j or the prevalent stem, whichever is shorter. If not, then we remove j
from the original cluster. We proceed iteratively until no more improvements of the firm
name can be made. In our Toyota example, we would begin by calling “Toyota Motor”
the stem given that it is the most prevalent name. We would then iterate through the firms
named “Toyota,” “Deal Toyota,” “Toyota USA,” and “Toyota Motor Credit.” Given that
“Toyota” is the shortest name fully contained in the stem, we would update “Toyota” to be
the new stem. Then, because “Toyota” is contained in all other firm names in this cluster,
we would update all other names to “Toyota” and terminate the iteration.
In a final step, we match the firms identified in the previous steps with firms in the
merged CRSP / Compustat database. We trim the full legal names of firms in CRSP /
Compustat using the same approach laid out above. We match a firm in our sample with
a firm in CRSP / Compustat according to the following heuristic. We match a first set
of firms if the name of one of our firms is exactly equal to the trimmed legal name of a
CRSP / Compustat firm. For all unmatched firms, check whether the name of a firm in our
sample (including all of its blank spaces) is contained in a trimmed legal name of a CRSP /
Compustat firm, and match if positive. For firms that remain unmatched, check whether the
name of a firm is contained in the ticker of a CRSP / Compustat firm, and match if positive.
For all firms that remain unmatched after these steps, check whether the name of a firm is
contained in the trimmed legal name of a CRSP / Compstat firm or vice versa, and match
if positive. All remaining unmatched firms are excluded from our analysis.
There are a few drawbacks of our approach. A first drawback is that we may often
aggregate subsidiary firms and their mother firms (Toyota Motor Credit and Toyota in our
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example). A second drawback is that we may end up with the shortest nickname of a firm
instead of its full official name. This poses difficulties when matching our firms to other
databases, such as CRSP and Compustat. Furthermore, if a firm has a short name and this
firm is very prevalent in our data, then other less prevalent firms may be clustered with the
more prevalent firm if they have longer names that include the short name. For example,
“Delta” and “Delta Dental” may be merged together even though they refer to different
firms. We find that these errors occurs only sporadically in the data. Section 2.3.1 studies
a subsample of our data for which we can verify the correctness of our algorithm, and
establishes that our approach has an accuracy rate of 73%. That is, over 70% of all firm
mentions in the subsample are correctly matched with a firm in our data. These results
suggest that our approach is highly accurate. Still, we manually adjust a few firm names
in our codes to prevent any major mismatches in the data. The manual adjustments are
identified with the string “# MANUAL ADJUSTMENT #” in the R files that are available
for download at http://www.gustavo-schwenkler.com.
A.1.3 Identifying connections between firms
Once all firms are identified, we proceed to construct the tupels E = (F1,F2,T ) of con-
nected firms. Our identifying assumption is that if two firms share some sort of business
connections, then the news should report about this connection by mentioning both firms
in the same news article within close proximity from each other. Based on this assumption,
we identify a tupel E = (F1,F2,T ) whenever firms F1 and F2 are mentioned in the same
sentence in an article published on date T .
A.1.4 Building the network
In a final step, we collect all tupels E = (F1,F2,T ) of firm connections and aggregate them
across time. We plot the collection of business connection in network form using the pack-
age “igraph” in R. An example of a network implied by our news data can be found in
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Figure 2·3 of the main body of the paper. Each node corresponds to a corporation. The size
of the node is proportional to the number of times that corporation appears in one of the
tupels E = (F1,F2,T ) either as F1 or F2. The width of the links between firm F1 and firm
F2 is proportional to the number of times F1 and F2 are identified to be in a relationship.
We can aggregate the connections at different frequencies, allowing us to build time
series of networks implied by the news data. For example, we can aggregate all tupels
E = (F1,F2,T ) for which T falls in a specific month and roll this over month by month.
Doing this would give us a monthly time series of news-implied networks.
A.2 Article co-mentions
We establish a link between two firms whenever they are mentioned in the same sentence of
a news article. An alternative approach pursued by (Scherbina and Schlusche, 2016) con-
sists of saying that two firms are linked whenever they are mentioned in the same article,
regardless of whether they are mentioned in the same sentence or not. Such an approach
is advocated by Thomson Reuters’ news analytics service, which tags news articles in its
database with the Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC) of the firms mentioned in an article. We
argue that our approach provides a robust and better performing alternative to relying on
co-mentions of firms or RIC. In our validation analysis in Section 2.3.1, we show that our
methodology identifies about 60% more firms in news data than an alternative approach
that relies on the availability of RIC. Simply put, RIC are not available for all firms. The
firms that have RIC and are identified in the news data tend to be larger firms with smaller
volatility and more assets, cash, debt, sales, expenses, and net income. This means that an
approach that identifies firms through their RIC yields a sample of firms that is biased to-
wards larger and more successful firms. In contrast, our approach identifies a large number
of small firms, firms with stocks that are traded only over-the-counter, as well as private
firms. Our approach identifies a richer cross-section of firms than an alternative approach
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based on RIC.
Even when using our methodology to identify firms instead of relying on RIC, estab-
lishing a link between two firms whenever they are mentioned in the same sentence yields
a more succinct view of a network of firm interconnections than an alternative approach
that establishes a link if the firms a co-mentioned in an article. Figure A·1 shows the net-
works of firms implied by our news data if we were to establish a link if two firms are
co-mentioned in the same article or in the same sentence of an article. For simplicity, we
only include the 50 most frequently identified firms in the network of article co-mentioned
firms and consider the same set of firms for the network of sentence co-mentioned firms.
We mark in red any link that is included in the network of article co-mentioned firms but
not in the network of sentence co-mentioned firms. We see that a network based on article
co-mentions is more dense than a network based on sentence co-mentions. The network of
article co-mentions appears to have a mesh architecture, where many nodes are connected
with many nodes. In contrast, the network based on sentence co-mentions showcases a
star architecture with few large nodes being connected with many small nodes. The star
architecture typically applies for economic networks, such as the network of sectoral input-
output flows (see (Acemoglu et al., 2012)).
We compare the information contained in the network of sentence co-mentioned firms
versus the network of the article co-mentioned firms. For both approaches, we construct
monthly networks implied the news data in a given month and compute the following sum-
mary statistics of the network architecture (see Section 2.4.2 for a description):
1. The average degree of the network.
2. The first-order interconnectivity measure of (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
3. The second-order interconnectivity measure of (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
We show in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 that these three network architecture measures capture
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(a) Network of firms that are co-mentioned in the
same article.
(b) Network of firms that are co-mentioned in the
same sentence.
Figure A·1: Networks implied by our news data if we assume that two firms are linked when they are
mentioned in the same article or in the same sentence of an article.
the degree of connectivity in a network and are closely associated with aggregate measures
of risk. Table A.2 shows that the connectivity measures of the article co-mention network
are closely spanned by the connectivity measures of the sentence co-mention network. The
sentence co-mention connectivity measures capture at least half of the time-series variation
of the connectivity measures of the article co-mention network. These results suggest that
our sentence-based approach captures a majority of the information that could be extracted
from news data if one were to build networks based on firms mentioned in the same article.
We ask whether we miss any significant information by focusing on sentence-based
links rather than article-based links. For this, we repeat some of the analysis of Section 2.5
but now we include the residuals of the regressions of Table A.2 that capture the information
that we neglect by not considering firms linked across sentences of an article. Section 2.6
shows that the average degree of our sentence-based network is closely related to measures
of financial uncertainty that drive short-term fluctuations of aggregate risk measures. We
ask whether the residuals of Table A.2 also contain information about financial uncertainty
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Average degree First-order IC Second-order IC
(article co-mention) (article co-mention) (article co-mention)
Intercept * 5.479 *** 1.108 ** 0.025
(2.427) (6.567) (3.058)
Average degree *** 2.129
(sentence co-mention) (18.803)
First-order IC *** 0.447
(sentence co-mention) (9.355)
Second-order IC *** 0.920
(sentence co-mention) (12.258)
Number of observations 85 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.507 0.640
Table A.2: Regressions of the average degree, the first-order interconnectivity, and the second-order in-
terconnectivity of the article co-mention network on the analogous measures of the sentence co-mention
network. The time series are monthly. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, *, and · denote
significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
VIX VXO Financial uncertainty Financial uncertainty EMV index((Jurado et al., 2015)) ((Carriero et al., 2018)) ((Baker et al., 2019))
Intercept *  3.657 *  4.276 0.008  0.062  0.604
( 2.167) ( 2.452) (0.411) ( 0.815) ( 0.234)
Lagged value *** 0.760 *** 0.751 *** 0.937 *** 0.796 *** 0.367
(14.992) (14.690) (42.794) (14.803) (4.359)
Average degree *** 0.480 *** 0.521 *** 0.003 *** 0.015 *** 0.775
(sentence) (5.560) (5.620) (3.492) (3.584) (5.813)
Degree residual 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.190
(article) (0.053) (0.132) (0.572) (0.104) (1.608)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.820 0.970 0.820 0.510
Table A.3: Regressions of several measures of financial uncertainty on their lagged values and con-
temporaneous values of the average degree of the network of sentence co-mentioned firms measures as
well as the residual of the average degree of the network of article co-mentioned firms implied by the
regression of Table A.2. The time series are monthly. The data is the same as the one used in Section
2.5. The values in parentheses give t-statistics. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%,
95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
that we are neglecting in our analysis. Table A.3 reports the results of regressions of several
measures of financial uncertain on their lagged values, the average degree of our sentence-
based network, and the average degree residual of the article co-mention network. We find
that the average degree of the article co-mention network does not contain any significant
information about financial uncertainty that is not already contained in the average degree
of our sentence-based network. As a result, there is no relevant information about financial
uncertainty that we are neglecting by focusing on sentence-based links rather than article-
based links.
Section 2.6 also shows that the second-order interconnectivity measure is predictive
of future default activity. We ask whether we lose predictive power by not considering
links across sentences of an article. We estimate a monthly one-lag vector autoregressive
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(VAR) model for the joint dynamics of our second-order interconnectivity measure, the
residual of the second-order interconnectivity of the article co-mention network, the ag-
gregate default rate, the GDP growth rate, and a contagion factor estimated by (Azizpour
et al., 2018) that measures default activity due to contagion from defaulted counterparties.
Figure A·2 shows the implied impulse response functions for the aggregate default rate and
the contagion factor, together with 90% confidence intervals, after one-standard deviation
orthogonal shocks to the sentence-based second-order interconnectivity measure and the
residual of the article-based second-order interconnectivity measure. We see that shocks
to the second-order interconnectivity measure of our sentence-based network predict sig-
nificant and persistent increases in the aggregate default rate and the contagion factor of
(Azizpour et al., 2018). However, shocks to the residual of the second-order interconnec-
tivity measure of the article-based network do not trigger any significant increases in the
aggregate default rate or the contagion factor. These results suggest that we do not lose pre-
dictive power by considering the network of firm links implied by sentence co-mentioned
firms rather than article co-mentioned firms.
All in one, the results of this section indicate that our approach is robust to alternative
choices for how we define links between firms. The results also imply that the majority of
the information contained in the news about economically relevant links between firms is
expressed in single sentences rather than across sentences of an article.
A.3 Robustness
We present robustness tests for the results of Section 2.5. We begin by running logistic
regressions as in Tables 2.10 and 2.12 for the likelihood of observing a link between two
firms conditional on characteristics of the link, the linked firms, and the macroeconomic
state. Now, however, we include individual fixed effects for the linked firms instead of a














































(b) Impulse response functions of the contagion factor to orthogonal shocks in the con-
nectivity measures.
Figure A·2: Impulse response functions for the aggregate default rate in the U.S. and the contagion
factor of (Azizpour et al., 2018) based on one-standard deviation orthogonal shocks to second-order
interconnectivity of the network of sentence co-mentions and the residual of second-order interconnec-
tivity of the network of article co-mentions implied by the regression of Table A.2. The impulse response
functions are implied by a monthly one-lag VAR model for the joint dynamics of GDP growth, the ag-
gregate default rate, the contagion factor, and second-order interconnectivity measure of the sentence
co-mention network, and the residual of a regression of the second-order interconnectivity of the article
co-mention network on the corresponding measure of the sentence co-mention network. Identification
is based on a Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix. We estimate the VAR
model using default timing data obtained from Moody’s Default Risk Service. We measure the aggre-
gate default rate as the ratio of the number of defaults observed in a month over the number of days in
that month (see Table 2.11 for summary statistics). The red lines in the impulse response functions give
the average responses and the grey areas give 90% confidence bands computed via bootstrap with 1000
bootstrap samples.
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identified links in our data and create monthly time series of link-level dummy variables
that indicate whether in a given month we identified a link between the two firms. Table
A.4 summarizes our findings. Column (1) shows the results when we randomly assign the
labels “Firm 1” and “Firm 2” between the two linked firms, while Column (2) shows the
results when we rank the firms in a link according to their market size. We find that the
results of Tables 2.10 and 2.12 do not change if we include firm fixed effects rather than
link fixed effects. The link likelihood is significantly higher if one of the two firms has
high volatility, negative income, or declines in earnings estimates. Equally, it is more likely
to observe a link between two firms when the smaller firm experiences credit declines
or negative stock returns. These observations indicate that our results are not driven by
uncontrolled differences in the frequency with which the news reports about individual
firms.
One may be concerned that our results are driven by the extreme financial crisis expe-
rienced in 2008 and 2009. To address these concerns, we repeat the experiment of Tables
2.10 and A.4 after excluding any link observed between December 2007 and June 2009,
which is the period that corresponds to the financial crisis according to the NBER recession
dates. Table A.5 summarizes our findings. We find that the likelihood of observing a link
in this non-crisis sample is also higher when one of the two firms experiences distress and,
in particular, when the smaller linked firm experiences financial distress.
One additional concern one may have is that our sample of the 3,000 most frequently
identified links includes many links between firms with starkly different market capitaliza-
tions (i.e., links between few extremely large firms and many small firms). Such a situation
would bias our estimates towards finding the characteristics of the smaller firms more rel-
evant. We evaluate whether this is the case by repeating the experiments of Table 2.10 and
2.12 in the set of links that are shared among the 500 largest firms in our sample. This
approach should not be affected by the aforementioned bias. Table A.6 reports the results,
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Firm 1 is random Firm 1 is larger




(Return)+ 0.079 0.091 0.206 0.052
(0.584) (0.441) (0.912) (0.168)
(Return)  ·  0.218  0.173 0.005 0.055
( 1.755) ( 1.203) (0.027) (0.249)
Volatility *** 1.382 *** 1.353 *** 1.402 *** 1.623
(8.478) (5.356) (5.109) (4.612)
Upgrade dummy  0.055 0.106  0.024 0.109
( 0.406) (0.604) ( 0.144) (0.524)
Downgrade dummy *** 0.219 · 0.179 0.003  0.042
(3.336) (1.863) (0.024) ( 0.272)
Revisions up 0.004 0.004
(1.119) (0.676)
Revisions down ** 0.013 0.006
(3.292) (1.331)
Earnings surprise 0.017  0.008
(1.043) ( 0.202)
(Net income)+  16.497 21.525 ·  37.178  27.005
(x 10 6) ( 1.245) (1.175) ( 1.953) ( 1.039)
(Net income)  **  20.542 *  32.026 **  25.427  29.053
(x 10 6) ( 3.317) ( 2.185) ( 2.676) ( 1.059)
Market cap *** 3.527 *** 2.843 * 1.726 · 1.794
(x 10 6) (6.418) (4.913) (2.246) (1.841)
Analyst coverage 0.000  0.003 0.002 0.004




(Return)+ 0.010  0.013  0.011 0.106
(0.069) ( 0.069) ( 0.083) (0.542)
(Return)  ·  0.181  0.003 ***  0.408 *  0.272
( 1.812) ( 0.015) ( 3.804) ( 2.006)
Volatility *** 1.244 *** 1.336 *** 1.291 *** 1.206
(6.378) (5.323) (6.779) (3.466)
Upgrade dummy 0.070 0.169 0.053 0.181
(0.758) (1.379) (0.557) (1.433)
Downgrade dummy * 0.198 0.143 *** 0.353 ** 0.297
(2.560) (1.498) (4.246) (2.866)
Revisions up 0.004 0.006
(1.078) (1.613)
Revisions down ** 0.011 *** 0.019
(2.987) (4.164)
Earnings surprise 0.012 0.025
(0.434) (0.801)
(Net income)+  0.454 9.358 · 35.021 *** 119.493
(x 10 6) ( 0.035) (0.455) (1.955) (4.281)
(Net income)  ***  18.691 **  42.598 ***  16.995 ***  48.336
(x 10 6) ( 4.493) ( 3.107) ( 3.765) ( 3.749)
Market cap *** 3.037 *** 2.987 *** 7.515 *** 5.857
(x 10 6) (5.359) (3.953) (6.368) (3.617)
Analyst coverage 0.001 ·  0.003 * 0.000  0.009
(0.505) ( 0.874) (0.130) ( 1.570)
Link-month obs. 81416 48479 81416 48479
Positive obs. 13734 8133 13734 8133
Unique links 1927 1156 1927 1156
Unique firms 525 361 525 361
Table A.4: Logit regressions of dummies that indicate whether in a given month we identified at least
one link between two firms. We consider the 3,000 most frequently observed links in the data. Summary
statistics of all factors are given in Tables 2.11–2.10. Albeit unreported, each regression includes an
intercept, dummies for whether the two linked firms are in the same industry or sector, the S&P 500
return, the VIX level, the industrial production growth rate, the level of the yield curve, as well as time
and firm fixed effects. The values in parentheses give z-statistics. Standard errors are based on sandwich
estimators clustered by firm and month. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%,
and 90% levels.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)




(Return)+ 0.221 0.220 0.221 0.220
(0.754) (0.651) (0.763) (0.522)
(Return)  **  0.609  0.451 *  0.609  0.451
( 2.745) ( 1.417) ( 2.365) ( 1.055)
Volatility *** 2.026 ** 1.930 *** 2.026 * 1.930
(4.656) (3.173) (4.339) (2.141)
Upgrade dummy 0.117  0.035 0.117  0.035
(0.729) ( 0.199) (0.627) ( 0.161)
Downgrade dummy 0.183 0.065 0.183 0.065
(1.070) (0.357) (1.050) (0.318)
Revisions up 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.989) (0.918) (0.984) (0.580)
Revisions down * 0.010 0.005 * 0.010 0.005
(2.448) (1.084) (2.246) (0.700)
Earnings surprise 0.035 0.009 * 0.035 0.009
(1.398) (0.248) (2.148) (0.225)
(Net income)+ · 33.666  19.506 · 33.666  19.506
(x 10 6) (1.750) ( 0.985) (1.395) ( 0.567)
(Net income)  ***  122.553 ***  96.465 ***  122.553 ***  96.465
(x 10 6) ( 6.286) ( 5.349) ( 6.812) ( 6.140)
Market cap *** 2.803 ** 1.747 *** 2.803 1.747
(x 10 6) (5.227) (2.658) (3.923) (1.505)
Analyst coverage  0.002 0.004  0.002 0.004




(Return)+ 0.056 0.237 0.056 0.237
(0.190) (0.876) (0.171) (0.882)
(Return)  ·  0.385 **  0.604 ·  0.385 **  0.604
( 1.689) ( 2.942) ( 1.683) ( 3.206)
Volatility *** 2.035 *** 2.428 *** 2.035 *** 2.428
(4.727) (5.163) (4.296) (4.452)
Upgrade dummy 0.146 · 0.255 0.146 * 0.255
(0.927) (1.834) (0.947) (1.990)
Downgrade dummy * 0.405 ** 0.430 ** 0.405 ** 0.430
(2.480) (2.864) (2.626) (2.746)
Revisions up 0.006 · 0.008 0.006 0.008
(1.426) (1.654) (1.331) (1.627)
Revisions down ** 0.012 *** 0.018 * 0.012 ** 0.018
(3.282) (3.838) (2.372) (3.179)
Earnings surprise 0.025 0.043 0.025 0.043
(0.793) (1.287) (0.844) (1.293)
(Net income)+ 15.077 *** 115.320 15.077 *** 115.320
(x 10 6) (0.745) (4.262) (0.550) (4.049)
(Net income)  ***  107.349 ***  156.214 ***  107.349 ***  156.214
(x 10 6) ( 5.533) ( 5.213) ( 5.707) ( 5.417)
Market cap *** 3.249 *** 6.451 *** 3.249 *** 6.451
(x 10 6) (5.963) (5.556) (3.825) (4.331)
Analyst coverage  0.006 *  0.010  0.006 ·  0.010
( 1.591) ( 2.049) ( 1.490) ( 1.662)
Link-month obs. 32958 32958 32958 32958
Positive obs. 5335 5335 5335 5335
Unique links 1141 1141 1141 1141
Unique firms 357 357 357 357
Fixed effects Link, time Firm, time Link, time Firm, time
Table A.5: Logit regressions of monthly link dummies. We consider the 3,000 most frequently iden-
tified links and exclude links observed between December 2007 and June 2009. Summary statistics of
all factors are given in Tables 2.11–2.10. Albeit unreported, each regression includes an intercept, same
industry and same sector dummies, the S&P 500 return, the VIX level, the industrial production growth
rate, the level of the yield curve. The values in parentheses give z-statistics. Standard errors are based
on sandwich estimators. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% levels.
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Intercept ***  4.416 ***  4.416
( 54.872) ( 35.713)
max{Return of larger firm, 0} · 0.278 0.278
(1.757) (1.134)
max{Return of smaller firm, 0} 0.163 0.163
(1.340) (1.196)
min{Return of larger firm, 0} 0.045 0.045
(0.367) (0.211)
min{Return of smaller firm, 0} ***  0.574 ***  0.574
( 6.061) ( 4.737)
Volatility of larger firm *** 1.804 *** 1.804
(10.410) (4.767)
Volatility of smaller firm *** 1.875 *** 1.875
(14.819) (9.487)
Upgrade dummy of larger firm 0.002 0.002
(0.018) (0.011)
Upgrade dummy of smaller firm  0.060  0.060
( 0.665) ( 0.708)
Downgrade dummy of larger firm ** 0.191 · 0.191
(2.977) (1.774)
Downgrade dummy of smaller firm *** 0.410 *** 0.410
(7.088) (5.289)
Net income of larger firm ***  30.219 **  30.219
(x 10 6) ( 6.574) ( 2.809)
Net income of smaller firm ***  17.070 ***  17.070
(x 10 6) ( 5.708) ( 5.691)
Market cap of larger firm *** 2.354 ** 2.354
(x 10 6) (7.075) (2.766)
Market cap of smaller firm *** 11.898 *** 11.898
(x 10 6) (17.806) (11.287)
Both firms in same industry *** 0.355 * 0.355
(4.242) (2.335)
Both firms in same sector *** 1.201 *** 1.201
(16.551) (7.613)
S&P 500 return *** 0.294 *** 0.294
(12.331) (7.454)
VIX ***  0.104 ***  0.104
( 5.349) ( 3.654)
GDP growth  0.019  0.019
( 0.112) ( 0.077)
Ind. prod. growth *** 1.115 *** 1.115
(10.261) (5.634)
Yield curve level ***  0.513 ***  0.513
( 6.283) ( 3.541)
Fixed effect Link, time Firm, time
Link-month observations 286641 286641
Positive link-month observations 15816 15816
Distinct links 6342 6342
Distinct firms 414 414
Table A.6: Logit regressions of link dummies, which indicate whether in a given month we identified at
least one link between two given firms. We consider all links among the 500 largest firms in the data by
market capitalization. For every link-month observation, we call the largest (smallest) of the two linked
firms “Firm A” (“Firm B”), where size is measured by the market capitalization of a firm in that month.
Otherwise, we keep the link name fixed. Summary statistics of all factors are given in Tables 2.11–2.10.
The values in parentheses give z-statistics. Standard errors are based on sandwich estimators clustered
by link and month. ***, **, *, and · denote significance on the 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence
levels, respectively.
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where all regressions include time fixed effects but some include firm fixed effects and oth-
ers link fixed effects. We do not find evidence of biases introduced by stark discrepancies
in market sizes between linked firms. The likelihood of observing a link between two of
the 500 largest firms in our sample is still significantly driven by whether one of the firms
has large volatility, low net income, or credit downgrades, and whether the smaller of the
two linked firms showcases negative returns. The link likelihood increases by a signifi-
cantly larger amount if the smaller firm experiences a credit downgrade than if the larger
firm is downgraded: The t-statistic for the difference in the coefficient values is 2.483 with
link fixed effects and 1.580 with firm fixed effects, which are significant for the one-sided
alternative at the 99% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
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